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ABSTRACT
In the State of Rhode Island, marine fisheries are managed through the Marine
Fisheries Council, a citizen-based regulatory body of nine members from either the
commercial or recreational fishing industries or experienced with the conservation and
management of fisheries resources. To ostensibly help this group m~ke infonned
decisions, biological data and scientific advice are provided by the State Division of Fish
and Wildlife. This thesis examines the decision-making process of this Council. More
specifically, it provides a case study of how this body has attempted to manage the State's
winter flounder stocks - an economically-valuable species which confines its life cycle
mostly within state jurisdictional waters. Specific attention is paid to the manner in which
scientific recommendations are incorporated into the Council's decisions. Through
carefully examining the minutes of monthly council meetings and annual stock assessments
of the past ten years, a detailed chronology is presented of the stewardship of this species.
Upon an analysis of this information, it is concluded that the Council has generally failed to
take timely action to prevent the collapse of this fishery despite being forewarned of its
demise, and even worse, has occasionally acted in direct contradiction to the Division's
findings and recommendations.
Any attempt to revamp the Council's decision-making process must provide a
framework to better incorporate scientific advice. In recognition of this, this thesis starts
with the premise that the fundamental purpose of any management system - public or
private - is to work towards the realization and accomplishment of an organization's goals
(as specified through objectives). Through a careful review of the State's environmental
laws, it has been determined that a critical omission in Rhode Island's marine fisheries
management program is the failure to clearly define its stewardship goals. As things
currently stand, it is uncertain as to whether or not the Council is even supposed to prevent
overfishing. Consequently, to the detriment of the State's fishery resources, important
decisions arc routinely delayed or postponed indefinitely as various factions within the
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Council work towards dissimilar or diametrically opposite goaJs. Given this state of
affairs, it is therefore not surprising that the Council has been largely ineffective in
preventing the devastating collapse of the State's winter flounder stocks despite an
abundance of data forewarning of such an occurrence.
To remedy this situation, it is recommended that the State unequivocally recognize
that conservation, not allocation, is the foremost goal of its management program.
Additionally, to help meet this goal, strategies should be developed to more consistently
incorporate scientific data into the decision-making process. This study further
recommends that the system of adaptive management, as specified under the Atlantic States
Marine Fisheries Commission Striped Bass Management Plan, serve as a model to better
include biological data in the decision-making process. An underlying precept of such a
program is the need to constantly monitor stock conditions and make adjustments when
necessary. In specific reference to the State's winter flounder fishery, year class
abundance as determined through the Division of Fish and Wildlife's inshore trawl survey
can survey as an early indicator to help reach more timely and effective management
decisions. By adopting these recommendations the State can take a giant step towards
ensuring that its marine fisheries remain a viable and sustainable resource for future
generations to enjoy.
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PREFACE
As a young boy growing up in New York City, I was fortunate to have a dad who
truly appreciated being outdoors and away from the noise and congestion of the city. He
spent countless hours taking me fishing for flounder, fluke, blackfish, bluefish, and striped
bass in Long Island Sound and around Fire Island Inlet. As I got a littte older, whenever
they had time, both my mom and dad took turns dropping me off on a town dock in Port
Washington, where I spent my time trying to figure out (mostly unsuccessfully) what
would make a fish bite my lure or bait. Little did I realize at the time, that while many of
my friends were turning on to drugs, my parents had turned me on to fishing and a love for
the ocean. They helped to inspire in me an insatiable desire to be by the ocean and to learn
as much as possible about it.
With this background, it should not be surprising that I jumped at the opportunity to
get out of New York City and study for a master's degree in marine affairs at the
University of Rhode Island. At the time, the only thing I knew about Rhode Island was
that it was the smallest state in the country. However, I quickly learned what a great place
it is for those people who like to be by the ocean. While studying for my degree, I was
fortunate to land ajob with the National Marine Fisheries Service in Galilee (and eventually
in Woods Hole). Sue Murphy, my supervisor, made it a point to show me around and
introduce me to as many of the fishermen as possible. I also managed to earn a couple of
extra dollars occasionally working as a "lumper" unloading fish from one of the vessels.
At about this time, winter flounder became one of the most contentious issues in the port.
The Council was struggling to find a way to satisfy small-vessel fishermen who wanted to
keep landing flounder while somehow still conserving the stocks. To make a long story
shore, from this controversy my thesis was born.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Meeting the competing demands of conservation and allocation of marine
fisheries can be one of the most intractable environmental problems. Ideally, managers
are expected to maintain a balance, where user groups such as commercial and
recreational fishermen are restricted to harvesting only a portion of the resource while
maintaining sufficient mature fish to ensure sustainable catches into the future. This may
seem like a readily achievable aim, however in practice it has proven to be elusive. In
addition to the technical challenge of generating accurate stock assessments, a
management system must contend with a diversity of participants, each with their own
value judgements that are often dissimilar or even mutually exclusive about what is
perceived to be a good or desirable outcome in a fishery. As a result, the decision-
making process is commonly marred by infighting between different factions arguing for
their own parochial interests. During which, necessary protective measures are
commonly postponed indefinitely while each group seeks to protect or enhance its "share"
of the resource. As a result of this intense lobbying, managers, many of whom are from
the fishing industry themselves, will usually look to foremost accommodate the short-
term economic needs of fishermen instead of the biological needs of the resource.
Consequently, conservation and long-term sustainability are seldom a priority.
Unfortunately, the scenario described above is endemic to the management of
marine fisheries throughout much of the United States. While on the national level this
situation has received substantial media coverage, especially with the collapse of the New
England groundfishery and the partial shutdown of Georges Banks, less noticeable is the
similar manner in which fish stocks are administered in the coastal waters of the state of
Rhode Island. Regulatory jurisdiction over all marine finfish and shellfish found within
the state's internal and territorial waters is entrusted to the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries
Council. l The RIMFC is composed of the Director of the Department of Environmental
Management (or a designee) and eight private citizens with "skill, knowledge and
experience in the commercial fishing industry, the sport fishing industry, and in the
conservation and management of fisheries resources. "2 Its powers and duties, which
include regulating the manner, size, season, quantity, and geographic location for
harvesting fish and shellfish, are explicitly stated under Title 20, Chapter III of the
GeneraL Laws ofRhode IsLand. However, conservation standards to be adhered to, as
defined through a system of goals and objectives, are conspicuously absent. This
omission has greatly hindered the Council's effectiveness to protect some of the state's
inshore fisheries. Nowhere has this been more evident than in its inability to make timely
and substantive decisions to help conserve the dwindling supply of winter flounder
(Pleuronectes americanus).
The severe decline of the winter flounder in Narragansett Bay (since the mid
1980s) has been extensively studied by federal, state, and academic sources.3 These
groups have provided invaluable examinations of the biological habits of the local winter
flounder stocks and have gathered a critically important continuous time series of
abundance data, dating back to 1959, through several independent research surveys.
Additionally, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has also kept track of
commercial and recreational catch and effort data for this species in the coastal waters of
Rhode Island. Through annual reports and periodic updates, this infonnation has been
presented to the Council by the Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife (RIDFW).
lGeneral Laws of Rhode Island vol. 4, ch. 3, Marine Fisheries Cowlcil.
(Hereinafter referred to as "the COlUlCil" or the RIMFC)
2Ibid. at 20-3-1.
3See chapter 3 for specific details. While there are other smaller stocks of winter flounder in most of
the coastal salt ponds and south shore estuaries, this paper win niainly concentrate on the fishery in
Narragansett Bay. It is this area, because of its tremendous commercial and recreational importance, more
so than the salt ponds, which ha~ been the center of attention.
')
Yet despite being presented with an overwhelming body of evidence illustrating its
precipitous decline over the past ten years, the Council has been unable to take timely and
substantive action to help conserve this resource and prevent a near total collapse of the
fishery.
In all due fairness, it should be noted that there are a host of factors, some of
which lie outside of the Council's jurisdiction, that have contributed to the winter
flounder's decline. For example, heavy fishing pressure in federal waters, habitat
degradation, and above-average winter water temperatures have all taken a toll on this
resource. However, it will be demonstrated that, with the exception of the power plant
entrainment in Mt Hope Bay, unsustainable fishing pressure in state waters is the
overriding factor responsible for the collapse of this fishery.
A system of concise goals supported by verifiable objectives would be of
invaluable assistance in providing an underlying philosophy of conservation to help to
bind the variety of decision makers and user groups who often participate in the
management of the State's coastal fisheries. The key words here are concise and
verifiabLe, for all too often in fisheries management, goals and objectives are stated in
such a fashion that precludes measurability and fail to provide any substantive guidance.
While there is no one definitive definition, in general goals are defined as "ideals, the
major accomplishments, ends, or states of affairs to be achieved for which managers plan,
develop strategies, and direct their organizations activities. "4 Objectives help facilitate
the accomplishment of goals by providing "specific, measurable, and verifiable
statements of intermediate tasks that must be accomplished. "5 Their usage would
4willard E. Barber and John N. Taylor, "The Importance of Goals, Objectives, and Values in the
Fisheries Management Process and Organization: A Review." North American Jourual of Fisheries
Manal:ement la, no.4 (1990):367.
5lhid. at 368.
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improve a managerial system by helping to: identify conflicting activities; guide the
decision-making process; and insure accountability.6
There is a small but growing Ixxiy of literature stressing the importance of goals
and objectives to more effectively manage marine fisheries.? While these topics have
received great attention in the business community, in fisheries they have remained
mostly an afterthought.8 However, there is increasing recognition that in fisheries
management, the decision-making process is often severely impeded not so much by
scientific deficiencies but by the failure to accurately specify the goals that are to be
achieved.9 When these goals remain unstated, or ambiguously worded, or even worse, at
cross purposes with each other, the management decision-making process is prone to
degenerate into a free-for-all where each user group vociferously argues its cause and
managers are compelled to make value-laden judgements without guidance or direction.
In such a situation, the needs of fishermen routinely take precedent over the needs of the
fish stocks, and consequently the resource is rarely harvested at a sustainable level.
This project will demonstrate, through a case study of the Council's handling of
the winter flounder fishery, that the system of marine fisheries management in Rhode
Island is in serious need of revision if the resource is to be harvested on a sustainable
basis. This thesis will address two specific questions:
1. How would the establishment of an explicit set of well-defined goals
supported by verifiable objectives improve the Council's ability to adopt
substantive conservation measures in a more timely fashion?
6Ibid.
7See Alverson and Paulik (1973); Sarneccbia (1988); Barber and Taylor (1990); Hilborn and Waiters
(1992) "Objectives of Fisheries Management":22-43.
8Supra note 4 at 366.
9Supra note 4 at 370.
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2. What management system(s) currently in use could serve as a model to
implement such a strategy?
This study wiIl operate with two major assumptions in its attempt to provide
further insight into the problem.
1. The ultimate goal of any fisheries management system is to ensure that
stocks do not fall below some cri tical threshold of abundance which
wiIl jeopardize their future viability. 10 To do so, a management regime
must be proactive, not reactionary. It should attempt to develop
strategies, through careful planning, to rebuild or maintain healthy
fisheries that do not periodically collapse due to unsustainable levels of
fishing mortality.
2. The validity of the technical and biological information will not be
critiqued. This material ha~ already been reviewed and confirmed by
several eminent biologists. While misleading or contradictory scientific
recommendations will be illustrated, no evaluation wiIl be attempted to
prove or discredit the science behind the advice.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Rhode Island, the Ocean State, has a proud fishing heritage which still continues
to play an important (albeit declining) role in the social fabric of the state. Its close
proximity to the fishing grounds off of southern New England has helped to promote the
lORay Hilbom and Carl J. Walters, Quantitative Fisheries Stock Assessment: Choice, Dynamics and
Uncertainly (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc.,I992):3
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development and growth of its commercial fishing industry. In 1991, approximately
139.8 million pounds of fish were landed in its ports worth over 85.1 million dollars (ex-
vessel). I I Additionally, its productive inshore waters have fostered the development of a
vibrant recreational fishery. In 1991, recreational anglers made approximately 1.1
million fishing trips and caught over 5.5 million fish. 12 Although some importan~
commercial and recreational stocks have dramatically declined from overfishing and the
loss of critical habitat, many residents are still directly or indirectly involved in the
fishing industry for their livelihoods.
The regulation of this resource within the jurisdictional waters of the state is
delegated to the RIMFC, which has full responsibility to promulgate and adopt
regulations untethered by binding performance standards and without final approval from
a supervisory agency. This level of autonomy for a state fisheries agency is quite
unique. 13 Its membership consists of the Director of the Department of Environmental
Management (or a designee), three representatives each from the commercial and
recreational fishing industries, and two participants from the scientific community.14
Regulatory actions taken by the Council must be done pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act, which include, among other things, providing ample prior notice of
upcoming public hearings and assessing the economic impact of its regulations. 15
Additionally, members are bound by the States' conflict of interests laws and must
therefore exercise caution prior to becoming involved in an issue which might have an
IIUS. Dept. or Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Marine
Fisheries Service. Fisheries or the United States, 1991 (May 1992):4.
l2US. Dept. of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Marine
fisheries Service. Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics Swvey, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts 1990-1991
(Sept. 1992): 133, 182.
13JiU Bubier and Alison Rieser, "Conflict of Interest and Fishery Management Councils" Territorial
Sea (Uni versity of Southern Maine) 4, no. 2 (1984):4.
14Supra note 2.
15Generall..Alws of Rhode Island, vol. 6C, ell. 35, Administrative Procedures.
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impact upon their income. However, outside of these restrictions, they are free to make
decisions regarding a fishery based solely on their discretion.
The winter flounder is commonly found in the inshore and territorial waters of
New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. It was chosen for this study, because in
addition to being an important commercial and recreational species, it also tends to
remain within state jurisdictional waters throughout most uf its life cycle. Except for a
separate body of fish located on Georges Bank, it is generaliy comprised of discrete local
subgroups centered around estuarine systems and embayments.16 Unlike many other
sought-after species, which spend the majority of their time offshore and only temporarily
venture into the shoal waters off Rhode Island during the warmer months of the spring
and summer, the winter Oounder is found concentrated inshore during the coldest months
of the year, when water temperatures are at a minimum. During the fall, as water
temperatures begin to decline, it migrates into bays and estuaries where it will spawn
during the winter or early spring. As water temperatures rapidly rise during the late
spring, it disperses offshore into deeper, cooler water.
Its relatively small-scale migrations make it an ideal candidate for localized state
or regional management. Returns from tagging studies indicate that approximately ninety
percent of the winter flounder indigenous to Narragansett Bay are harvested within
nearby coastal waters. l7 According to landings reported to the NMFS, in 1990 this
species was the most commercially important (in lbs. and dollars) finfish caught in
Narragansett Bay; approximately 64,353 Ibs. of winter flounder were recorded at a value
of 61,161 dollars. 18 These figures substantially exceed the next ranking finfish of
16Ibid. US. Dept. of Commerce. National Oceanic and Almospheric Administration. Nationall\larine
Fisheries Service. Northeast Fisheries Science Center. Status of the Fishery Resources Off the Northeastem
United States (Jan. 1991): 68.
17Mark R. Gibson, Stock Assessment of Winter Rounder in Rhode Island. 1991: A Report to the Rl .
Marine Fisheries Council Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, (Nov. 1991):4.
18Sue Murphy, National Marine Fisheries Service, Personal Contact, 15 Nov. 1991. This figure most
likely under-represents the lolal catch in the bay since most small trawlers that fish this area generally land
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herring, scup, and summer llounder. 19 Its relatively high price, consistently averaging
over a dollar a pound, makes it an economically important species for small commercial
vessels, which can not safely venture far offshore.2o Additionally, it is also one of the
most higWy sought-after species for recreational fishermen. Over 36 percent of the total
regional landings of winter Ilounder since 1978 have been by recreational fishermen.21
According to the NMFS's Marine Recrcational Fisheries Statistical Survey, in the North
Atlantic subregion (which includes Rhode Island) the winter Oounder was the primary
target in 11.37 percent of its total interviews, ranking fourth behind bluefish, none (no
one specific primary species), and Atlantic cod.22
Various trends indicate that the local population of winter Oounder is in a serious
stale of decline.
1. Since 1982, there has been a 81 percent reduction in commercial catch
per unit effort (CPUE) of winter flounder in the NMFS statistical area 539
(which incluues Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, and Block Island
Sound).23 The present stock size is estimated to be less than 10 percent of
the stock size of 1982.24 (The abundance of fish in this region is heavily
dependent upon the health of the stocks from the estuaries and salt ponds
of Rhode Island.)
their catch late in the day when reporting agents are not on duty. However, the proportional distribution of
the landings is most likely reflective of the fishery.
191bid.
20lbid.
21Supra note 17 at 6.
22Supra note 12 at 99. It should be noted that as this species has declined throughout the Northeast and
subsequently has become more difficult to catch by rod and reel, its popularity amongst recreational anglers
has fallen. For instance, in 1987, when its abundance was relatively high, it ranked third and was the
intended species for 13.56 percent of tlle total interviews (Marine Recreational Fishery Statistic Survey,
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, 1987-1989), whereas in 1991 it ranked seventl1 and was the intended target 7.25
percent.
23Mark R. Gibson, Stock Assessment of Winter Rounder iIi Rhode Island, 1993 Rhode Island Division
of Fish and Wildlife, (Mar. 1994): 16. (For a map of this area, see figure 3.6 in chapter 3.)
241bid. at 1.
2. The estimated recreational catch in Rhode Island waters declined from a
range of 1.3 to 1.7 million fish during the late 19705 and early 1980s to
91,600 fish in 1990 (the last full year before the inshore moratorium).25
3. Indices of winter flounder abundance, gathered from survey trawls in and
around Narragansett Bay by the University of Rhode Island, Marine
Research Incorporated, the RIDFW, and the NMFS are all at or near
record low levels.26
Evidence, like the information stated above, is presented to the Council by the
RIDFW on a regular basis. Additionally, during the late fall, similar data are combined
into a comprehensive stock assessment detailing the condition of the fishery. Yet despite
these periodic updates, the Council has generally been unable to effectively work together
with the RIDFW to adopt timely protective regulations. As a result of this situation, the
population of fish in Narragansett Bay has deteriorated to the point of stock collapse and
recruitment failure.
Critics of this argument may point to the 1991 inshore winter flounder
moratorium, the most substantive measure taken to date, as an indication that the system
does eventually work out in the long run. Yet the ban can hardly be called a timely
restriction; by the time it was passed, the fishery had deteriorated to the point where
biologists with the RIDFW estimate that it may take a decade for the population to
recover!27 Additionally, it should also be noted that since its inception a faction within
the Council has tried to rescind the ban on several occasions. In early 1994, under
25Supra note 17 at 6.
26Mark R. Gibson, Stock Assessment of Winter Rounder in Rhode Island. 1992: A Report to the
Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife (Jan. 1993): 1.
271bid. at 2.
relentless pressure from bait and tackle store owners, the Council approved a one month
(April) open recreational fishery despite a continuance of depressing news about the
health of the stocks. Subsequent attempts may yet prove successful in further weakening
the ban before the stocks have truly recovered.
The management of the winter flounder fishery will be studied emphasizing a
systems approach. That is, all components and participants involved in the decision-
making process will be reviewed. The overall purpose of this undertaking is to
demonstrate how c1early-stated, verifiable goals and objectives can help promote
conservation by providing a decision-making framework to promote the adoption of more
timely and effective regulations.
METHODOLOGY
This study will be divided into two major sections. The first half will focus upon
the process of fisheries management in Rhode Island. The regulatory powers and
administrative procedures of the RIMFC will be reviewed. An assessment will be made
of the stock reports provided by the RIDFW and how the Council subsequently
responded. The second half of this thesis will review how a system of conservation goals
and objectives played a critical role in the restoration of the Atlantic striped bass and how
such a program could be adopted to better manage the winter founder fishery in
Narragansett Bay.
This project will begin with an overview of marine fisheries management by the
Council. Its composition, jurisdictional powers, and administrative guidelines will be
examined. An historical review of its establishment in 1976 will be reviewed to assess
whether or not it has lived up to the expectations of its originators. A briefcomparison to
other fishery management programs will illustrate that the independence granted to this
regulalory body is not commonplace.
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The next chapter will contain a summary of the commercial and recreational
importance of the winter flounder and how it is dependent upon responsible localized
state management. Commercial and recreational catch and effort data are available from
the NMFS and have also been analyzed by the RlDFW. Information about its biological
requirements and dependency upon estuarine systems is available from an extensive body
of literature published in scientific joumals.28 Specific details about its temporal and
spatial distribution as well as its decline in abundance will be gathered from survey
trawls, tagging studies, and CPUE data gathered by the NMFS. Much of the information
has already been collected in the annual stock assessments by the RIDFW. The following
four major natural and anthropogenic causes of mortality will be covered to fully explain
the collapse of the fishery:
1. the correlation between above-average water temperatures and low
survival rate of juvenile winter flounder;29
2. the crash of the Mt. Hope Bay stock of fish due to entrainment in an
electrical power plant on Brayton Point;
3. the loss of habitat due to pollution and coastal development; and
4. excessive fishing effort.
Information for this section will be obtained from reports distributed by the RIDFW and
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, scientific literature, and government
documents.
28See William G. Pearcy (1962); Grace Klien-MacPhee (Synopsis No. 117); Alfred Perlmutter (1947);
Saul Saila (1961). .
29perry H. Jeffries and William C. Johnson, "Seasonal Distribution of Bottom Fishes in the
Narragansett Bay Area: Seven-Year Variations in the Abundance of Winter Rounder (Pseudopleuronectes
americallus)" Jonrnal f-ishcrics Research Board or Canada 3\ (\97'+): \057-1066.
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The following chapter will contain an assessment of how the Cou~cil responded
as the winter flounder fishery declined. Through a thorough examination of the Council's
minutes from past meetings, a chronological record will be compiled of its
accomplishments and failures. This section will focus upon the origins of specific
recommendations, how these ideas were introduced to this regulatory body, and how they
progressed through the decision-making process before being rejected or accepted.
Special attention will be directed towards illustrating how infighting and differences of
opinions have impeded the Council from adopting proactive conservation measures.
Additionally, the role of the RlDFW in the management process will also be covered.
Specific attention will focus on its assessments and advice regarding the winter flounder
fishery. By studying the minutes of past meetings and through questioning present and
fonner Council members, a determination will be made of how a system of realistic and
verifiable goals and objectives could have facilitated the decision-making process and
enhanced the stewardship of the state's winter flounder stocks.
The last chapter of this study will provide an example of an existent management
program that can serve as a model to implement goals and objectives into Rhode Island's
management system. Under the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission's Interstate
Striped Bass Management Plan, a specific goal to rebuild the striped bass population has
been carefully outlined through a series of detailed objectives. Through a system known
as adaptive management, allowable fishing mortality is adjusted based upon the juvenile
abundance index as gathered through Maryland's young-of-the-year beach seine survey.
The results of this survey are used to forecast stock abundance and thereby provide an
early warning of any upcoming potential problems. Through a trigger mechanism based
upon a three year running average of the index, the fishery was rebuilt in a gradual and
risk-averse manner. A similar system may provide a practical way to better utilize data
from the trawl surveys in Narragansett Bay and thereby develop a proactive. strategy to
manage the winter f10under fishery.
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Based upon the striped bass example, a series of multiple regression analyses will
be conducted to detennine which data base offers the most significant means to account
for the variation in the total catch of winter flounder from the waters off Rhode Island.
These analyses will be modeled after Philip Goodyear's study comparing the Maryland
young-of-the-year striped bass index to commercial landings along the e~stem
seaboard.30 Additional comparisons will be conducted if appropriate. While this study
will not derive a specific index value, it will review the necessary procedure required to
develop an index as well as assess the potential for such a system considering present
knowledge of stock conditions.
30Philip C. Goodyear, "Relationship betwet:ll Rt:ported Commercial Landings Abundallct: or Young
Striped Gass in Chesapeake Bay, Maryland," Transactions of the American Fisheries Society, 114 (1985):
92-%.
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CHAPTER II
THE RHODE ISLAND MARINE FISHERIES COUNCIL
Traditionally, most marine fisheries have been considered unrestricted common
property resources. As such, they have been harvested on a first-come-first-served basis.
While there have always been natural cycles of abundance, where some species Oourish
while others decline, generally speaking, prior to the advent of modem fishing
technology, most stocks were able to sustain themselves by naturally replacing any losses
due to fishing mortality. However, in an ever-spiraling race to obtain even greater
economic benefits, fishermen have invested - and continue to do so - in a vast array of
sophisticated technology to maximize their total catch. The result of this scenario is a
tragedy ofthe commons situation, as described by Garret Hardin, whereby stocks are
unsustainably exploited, thus jeopardizing their future viability.31 In an attempt to change
this course of events, governments have intervened with the intention to conserve and
manage their fishery resources.
In the jurisdictional waters of the United States, marine fisheries management is
both a federal and state responsibility.32 Under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, federal jurisdiction, in what is commonly referred to as the Fishery
Conservation Zone, extends from the seaward boundary of the coastal states' territorial
sea to approximately 200 miles from shore. Marine resources in this zone are
administered under the authority of the Secretary of Commerce through eight regional
councils comprised of local officials and private citizens familiar with fisheries issues.33
Landward of the Fishery Conservation Zone, fisheries management is a state
31Garrett Hardin, "111e Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968): 1243-1248.
32It should also be noted that there are several quasi-private organizations - the Atlantic, Gulf, and
Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commissions - that until 1994 had nonbinding power, unless otherwise
specified by Congress, to help coordinate interstate and federal-state management efforts. This has since
changed with the passage of the Atlantic Coastal fisheries Cooperative Management Act, under which their
management plans are now binding. .
33 16 United States Code §§ 1801-1882, 1976 Public Law Number 94-265. (Hereinafter refeo"ed to
as MFCt>v1A)
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prerogative.34 Unlike in federal waters, where regulations are issued under one uniform
system, the process by which this resource is administered often varies considerably from
state to state. While a few states have retained this power with their legislative branch,
most others have delegated part or all of this responsibility to a natural resource agency or
citizen-ba~edcouncil.
MEMBERSHIP
In the state of Rhode Island, coastal inshore fisheries are regulated by the RIMFC.
This jurisdiction extends over its entire range of inshore and territorial marine waters up
to three miles offshore, and over a fishing industry that landed 139.8 million pounds. of
fish with an ex-vessel value of $85.1 million in 1991.35 The Council is composed of the
Director of the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) (or a designee) and
eight private citizens "with skill, knowledge, and experience in the commercial fishing
industry, the sport fishing industry, and in the conservation and management of fisheries
resources. "36 Pursuant to the General Laws of Rhode Island, three members each are
from the commercial and recreational fishing industries and two are from the scientific
community.3? Present and previous participants have include: commercial and
recreational fishermen, academicians with backgrounds in maritime law and marine
biology, a scientist from the NMFS, a former member of the New England Regional
Council, and a Director of the Rhode Island Seafood Council. Members are appointed by
the Governor, with the consent of the Senate, for terms of fours years which may be
34Commerce Clause, United States Constitution Article 1 § 8, clause 3 leaves state police power in
this area, absent of any conflict with overriding federal law; Submerged Land.. Act of 1953 (43 United
States Code §§ 1301-1315 (1976» granted states ownership of three-mile marginal belt off their shores,
subject to pre-emptive power to protect navigation, commcrce, national defense, and international affairs.
35Supra note 11 at 4.
36General Laws Of Rhode Island §20-3-1. Originally, ihe COlmcil consisted of only six members
in addition to the Director. In 1985, under P.L. 1985 cll. 190, two additional positions were added.
37Ibid.
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successive. Although they are not paid a salary, compensation is provided for travel and
other incidental expenses.38
JURISDICTION
The Council has "regulating jurisdiction over all marine animal species within the
jurisdictional territory of the State."39 This authority includes establishing rules
governmg:
1. The manner of taking fish, lobster, and shellfish.
2. The legal size limits of fish, lobster, and shellfish to be taken or
possessed.
3. The season and hours during which fish, lobsters, and shellfish may be
taken or possessed.
4. The numbers of quantities of fish, lobster, and shellfish which may be
taken or possessed.
5. The opening and closing of areas within the coastal waters to the taking
of any and all types of fish, lobster and sheIlfish.40
Additionally, in conjunction with the DEM, the Council may also designate special
shcllrish and marine life management area<; for several purposes including "enhancing the
cultivation and growth of marine species, managing the harvest of marine species, (and)
38Ibid.
39Ibid. at §20-3-2.
-lDlbid. (copied verbatim)
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facilitating the planting, cultivating, propagating, managing, and developing any and all
kinds of marine life... 1141
The Council's authority is limited in some circumstances. The legislature still
reserves the right to pass any and all laws concerning the state's jurisdictional marine
fisheries. However, possibly in an attempt to avoid the controversy and criticism inherent
in this field, it has generally been reluctant to exercise this authority, except in issuing
licenses.42 Furthermore, the Council is empowered only to regulate fishing effort;
additional factors which can effect a fishery, such as habitat degradation and water
pollution, are under the jurisdiction of other state agencies and are therefore beyond the
scope of its rule-making capacity. Finally, on a more limited basis, the Director of DEM
may take emergency actions to open or close areas to the harvesting of fish and shellfish
where a delay would endanger the public health. However, such decisions are still
subject to subsequent confirmation by the Council.43
The Council is relatively free to decide on fisheries issues as it sees appropriate.
Unlike on the federal level, where all management plans must be, among other things,
consistent with the seven national standards stipulated in the MFCMA, Council members
may pass regulations untethered by binding performance goals and without the
subsequent approval of a supervisory agency. The closest thing to an operating directive
can be found in the 1981 act that recodified the state's environmental statutes under one
law. In An Act Recodifying Title 20 of the General Laws ofRhode Island, it is the
legislative finding that,
... the animal life inhabiting the lands of the state, its lakes, ponds, streams
and rivers, and the marine waters within its territorial jurisdiction, are a
41lbid. at §20-3-4.
42This was most recently apparent when, in 1992 it deferred voting on a highly contentious biU
that would have prohibited the harvest of shellfish by scuba divers, until the Council was given an
opportwuty to render an opinion on the issue. Upon the Council's recommendation, the ban was never
implemented.
43Supra note 36 at §20-J-5.7.
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precious, renewable, natural resource of the state which, through the
application of enlightened techniques, can be developed, preserved and
maintained for the beauty that wild animals bring to our environment.
The General Assembly further finds that the management of fish and
wildlife through the establishment of hunting and fishing seasons, the
setting of size, catch, possession and bag limits, the regulation of the
manner of hunting and fishing, and the establishment of conservation
policies should be pursued utilizing modem scientific techniques, having
regard for the fluctuations of species populations, the effect of
management practices on fish and wildlife, and the conservation and
perpetuation of all species of fish and wildlife.44
Unfortunately, it is only in these two paragraphs where the legislature attempts to define
the overall stewardship goal(s) for the state's fish and wildlife resources. Yet this section
falls far short of providing a clear directive. For example, is it realistic to both "develop"
and "preserve" a natural resource? In a case where there is a clash between conservation
and utilization, which takes priority? This statement is worded in such a way that while it
offends no one, it is of little functional value. Yet, it is also states that fish and wildlife
resources should be managed having regard for, among other things, the "conservation
and perpetuation of all species ... " Such a statement would seem to indicate that
sustainability is an intended aim, yet whether or not that this is the most important goal
remains unclear. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, it is this failure to be more
explicit that has resulted in a fishery management system where matters of conservation
are generally overlooked in the free-for-all fight over allocation rights.
44p.L. 1981 ch. 197.
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OPERATING PROCEDURE
The Council's origins date back to a period when the future of New England's
fishing industry seemed especially promising. Prior to the MFCMA, the United States
claimed jurisdictional control over the fisheries only within three miles of its shores.
During this period, foreign fishing vessels severely depleted many commercially
important stocks off of New England. (It was even permissible for these vessels to fish a
strip of international water situated between Block Island and the mainland!) The United
States fishing industry, which relied mostly on small inshore trawlers, was unable to
compete against these highly efficient fleets. International agreements to limit fishing
effort and conserve the stocks were mostly unsuccessful. With the passage of a 200 mile
limit under the MFCMA in 1976, many fishermen and entrepreneurs mistakenly believed
that the stocks would never again be so depressed and that a great era of economic
opportunity would be forthcoming. In 1975, in anticipation of this legislation, then
Governor William Noel established a special fisheries advisory task force to review how
the state could more fully capitalize on a revitalize fishing industry.
The task force, which was comprised of officials (both state and federal) from
natural resource agencies, fishing industry spokesmen, and academicians, recommended,
among other things, to revamp the state's management system.45 Prior to the
establishment of the Council, the power to regulate marine fisheries was vested entirely
with the then-Director of the Department of Natural Resources (the predecessor of the
Department of Environmental Management). The task force noted that such a system
placed too much power in the hands of one individual; policy decisions could easily fall
4S'Task force named to advise fishing industry," Providence Journal Bulletin. lOOctober 1975:
A21. & Steve Olsen, fonner task force member (and present Director of the Coastal Resource Center in
South Kingston, Rhode Island), Personal Contact.
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victim to political pressure and personal favoritism for specific individuals or groups.46
As a solution, it recommended a council system whereby representatives from the
scientific community and the recreational and commercial fishing industries could pool
their skills and experiences to more efficiently manage the state's fisheries.47 The
eventual culmination of the task force's recommendations was th~ Registration and
Reports ofCommercial Fisheries Act, which fonnally established the Council in 1976.48
Despite its shortcomings, the council system has fostered a more reviewable and
participatory management process. The Council operates in an open forum where its
decisions are subject to public review. All meetings are open to the general public and
convene, by tradition, on a regular schedule (usually once a month). An agenda is
generally prepared beforehand, yet this does not preclude members from introducing new
issues at the beginning of its meetings. Proposals are generally raised by public petitions,
member initiatives, or RIDFW staff recommendations. Anyone in attendance may
comment on a topic after the members have completed their remarks. The Council
operates according to the guidelines specified in Robert's Rules of Order. All motions,
which must be seconded before being voted upon, are carried by a simple majority. The.
chairman may only vote in instances to "make or break a tie."49
To assist the Council in its decision-making process, technical support is provided
by several state agencies. As specified in its enabling legislation, the Chairman of the
Coastal Resources Management Council, the Chief of the Division of Enforcement within
the DEM, and the Chief of the RIDFW serve in an advisory capacity to the Council.50
46"Study asks separate agency for regulation of commercial fishing." Providence Jou01al12
December 1975:81. It should be noted that the task force was not critical of the then present Director,
Dennis J. Murphy; it commended bis perfonnance. However, the task force warned that such a situation
might not persist wlder a different administrator.
4'fIbid.
48Rhode Island Law 1976 - Chapter 267.
49see Henry M. Roberts, Robert's Rules of Order, (New York:Berkley Books, 1989)
50Supra note 36 at §20-3-1; in practice, the Chainnan of the Coastal Resources Management
Cotmcil does not regularly attend Council meetings.
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Additional support, regarding such matters as operating procedures and potential conflicts
of interest, is occasionally provided by the OEM legal counsel. In practice, the Council
most commonly interacts with the RIOFW. The RIOFW, which is a division of the
OEM, operates with a staff of 57 full-time employees and a budget of approximately 8.2
million dollars.sl Its biologists stGdy terrestrial and aquatic species indigenous to Rhode
Island. It provides a wide assortment of assistance :-anging from addressing specific
technical questions to conducting research-intensive biological assessments. All data and
advice rendered to the Council is nonbinding and therefore, its members are free to accept
or ignore it as they feel appropriate.
Further assistance is provided by the finfish and shellfish subcommittees. These
groups are chaired by RIOFW biologists and their membership is open to the general
public. They serve as an initial forum where participants from the recreational and
commercial fishing industries can gather to discuss and formulate nonbinding proposals
for the Council to consider. For the most part, these subcommittees are comprised of
inshore commercial fishermen, and to a much lesser extent, recreational anglers (on the
finfish committee), who regularly attend Council meetings. Since they tend to be
dominated by commercial fishermen, it is not surprising that their advice is usually biased
towards this user group.
OPERATING GUIDELINES
During the past two decades, legislatures have delegated substantial rule-making
responsibility to many non-elected officials, who as a result, have the authority to
promulgate regulations that can have profound social and economic consequences. To
help ensure that these rules are adopted in an orderly process and remain consistent with
SIGeorge Welly. Budget Administrator, Rhode Island Deparunenl of Environmental Management,
Personal Contact 19 July 1994. (Note: Budget includes money allocaled for capital projecL~)
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the public trust, there are generally specific operational guidelines that must be adhered
to. In Rhode Island, the Council is bound by the guidelines stipulated in the
Administrative Procedures and the Conflict of Interest Acts.
In an attempt to ensure against capricious and secretive rule-making, regulatory
ager.sies in Rhode Island must abide by the Administrative Procedures Act .52 Under this
law, all state entities, such as the Council, are compelled to:
1. Provide at least twenty days prior notice of an impending meeting
(either by newspaper announcement or through mailings), which shall
state "either the tenns or substance of the intended action or a
description of the subjects and issues involved, and of the time when,
the place where, and the manner in which interested persons may
present their views thereon. II
2. Afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data,
views, or arguments, orally or in writing.
3. Demonstrate the need for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any
rule in the record of the rulemaking procedure.
4. Determine the economic impacts of an action upon small businesses.53
These guidelines are intended to ensure that concerned citizens have prior notification of
impending regulatory actions, and that there is an opportunity for public input.
Noncompliance with these procedures can potentially invalidate a regulation.
Members of rule-making boards and commissions, such as the Council, whose
membership qualifications specify individuals with skills and experience in the industry
being regulated, may occasional find themselves in a position to benefit from a decision
52Supra nole 36 al §42-35 el. seq.
53fbid. at §42-35-3.
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made in an official capacity. In an attempt to protect the public trust, Rhode Island, like
most other states and the federal government, has passed laws concerning this type of
situation.54 The responsibility for adopting guidelines and rulings on this issue has been
delegated to an ethics commission of 15 members appointed by the governor.55 Council
members, like all other state officials, must abide by the its decisions. This creates
somewhat of a dilemma for those members who, as part of the criteria for their selection,
work or own a business in the fishing industry. Since they are responsible for regulating
the same field from which they earn an income, they may occasionally benefit, either
directly or indirectly, from a Council's decision. Therefore, to avoid being found in a
conflict of interest, it is prudent that Council members seek the approval of the
Commission prior to participating in the management of a fishery that is a source of
revenue.56
The criteria for determining conflict of interests is multifaceted. State officials (or
those acting in a governmental capacity such as Council members) must exclude
themselves from promulgating laws or regulations that may cause a "substantial conflict"
with their personal interests.57 The Commission has found a "substantial conflict" to
exist in those cases in which a financial gain or loss exceeds $5000 or 5% or gross
income.58 A "substantial conflict" is further defined to be applicable only when a new
rule has the potential of yielding greater benefits to a regulator or lawmaker than to "any
other member of. .. [their] business, profession, occupation or group. "59 Therefore, a
Council member could participate in the management of a fishery where the maximum
54Supra note 36 at §36-14 el. seq. For a detailed analysis of how the Conflict of Interest law
pertains to the Council (especially concerning the COlIDcil's attempt to manage the striped bass fishery
during the 1980s) see Jill Bubier and Alison Riesor, "Conflict of Interest and Fishery Management
CotUlcils" and Charles C. McKinley, "Marine Fisheries Commissions Adlift in the Murky Waters of
Conflict of Interest Law."
55lbid. at §36-14-8 (Hereinafter referred to as the Commission).
56Ibid. at §36-l4-19.
57Ibid. at §36-14-5.
580ary Powers, Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management as stated
in RL\1FC Minutes II Fcb. 1992.
59Supra notc 36 at §36-14--7.
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income limitation will be exceeded, so long as he does not prosper to a greater degree
than others in his particular profession. However, since the law does not offer any
explicit suggestions for identifying one's "business, profession, occupation, or group" the
Commission must make this detennination on a case-by-case basis.
One highly publicized incident involving the Council on this matter occurred over
the struggle to help conserve striped bass stocks during the early 1980s. Because of the
importance of the striped bass fishery to both recreational and commercial fishermen, this
issue became highly contentious and not surprisingly polarized both groups against each
other. After many strife-ridden meetings, the Council eventually adopted a complete
fishing moratorium. Recreational anglers cried foul over the participation of two
commercial representatives who were also owners of businesses that derived a substantial
portion of income from this fishery.60 The Commission, which had previously cautioned
the two members against participating in the management of this fishery, defined their
business as the cOfmnercial fishing industry and noted that as commercial fishermen they
would realize greater benefits from a ruling concerning striped bass than other members
of their profession. Had the Commission issued a narrower interpretation, and classified
their occupation as striped bass fishermen, then it may have been permissible for them to
have participated in the management of this fishery, for as striped bass fishermen it is
unlikely that they would have received benefits in excess of other members of the striped
bass fishing industry .61
60rhis regulation was perceived by recreational fishennen as a spiteful action. This Council was
originally considering a 24 inch minimum size limit. This restriction would have severely impacted the
economic livelihoods of the two commercial representatives - one owned a fish trap company which mostly
captures small school bass less than 24 inches and the other was a wholesale fish dealer who derived a
substantial portion of his income from this fishery. According to the recreational argmneut, the moratorium
was a vindictive regulation intending to inflict upon recreational anglers similar hardships that would have
been imposed upon commercial fishermen had the 24 inch size limit succeeded. (as noted in Olarles C.
McKinley, "Marine Fisheries Commissions Adrift in the Murky-Waters 01" Conllict of Interest Law.")
61Jill Bubier and Alison Riesor, "Conl1ict of Interest and Fishery Management Coum:ils,"
Territorial Sea (University of SOllthern Maine) 4, no. 2 (1984):2.
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UNIQUENESS OF POWER
The RIMFC is somewhat unique in comparison to other citizen-based fishery
commissions.62 Administering a state's marine fisheries through an advisory or rule-
making commission is fairly common throughout the United States. Of the twenty-three
maritime states, sixteen utilize a commission in one form or another.63 However, most
states have been reluctant to delegate full regulatory power to an independent board
dominated by commercial and recreational fishennen. Instead, many commissions are
staffed by private citizens who are not representatives of the fishing industry. In practice,
because of their lack of expertise or knowledge of fishery issues, these groups usually
work closely with a state fisheries agency and seldom act contrary to their
recommendations. Other commissions that are dominated by fishermen, generally serve
in an advisory capacity and must have a state agency approve their proposals.
Consequently, in addition to Rhode Island, there are only two other states, Alaska and
North Carolina, with fully independent rule-making commissions that are staffed by
fishing industry representatives. Yet, as will be demonstrated, even these two states have
safeguards built into their systems to facilitate the decision-making process and thereby
avoid or overcome many of the problems that have afflicted the RIMFC.
For the purpose of this undertaking, management programs have been grouped
into six broad categories of rule-making systems (see table 2.1). It is important to
remember that in each case their respective legislatures still retain the authority to pass
laws over their jurisdictional fisheries. Therefore, in those situations where rule-making
62The temlS conunissioll and council are used interchangeably from state to state without
difference. For the sake of consistency, when referring in generalities, the term conunission will be used.
63The vast majority of infonnation concerning state management systems was gathered by
personal communications with Richard Christian, Lawrence Simpson. and David Hanson respectively of
the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific States Marine fisheries Commissions. Additional infonnation about certain
specific state systems was obtain through personal contacts with agency representatives familiar witil
marine fisheries issues.
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Marine Fishery Manaa:ement Systems in the United States
LeKislative
Connecticut
New York
South Carolina
Resource Agency
Alabama
Delaware
Maryland
Washington
Advisory Commission
Federal
Ronda
Hawaii
Maine
Massachusetts
Blocking Commission
New Jersey
Independent Independent Fishery
Multipurpose Commission Commission
California Alaska
Table 2.1
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
New Hampshire
Oregon
Texas
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North Carolina
Rhode Island
Virginia
power is delegated to a commission or agency, there exists an alternate statutory route for
developing such ordinances. Unfortunately, not every program fits snugly into one
particular category. In some states, a commission or agency has jurisdiction only over a
limited number of species. Therefore, in these instances there may be several proscribed
routes by which to develop fishery rules.64 Additionaliy, California's management
system is a hybrid of two categories: recreational regulations are established by it~ Fish
and Game Commission, whereas its commercial industry is administered through
statutory law.65 Therefore, it could technically be placed into both the Multijurisdictional
Natural Resource Commission and Legislative categories, however for the.sake of
simplicity it is listed under the former. Additional exceptions will be identified as they
occur.
Some legislatures have been reluctant to delegate regulatory authority over their
jurisdictional marine fisheries. Such is the case in Connecticut, New York, and South
Carolina, where this power has been retained, in its entirety, by their respective law-
making bodies. Under this system (designated as Legislative in table 2.1) fishery rules
can only be introduced a'i bills and must therefore undergo the same process as all other
proposed legislation before being adopted. Proposals are primarily generated through
formal requests sponsored by concerned groups or through recommendations made by a
state resource agency experienced with fisheries issues. Public input is gathered through
petitioning local representatives and/or public hearings. Most often, a resource agency is
responsible [or researching and critiquing potential rules. Although such an agency does
not have formal rule-making authority, its decisions often playa pivotal role in the
acceptance or rejection of a proposal. For example, in New York, a state where fisheries
issues are of relatively minor importance on its legislative agenda, the governor relies
64 In Maryland this list is quite comprehensive and covers most imporlant commen.-ial or
recreational species. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, Maryland is listed as having a resource
agency management system. However, New York, whose Department of Enviromnental Conservation has
rule-making authority only over a few species, is categorized as a legislative system.
65David Hanson, Pacific States Nlarinc Fisheries Commission, Personal Contact, 28 JiUlC 1993.
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heavily upon the counsel of the Department of Environmental Conservation, the agency
whose responsibilities include keeping tabs over the state's marine fisheries, prior to
deciding upon most fishery-related bills. In effect, the Department's endorsement serves
as a Good Housekeeping seal of approval.
Legislative management systems, due to their cumbersome decision-making
process, are not widely practiced. Law-m~kers are usually confronted with a multitude of
problems that need to be addressed. In those states where fisheries are administered
through their general assembly, this extra responsibility only adds to their work load.
Additionally, representatives from noncoastal districts may only be vaguely familiar with
marine fisheries, and have little if any interest in managing this resource. Consequently,
some states, such as Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, and Washington have transferred this
authority to a natural resource agency experienced with marine fisheries. Under this type
of management system (designated as Resource Agency in table 2.1), a director of a
specified agency holds final decision-making power. In an attempt to guard against
secretive and capricious rule making, administrative guidelines generally stipulate
mandatory public notification of impending regulations and a procedure to allow public
input into the decision-making process. Ad hoc or standing committees may also assist in
the decision-making process by contributing nonbinding advice. For example, the
Secretary of the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (through the Tidewater
Administration), who has regulatory jurisdiction over, among other things, the state's
marine fisheries, may seek advice on proposed fishery regulations from it,> sport fishery
and tidal fishery commissions.66
In an attempt to establish a more participatory system while still retaining some
degree of control, a number of legislatures have created a two-tiered decision-making
process involving both a natural resource agency and a citizen-based commission. Under
66Sleven Early, Maryland Tidewaler Adminislralion. Personal Conlacl, 24 June 1993.
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this scheme (designated as Advisory Commission in table 2.1), management plans, which
are developed through a commission, require the subsequent approval of a designated
official before being adopted. The most widely recognized example of this type of
system is the federal management program, authorized under the MFCMA, whereby
fishery management plans developed by the eight regional councils are subject to review
by the Secretary of Commerce (or a designee). The councils are comprised of federal and
state officials, and private citizens experienced with fishery matters.67 Theoretically, to
be approved, a plan must be consistent with, among other things, the seven national
standards specified in the MFCMA.68 This arrangement allows for direct involvement of
the fishing industry in the management process through the councils, while still retaining
final decisio[1-making authority with a federal official. Therefore, a government
representative is ultimately accountable for approving or rejecting a proposed
management plan.
Similar programs, with some administrative differences, have been adopted in
Rorida, Hawaii, Maine, and Massachusetts. In Maine, lobster, because of its commercial
importance, is administered through a separate council solely devoted this species; all
other fisheries are the jurisdiction of the Marine Resources Advisory Counci1.69 Unlike
the regional councils, whose membership is comprised mostly of industry representatives,
in Rorida's Marine Fisheries Commission, participants come from various backgrounds,
some of which have little, if any connection to this resource. For instance, the 1993
commission consisted of, in addition to the chairman and vice-chairmen (who are not
fishermen), a marine biologist, a coastal and inland resorts consultant, a retired United
States marshall, an architect, the president of a county farm bureau, a former university
president/fisheries professor, and an attorney.70 Hawaii requires its Division of Aquatic
67Supra note 33 al §1852(a) & (b).
68lbid. at §1853(a)(1)(A).
69Richard Laltay, Maine Department of Marine Resources, Personal Contacl, 24 June 1993.
70Sandra Rohrer, Rorida Marine Fisherics Commission, Personal Contact, 24 JUlie 1993.
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Resources to have initial discretionary power before subsequently forwarding any
accepted proposal to the Board of Land and Natural Resources. Any plan approved by
the Commission must then be signed by the governor before becoming official.?1
Therefore, in essence, it has a three-tiered decision-making process. In
Massachusetts,most proposed fishery regulations are first reviewed by the Division of
Marine Fisheries prior to being forwarded to it,; fishery council.72
One substantial variation of the two-tiered management process is found in New
Jersey, where its fisheries council not only serves in an advisory capacity, but it also has
the power to block proposed regulations. Under this system (designated as Blocking
Commission in table 2.1), fishery rules are introduced and promulgated through the state
Commissioner of Environmental Protection. In practice, most regulations originate from
the Fish, Game, and Wildlife Division, a branch of the state Environmental Protection
Agency. The New Jersey Marine Fisheries Council, an 11 member board comprised of
representatives from the recreational and commercial industries as well as two from the
general public, has both an advisory and discretionary function in the management
process: it serves as a vehicle for gathering public input through it,; meetings and it has
the authority to nullify any rule introduced by the Commissioner. Therefore, to avoid the
embarrassments of a last moment veto, the Fish, Game, and Wildlife Division has made it
a practice to seek the Council's approval prior to recommending a new rule to the
Commissioner. As a result, since 1969 there has been only one incident where the
Council has exercised its veto power.?3
All of the programs mentioned so far include some form of direct state or federal
involvement in the rule-making process. While such a situation enables their respective
governments a large degree of control over the outcome, it also leaves them vulnerable to
7lRandy Honebrink, Hawaii Division of Aquatic Resources, Personal Coutact, 7 July 1993.
72 Dan McKieran, MassachusetL'i Division of Marine Fisheries, Personal Contact, 3 Mar. 1992.
73Thomas McCoy, New Jersey Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife, Personal Contact, 7 July
1993.
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the controversy and criticism inherent in fisheries management. Therefore, some have
tacitly side-stepped the problem by delegating this responsibility, in its entirety, to a
citizen-based commission. These bodies tend to be of two general types: some, like the
RIMFC, are marine fisheries specific, whereas others are multijurisdictional and must
therefore steward a broad spectrum of natural resources. Under each type of system,
industry representatives and resource agencies play varying roles in the decision-making
process.
Under a multijurisdictional system (designated as Independent MuLtipurpose
Commission in table 2.1), the likes of which is practiced in California, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Texas, marine fisheries are
administered under one rule-making body that also has authority over other natural
resources. These commissions must deal with a multitude of resource issues,
consequently fisheries matters are only occasionally the focus of their attention. For
example, in Texas, marine fisheries are managed through the Parks and Wildlife
Commission, which also has jurisdictional control over state parklands, terrestrial wildlife
and freshwater fisheries.74 Since multijurisdictional commissions do not specialize in one
particular field and must therefore interact with a wide range of constituencies, members
usually come from a diversity of backgrounds. As a result, it is often extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to ensure that all user groups are directly represented by a specific
member. Therefore, spokesmen from the commercial and recreational fishing industries
may not always be present on these bodies. Furthennore, the likelihood that they will
constitute a majority, and thereby playa consequential role in the rule-making process, is
extremely remote.
In general, fisheries representatives are at most, a small and uninfluential
component of these multijurisdictional commissions. Without the dominance of
74PauJ Ham~rschm.idt, Texas Division of Coastal Fisheries, Personal COlltact, 22 June 1993.
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commercial and recreational user groups - each with its own parochial convictions
concerning the manner in which the resource should be administered - state resource
agencies playa more influential role in the decision-making process. Most members who
serve on these commissions lack the experience and academic training to feel comfortable
making unao;sisted decisions on fisheries issues. As a result, they almost always abide by
the recommendations made by an agency skilled in this field. For example, referring
back to the Texas program, the P.arks and Wildlife Commission, as an unwritten rule, will
seek advice from the Coastal Fisheries Branch of the Fisheries and Wildlife Division
whenever deciding upon marine fisheries regulations, and nearly always acts upon its
recommendations.75 Therefore, in a situation that is somewhat similar to the
legislatively-exclusive management programs, state resource agencies often playa critical
role in the regulatory process.
In addition to Rhode Island there are three other states, Alaska, North Carolina,
and Virginia with independent fishery commissions whose sole concern is to regulate
their respective marine fisheries. Each of these states has a commission that can
promulgate regulations without subsequent approval from a supervisory agency.
However, there are some important differences between each commission. Jurisdiction
over marine fisheries in Virginia is the responsibility of the Marine Resources
Commission. This Commission is composed of a broad ba'ie of members of which only
one is required to make a l'iving from fishing or a fisheries-related industry. Participants
on the 1993 Commission include two lawyers, a physics professor, an administrator for a
marine transportation company, and a retired marine resource enforcement officer. In a
situation that is similar to the Legislative Management and Independent Multipurpose
Conunissions, their lack of expertise or experience with fisheries issues has foslcred a
close working relationship the state Fisheries Management Division, which is staffed by
75[bid.
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biologists trained in fisheries science. Consequently there is generally a harmonious
working relationship between these two groups and most issues are decided unanimously,
in accordance with the advice of the Fisheries Management Division.76
In North Carolina, marine fisheries are the jurisdictional responsibility of its
Marine Fisheries Commission. This Commission is required to have four representatives
each from the commercial and recreational sectors, two fish processors, two scientists,
and two at large members. This group would seem susceptible to the same clash in
values that has plagued the RIMFC. However, in an step to mitigate this problem, the
state Director of Marine Fisheries has been granted proclamation power to promulgate
most fishery regulations. In practice, this power has been reserved for those occasions
when the Commission has reached an impa~se. As a check on this power, the
Commission, if it so decides, can subsequently override the Director's decision with a
new regulation at its next meeting.77
In Alaska, both fresh- and salt-water fisheries are administered by the Alaska
Board of Fisheries. This Board is comprised of seven members appointed by the
Governor, of which three represent commercial fisheries, three represent recreational
fisheries, and one represents subsistence fishermen. It has full power to promulgate
regulations without subsequent approval from a supervisory agency. Technical
information and stock assessment are provided by the Alaska Department of Fish and
Game. In general, there is an excellent working relationship between these two groups.
Unlike in Rhode Island, where its Council members are free to make decisions
unrestrained by performance goals and objectives, the Alaska Board of Fisheries is
76Eric Barth, Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences, Personal Contact, 7 July 1993.
77\)emlis Spitsburgen, North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries, Personal Contact, 14-
September 1993.
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obligated by statute to first works towards the conservation of wild fish stocks prior to
deciding upon issues of allocation.78
In comparison to most other states, the RIMFC operates in one of the least
restrictive environments. It has full power to pass regulations without subsequent
approval from a state agency and it is not accOi.:ntabfe to meet any predetermined
performance goals and objectives. Its members are free to make decisions based solely
on their own interpretation of the issue at hand. Therefore, the RIMFC may act
independently of the recommendations by the RIDFW. Furthermore, its dominance by
commercial and recreational fishermen, each with their own experience and knowledge of
fishery issues, has served to foster this sense of independence. In essence then, Rhode
Island's management system operates without the safeguards that have been built into or
have developed in the management programs of most other states.
CONCLUSIONS
The Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council was originally established in an
attempt to improve the overall stewardship of the state's marine fisheries. Wherea..<;
management decisions were formerly vested solely with one individual, the Director of
the Department of Naturaf Resources, the present system is designed to be more inclusive
of the major constituencies in the fishing industry in an attempt to better ensure that their
interests are represented when promulgating new regulations. As previously discussed,
the Council has brought together nine individuals, each experienced with commercial or
recreational fisheries, or with a background in marine biology. It is intended to serve as a
forum where these representatives, and members of the general public, can work together
to develop mutually-agreeable management strategies. However it may have been too
78HcnwUl Savikko, Fisheries Infonllation Officer, Alaska Deparlment of FislI and G'illlC. Personal
Conlacl, 18 July 1994.
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optimistic to conclude that this arrangement could "conserve and perpetuate" the state's
marine fishery resources. For without a more definitive directive making this condition a
priority goal, its members are relatively free to champion the parochial interests of their
own user groups rather than support what is in the best interest of sustainable production.
One of the side effects of permitting different user groups to become involved in
the decisions-making process, is that it brings together a myriad of opinions regarding the
overaH purpose of fisheries management. Each participant interprets events and makes
decisions based on their own personal beliefs and experiences (sometimes more formally
referred to as value systems) which mayor may not always be technically correct or truly
accurate. For example, a fisherman may genuinely believe that portution is responsible
for his poor catch despite conclusive data indicating that overfishing is the real problem.
Consequently, it is unlikely that he would be supportive of a stock rebuilding program
that heavily depends upon reducing fishing mortality, despite the potential benefits. Or,
as another example, consider the fisherman who has mortgaged his home to pay for his
vessel; as will be explained later in the chapter, he may rationalize not curtailing
overfishing to protect his investment. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the
Council, which brings together nine individuals of different backgrounds and values,
should have such a difficult time reaching a consensus when deciding how to manage the
state's marine fisheries. As previously discussed, its members are relatively free to work
towards dissimilar if not diametrically opposite goals. Consequently, its meetings can
and often do become free-for-alls, where timely and responsive decisions arc delayed
indefinitely, resulting in management that is more reactive than proactive.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the scope of the Council's power, and the manner
in which it operates, have been carefully proscribed by the state legislature. Its authority
to regulate the harvest of finfish and shellfish from state waters is clearly ddineated in its
enabling legislation. Its decision-making process, which must conform to the guidelines
of the Administrative Procedures Act, is reviewabJle by the general public and allows for
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public input. Additionally, to help protect the public trust, as specified under the Conflict
of Interest Act, under certain situations its members are prohibited from participating in
the management of those fisheries in which they have a vested financial interest. It is
ironic that such tremendous attention has been given to the framework of its decision-
making process while there is only an indirect and somewhat ambiguous mention made of
its fU'ldamental purpose. Only in the 1981 recodification of the slate's fish and game laws
can there be found a brief general statement concerning the management of all wildlife
throughout the state, including marine fisheries.79 Although there are some broad
statements about "preserving and maintaining" and "conserving and perpetuating" the
state's fish and wildlife resources, this advice falls far short of providing a clear directive
for the Council to operate by. Consequently, without this guidance, there is no
mechanism by which to focus the Council's decision-making process or effectively
resolve internal differences when they occur.
If it is the intended goal of the Council to "consen'e and perpetuate" the stale's
marine fishery resources, it is imperative that this be more definitively and
unambiguously stated. Before proceeding any further with this argument, it is important
to understand how goals and objectives are an integral part of any management program.
Although the tenns are often used interchangeably, for this undertaking they have two
distinct but dependent definitions. While definitions often vary somewhat from source to
source, goals are generall'y recognized as "ideals, major accomplishments, ends, or states
of affairs to be achieved."8o Most often they are stated in broad terms that help provide
direction for organizational activities as weB as for the planning and development of
strategy. For example, a goal under Amendment Five to the Northeast Mullispccies
Fishery Management Plan is to reduce fishing mortality on cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounder stocks. However, goals, of and by themselves, are of little functional value
79see pages 17 & lK
80Supra nole 4 al365.
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without being further clarified by more specific perfonnance objectives. In reference to
the previous example, to what extent should fishing mortality be reduced? What criteria
will be used to detennine if the reduction is effective in rebuildjng these stocks? As with
goals, there is no one definitive definition of objectives, yet they are generally defined as
"measurable, verifiable statements of intennediate tasks that must be accomplished for
goal attainment. "81 They are of invaluable assistance in refining broad ideas into more
specific strategy. For example, in reference to the above-stated fisheries goal, a
perfonnance objective may be to increase the percent maximum spawning potential of
cod and yellowtailllounder to 20% in five years and to 30% for haddock in ten years.
While similar technical objectives are probably best left to be developed by the RIDFW,
which has experience and expertise in stock modeling, the General Assembly should
legislate that it is the intended goal for the state's jurisdictional fisheries to be
administered in such a manner as to prevent overfishing and protect their long term,
continuous sustainability.
Incorporating a specific set of realistic goals and developing objectives to meet
these goals are central to the success of any management system. To better understand
this, it is helpful to conceptualize what is meant by the tenn management. While there is
no one definitive definition, generally speaking, management can be described as,
the art and science of determining, coordinating, and utilizing human and
material resources to reach the goals and objectives of an organization. It
is a process that includes the elements of planning, giving direction,
coordinating, organizing, and controlling the organization to reach its
goals and objectives.82
811hid.
~2Ibid. <11367.
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Goals and objectives provide a sense of purpose and direction for a management body.
They help specify the state of being or outcome that an organization seeks to achieve. If
they are constructed with foresight, they can better enable an organization to develop
preemptive strategies to avert future crises, or at least rapidly respond and adjust to new
and changing situations. Furthermore, a system of realistic goa1ls supported by clearly-
defined performance objectives can help to:
1. make conOicting activities more recognizable;
2. compare choices when there are conflicts;
3. rationally allocate human and physical resources;
4. promote accountability.83
Without a clear understanding of an organization's goals and objectives, each participant
must therefore determine them individually. While this may be feasible where there are
few people involved in the management process or when an organization has a well
understood directive, it is not very practical in large organizations or those whose purpose
may be somewhat ambiguous.
The omission of specifically defined stewardship goals for the state's marine
fisheries incurs the Council to operate at a serious disadvantage in reconciling the
disparate management philosophies that it brings together. The initial decision to create a
regulatory body like the Council, where commercial and recreational fishermen as well
as members from the scientific community can work together, is commendable in its
intentions. Such an arrangement serves to better ensure that most interesls are at least
broadly represented when regulations are being promulgated. In an ideal world, its
members would be willing to set aside their differences to \vork towards some mutually
beneficial outcome for the greater good of everyone involved and for the resource.
83Ibid. at 36K
38
However, in reality, this is seldom the case. As noted in one analysis of multi-
participatory fisheries management programs,
the array of objectives proposed by policy makers, scientists, administers,
etc., are frequently not reconcilable.... More often than not, they do not
agree among themselves on appropriate goals, a'1d if they do they seldom
agree in a functional sense on how they can be obtained. tW
Therefore, for reasons that will be discussed, it should not be surprising that the Council,
like its counterparts on the federal level, often has a difficult time reaching a consensus
when administering the fisheries within its jurisdiction.
Nowhere are these discrepancies more obvious than in the inherent disparity of
management goals and objectives supported by those user groups that are economically
dependent upon fishery resources, and those who are not,85 Despite what they may
publicly endorse, those with a vested economic interest in the fishing industry are
generally not receptive towards forgoing their present catch for the possibility of greater
returns in the future. (While in their defense, this may not hold true where alternative
fisheries of similar value arc available, in reality, this is seldom the case.) Conservation
measures are seldom willingly embraced even in those situations where overfishing has
seriously depleted a fishery. This is due in part to the innate inefficiencies of harvesting a
common property resource in an open access industry. With such a resource, those
willingly to make sacrifices may not necessarily reap any of the potential benefits. For
example, the best intentions of an ethical fisherman who purposely avoids fishing in a
known nursery area harboring many juvenile fish, may be subsequently thwarted by a less
scrupulous captain who is willing to kill many undersized fish to cull out a few keepers.
Additionally, even if these fish were allowed ,to mature unmolested, in an open access
84n. L. Alverson and G.J.Paulik, "Objectives and Prohlems of Managing Aquatic Living
Resources," Journal and Fisheries Research Board of C<mada, 30, no. 12 (1973): 19-:\.1.
X:'ilbid.
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fishery, others would be free to enter the fishery when catch levels improved, and thereby
dissipate his benefits. As a result, it is not always monetarily profitable to be future
minded in such an industry. Additionafly, it should be remembered that forecasting stock
size, despite all the recent advancements in modeling and data gathering, must still deal in
probabilities and is not always perfectly accurate. It is this imprecision, or at least
perception of imprecision, coupled with the above-mentioned conditions, that can orten
lead fishennen to prioritize their immediate economic demands ahead of the long-term
health of the resource. On top of all of this, there are often social factors, such as
maintaining certain lifestyles or protecting community structures, which may further
dampen support for promoting sustainable yield.86
In reality, most fisheries are managed for the benefit of people, not fish. In a
critique of modem fishery management regimes, it was noted that,
a fundamental premise... is that all benefits derivable from fisheries
management are accruable solely to man. Given this premise, a simple
general theory of fisheries management can be developed in which most of
the controversy surrounding fisheries management decisions revolves
around which goals and objectives are selected and who selects them. In
such a "general theory of fisheries management" biological factors arc
largely constraints and are only rarely major decision variables.87
These goals are almost always primarily concerned with allocation rights, not matters of
conservation. Given the inherent inefficiencies of harvesting common property fisheries,
coupled with the anthropocentricism referred to above, is it realistic to expect sustainable
yield to be the end result if it is not specifically mandated? Therefore, it should be no
86Ray Hilborn .Uld Carl J. Waltcrs.,"Differing Goals of Salmon Management on the Skeena
River," .fotimal of Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 34 (1977): 27.
87Robert T. Lackey, "Fisheries Management Theory," American Fisheries Society Special
£l.Iblication. II (1978): 417.
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great surprise that many members of the Council often support their own parochial
interests at the expense of the long-term health of the resource.
It is the selection process, where goals and objectives are contested in the free-for-
all atmosphere of public fishery meetings, that conservation principles generally fall by
the wayside. In a criticism of salmon management in the Pacific Northwest, which could
just as accurately be applied to many other fishery management regimes, including the
RIMFC, it was noted that,
seldom are the long-term values of the public at large sought or recognized
explicitly at ad hoc so-called "public" fishery meetings during times of
crisis; instead, actions center on appeasing the demands of vociferous, 011-
site user groups. If no meaningful survey of public values is available and
sufficient or adequate policy statements have not been developed for
salmon resources, managers may take the intellectual and political
shortcut, spare themselves some verbal abuse from special intcrests, and
assume more fish, however produced, in the short run is automatically
better management-regardless of the long-term impacts on stocks or
~ t 88ecosys ems...
Most public fishery meetings are dominated by user groups who have a vested financial
stake in the fishing industry. For reasons previously discussed, these groups do not
necessarily act in the best long-term interest of the resource. Others, such as
environmentalists or members from the scientific community, who may care most about
conservation, are usually so outnumbered that at best, they arc only a minor inOuence in
the process. In specific reference to the Council, only three of its nine members are not
from the commercial or recreational fishing industries (and as already discussed, one of
these members, the chairman, can only vote in instances to make or break a tic).
Furthermore, conservation groups, who are the most likely to speak out on behalf of the
88Dennis L. Scamccchia, "Salmon Management and thc Search for Valucs," Canadian Joumal of
Fisheries and Aquatic Scienecs,45 (1988): 2044.
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resource, seldom if ever are an inOuential force at Council meetings or public hearings.
As a result, the management process usually degenerates into a struggle where each group
is in competition for a larger stake of the resource. Unfol1unatcly, this is a cycle that
seems to feed upon itself; for a<; a fishery declines from being over harvested year after
year, and managers struggle to find a remedy, each faction only intensifies its lobbying to
ensure that its aIlocation does not diminish.
This is not to say that fishery management regimes never pass any substantive
conservative fishing restrictions; it is just that such measures are too often adopted only
after the above-mentioned scenario has been played out over a protracted period of time,
during which the resource is allowed to precipitously decline. It seems that it is only at
the point when public frustration manifests itself into outrage, that something beneficial
occasionally gets done. However, by this late stage, implementing stock rebuilding
programs while trying to minimize regulatory interference or interruptions in a fishery, is
seldom realistically possible.
To help reconcile the vast dilTerences of opinions assembled in most
multiparticipatory fisheries management bodies, it is important to recognize the role that
values play in the goal selection process. Before proceeding any further with this
argument it is beneficial to define the term values. While definitions may vary from
source to source, values are generally recognized as "personal standards as to what is
good or bad, fair or unfair, and hence inCluence decisions."89 Or, in other words, they are
"conceptions of the desirable, inllueneing selective behavior."C)() For example,
commercial fishermen are generally inclined to support those policies that maintain or
inerease their present cateh rather than accept restrictions that offer the potential of
greater returns in the future. In simpler terms, to borrow from a familiar children's fabie,
89Supra note 4 at 365.
9On.L. Sills, ed.lnternational Encyclopedia of of !lle Social Sciences, New York:Macmil1an,
1968:283.
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to a fisherman, a fish in the net is worth more than two in the sea. The importance of
values in fisheries management is just starting to be recognized. As noted in one analysis,
crfective managers must be knowledgeable of fishery science and human
values. The science in fishery management is the objective, logical, and
systematic method of obtaining reliable knowledge about fishery
resources. The art in fishery management involves our values, that is what
we judge to be good, desirable, and important in the long run. A rational
management plan is a selective embodiment of the values of the manager
or of the organization or society that the manager represents.9l
Goal selection is largely shaped by the intrinsic values of those involved in the decision-
making process; they help detennine what is and is not desirable in a fishery. As can be
expected, those values deemed most worthy or desirable orten vary from group to group
and even between those within a group. In other words, individuals often disagree over
what is good or bad for a fishery. Therefore, if an organization or society ha<; not
prioritized its values, and there is little or no agreement regarding those values it wishes
to endorse, then the goal selection process will often degenerate into a free-for-all where
the most vociferous group has a great advantage in getting what it \-vants. It should
therefore be no surprise that in fisheries management, where goals are notoriously left
either unstated or ambiguously worded, that small but well-organized user groups often
have a disproportionate influence on the decision-making process.
In Rhode Island, the Council often finds itself embroiled in controversy for failing
to take the necessary precautions to promote conservation. With no directive other than
to pa<;s fishing regulations, its members are free to pursue ~oals of their own choosing.
Since this body is dominated by recreational and commercial fishennen, and since it is
often under intense pressure to minimize regulatory interference by these same groups at
9\ Supra nole 88 at 2042.
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public hearings, it should therefore come as no surprise that the immediate needs of these
constituencies often take precedent over the long-tenn needs of the resource. Therefore,
if the state's marine fish stocks arc to be held in trusit so that future gcnerations may
continue to enjoy the benefits dcrived from this resource, then the statc's management
system, as it presently exists, leaves a great deal to be desired.
CHAPTER III
WINTER FLOUNDER: SPECIES PROFILE
From its physical appearance it is difficult to initially discern what makes the
winter flounder (Pleuronectes americanus), which is also commonly known as
blackback, lemon sale, and Georges Bank flounder, so popular with commercial and
recreational fishermen,92 It has a laterally-compressed, ovate-shaped body over twice as
long as it is wide (as measured to the base of the cauda'! fin) (see figure 3.1),93 It is a
demersal flatfish with a small mouth and thick lips. Like other members of the Family
Pleuronectide, such as the witch (Glyptocephalus cynoglossus) and yellowtail flounders
(Limandaferruginea), both its eyes and viscera are located on its right side. To better
enhance its survival from predators lurking above, its top-side pigmentation varies in hue
(usually reddish brown, olive green, or dark slat) to blend in with its surroundings. Its
bottom-facing side is usually white.94 Its maximum recorded size is 8 pounds (64 em
totallength),95 In comparison to other highly sought-after groundfish of the Northwest
Atlantic, such a~ cod (Gadus morhua) and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), which
can both grow in excess of thirty pounds, the winter flounder is relatively small.
Except for a stock that permanently resides on Georges Bank, the winter flounder
is most abundant in inshore waters from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Chesapeake Bay
and occasionally is found as far north as Labrador and south to Georgia,% Unlike many
other species which only temporarily migrate inshore as water temperatures moderate
92Notc that winter tloundcr is oftcn listcd scparately from lemon sole in tllC NNfFS catch statistics.
Commcrcially, winter tlounder weighing more Lhan 3 lbs are catcgorized as lemon sole.
93K.A. Fostcr, Status of winter tlowldcr (psendoplcuroncctcs amcricanus) stocks in the Gulf or
tvIainc, Southern New En~land, and Middle Atlantic areas, National Mmine Fishcries Service, Northeast
Fisheries Center, Woods Hole. Laboratory Referencc Document No. 87-06: 5.
94Henry B. Bigelow and William C. Schroeder, Fishes of the Gulf of Main r Fishery Bulletin 74
of the Fish and Wildlife Service, vol. 53, Washington: GPO, 1953: 276.
9Sc. Richard Robins, G. Carlton Ray, and John Douglass, A Field Guide to Atlantic Coast
Eishes, (fhe Peterson Field Guide Series). Boston: Houghton Mifl1in Company, 1986: 295.
96Supra note 94 at 282.
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Figure 3.1: Wiuter Flouuder, P1eu ronect:es americanus97
97 Source: Ibid. at 276.
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during the late spring and summer, the winter flounder remains close to its nalal estuaries
and embayments throughout most of the fall, winter, and spring. During the warn1er
months, just a'i many other species are making their initial inshore appearance, it migrates
offshore to cooier waters, where it generally does not venture deeper than 20 fathoms, or
approximately fifteen miles offshore (excluding the population of fish on Georges
Bank).98
Throughout New England and the mid-Atlantic states, the winter llounder remains
one of the most popular commercial and recreational species despite a marked downturn
in total landings over the last decade. In 1992, commercial fishermen landed 13,934,000
lbs. of winter flounder with an ex-vessel value of approximately 15.8 million doUars. 99
Additionally, for the same year, the NMFS estimates that recreational angkrs caught
nearly 1,674,000 lbs. of winter Oounder.HK) Unfortunately, the future of this fishery is
uncertain; a combination of unfavorable natural conditions, persistent overfishing, and
critical habitat degradation has resulted in annually decreasing stock size and
consequently, lower landings.
The winter flounder is an especially important species for small commercial
fishing vessels that can not safely venture far offshore, as well as for shore-bound and
small-boat recreational fishennen. In recent years, as many inshore stocks have declined,
so too has the number of undertonnage Oess than 5 gross registered tons) and class 2 (5-
50 gross registered tons) fishing vessels, commonly referred to as dayboats. lOi In the
Northeast, from Maine to Delaware, there has been a nearly one-quarter reduction in the
98Grace Klein-MacPhee. Synopsis of Biolo~calData for the Winter Flounder.
Pseudopleuronectes americanus (Walhaum). NOAA Technical Report, N!vlFS Circular 414/fAO Fisheries
Synopsis No. 117: 35.
99Supra note 11 at 1.
IOOrbid. at 28-
WIThe name "dayhoat" is in reference to the length of a typical fishing trip - usually lasting only
a day.
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number of class 2 ottcr trawl vessels si nce 1982. 102 Many of the fishcrmcn still
remaining have gencrally fallen on hard times. Until very reccntly, the winter t10under
fishery provided a dependable source of much-needed income. Its tendency to be found
over unobstructed muddy or sandy bottoms makes it ideally suited for the otter trawl,
which accounts for approximately 95% of the commercial landings recorded by the
NMFS.103 Additionally, its ex-vessel price of over a doHar a pound is well above that
paid for most other groundfish that are commonly caught in large quantities close to shore
(see table 3.1). Its offshore migration during the warmer months ideally coincides with
the inshore arrival of other valuable species, such as scup (Stentotomus chrusops) and
summer flounder (Paralichthys lethostigma) in southern New England. During the
remainder of the year, when water temperatures are less suitable for most other species, it
provides one of the few, if not the only, viable inshore fishery. Consequently, the winter
flounder helps to provide small vessel fishermen with both an important and steady
source of income.
As previously mentioned, the winter flounder is also a popular recreational
species. Its distribution in in close proximily to shore, coupled with il~ willingness to
strike a baited hook, have made it a common target for many fishermen. During the early
spring and late fall it is often the first and last fish available for most recreational anglers.
It docs not require cIaborate or expensive equipment to catch; light tackle and a hook
baited with a piece of clam, mussel, or sea worm rested on the bottom is often all that is
needed. Its flaky texture and mild, delicate flavor are part of the reward for the successful
angler. Many bait and tackle stores, small boat liveries, and headboats are dependent
upon it as an important source of income. However, in recent years, as its numbers have
102From 538 vessels in 1982 to 403 vessels vessels in 1991. For a discussion of this trend see
Anthony, V.c. ''The New England Groundfish Fishery after 10 Ycars of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act" NOith American Journal of fishery Management 10: 175-184
l03Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission. Interstate Management £Ian for Inshore Stocks
of Winter Flounder, Oct. 1991: 34.
48
Price of Comme.·cially ImpOliaJ:lt Finfish & Squid Common to
Narragansett Bay & Rhode Island Sound
Species Price ($/Jlb)
Summer Rounder 1.45
Winter Flounder 1.15
Monkfish 0.82
Cod 0.80
Butterfish 0.59
Windowpain Floundcr 0.54
Squid (Lol'igo) 0.53
SCllp 0.52
Silver Hake 0.31
Rcd Hake 0.22
Occan Poul 0.10
Allanlic Herring 0.06
Table 3.1: Pricc!lb of fish commonly c:.\lIght in Rhode Island "·aters 104
l04United States. Department of COimnerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
National Marine Fisheries Service. Northeast Fisheries Center, Woods Hole Massachusetts, Status of the
Fishery Resources Off the Northeastem United States for 1992, Technical Memorandwn NMFS-F/NEC-95.
1992: 18.
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declined, so has its popularity. As estimated with data from the NMFS's Marine
Recreational Fishery Statistics Survey (MRFSS), in 1988 and 1989, it ranked second in
the North Atlanlic subregion, behind bluefish (Pomatomus saltatrix), as the most
commonly sought-after species; by 1991, it ranked fifth. 105
Although the total population of winter flounder is comprised of many localized
subgroups, for descriptive and management purposes it is divided into four major stocks:
Gulf of Maine; Southern New England; Middle Atlantic; and Georges Bank. 106 The
individual stocks have similar growth, seasonal movement, and female maturity
schedules, allowing each to be m<.x.ieled as a single unit. 107 To a large degree, the winter
flounder is a victim of its own popularity. Continuous overfishing by both commercial
and recreational fishermen has significantly reduced total stock size throughout its range.
Since around the mid-1980s, aU of the stock have generaHy declined in abundance to a
point where there is a great deal of uncertainty over whether or not even the present row
landings will be sustainable into the future.
For management purposes, the winter llounder population in Rhode Island is
grouped into two separate stocks, one of which comprises all of Narragansett Bay and the
other the salt ponds. The total abundance of winter flounder in Narragansett Bay has
precipitously declined to a record low level. Since t980, as measured through several
research surveys, there has been a 60-95% reduction in the number of fish in the Bay.
Preliminary moocls by the RIDFW for the salt ponds indicate a similar decline, yet there
is some uncertainty due to a paucity of historical abundance data for this population. In
Narragansett Bay, there are several factors which have contributed to the stock's decline.
105United Slates. Deparlment of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
National Marine Fishcries Scrvice, Marinc Recreational Fishery Statistics Survey. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,
1987 - 1989. Washington: GPO, 1991: 145 & 215. and Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics Survcy,
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, 19'JO - J991. Washington: GPO, 1992: 185.
lOG-rhe NMFS has grouped the population into 3 stocks, combining the Sonthem New England
and Middle Atlantic stocks into one ,!,Jfoup. ·The ASNlFC feels these stocks should be considered separately.
107Supra note 103 at 19.
50
Many commercial and recreational fishermen argue that while overfishing is partially at
fault, there are other natural and man-made problems responsible for this predicament. A
closer examination of the status of the winter flounder population reveals there is some
validity to their argument. Past catch records and trawl survey data reflect, what appears
to be, its natural cyclical ,pattern of abundance. There is now strong evidence linking
poor recruitment with above-average winter water temperatures. Additionally, there is a
growing body of data indicating that the collapse of the Mt. Hope Bay subpopulation is
due in large part to the high larval entrainment rate by the Brayton Point electrical power
plant. And finally, habitat degradation may a)so be a contributing factor fimiting stock
production. However, with the possible exception of the Mt. Hope Bay situation, it will
be demonstrated in this chapter that the most realistic course of action to help stabilize
and rebuild the fishery in the foreseeable future is primarily through curbing overfishing.
SPECIES PROFILE
To survive in the ever-changing nearshore zone, the winter flounder is able to
adapt to varying conditions. Unlike deeper ocean waters, which tend to remain relatively
stable, shallow coastal areas are greatly affected by seasonal changes and weather
conditions. Varying amounts of solar heating and rainfall can lead to wide fluctuations in
water temperature and salinity. The winter flounder can tolerate a temperature range of
0°_25°C and a salinity differential of 4-300/00 without any critical impediment of its vital
functions.l08 Younger fish are more tolerant of higher temperatures and are therefore
able to stay inshore even during the warmer summer months.l09 Mature fish on the other
l08Supra note 98 at 9.
l09Ibid. al5.
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hand, tend to seek a comfort zone of 12°-15°C and will therefore migrate inshore and
olTshore to stay within this range. I 10
This migratory behavior can be observed through data from both tagging studies
and research sunfeys. The results of a RlDFW tagging study in upper Narragansett Bay
of legal size fish, indicate that winter Ilounder migmte out of the Bay, through the deeper
cooler waters of the East Passage, when water temperatures reach the critical 15'C
threshold, usually in Mayor June (see figure 3.2).111 A tagging study of fish from the
salt ponds noted a similar dispersal from inshore areas during the warmer summer
months. 112 While offshore, these fish generally move into Rhode Island Sound and areas
southeast of Narragansett Bay.u3 In the fall, as water temperatures decrease, they
generally return, sometime between October and December, to the same location from
which they departed. 114 Throughout the coldest months they wiB remain in a
semidormant state buried in the bottom sediment until they are ready to spawn sometime
during the latc winter or early spring. liS
This exodus and influx of fish into and out of the Bay during the spring and fall is
also reflected in the monthly catch of winter !lounder by thc URIGSO research survey.
This survey intercepts those fish that enter and exit the bay through the West Pa<;sage at
two sites. The Fox Island station is located in central Narragansett Bay, whereas the
Whale Rock station is situated just ouL"ide the mouth of the Bay in Rhode Island Sound
(see figure 3.3).116 The bimodal distribution (with peaks occurring during the spring and
IIOJ:bid. at 23. One exception to tillS pattern occurs near tile extreme northern extent of its
distribution. In this region, wintcr 110under migrate inshore during ilie summer when watcr temperaturcs
moderate to a more comfortable range and slightly offshore into deeper water during tile winter.
lllChristopher J. Powell, "Winter Hounder Tagging Study, 1986 - 1988 with Comments on
Movement," Rhode Island Division of [-ish and Wildlife, Jan. 1989. Res. Ref. Doc. 89/3: 3.
112Saui B. Saila, "A Study of winter 110under movements," Liminolol:Y Oeeano~raphy 6.3: 294.
113Ibid.
114Supra note Ill.
I1SRichard Crawford, Winter Rounder in Rhode Island Coa<;tal Ponds, Narragansett, Rhode
Island: Rhode Island Sea Grant, Mar. 1990: 6.
116-J'llis and oilier research surveys in and around Narragansett Bay will he explained in greater
detail furtiler in tlus chapter.
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117Source: Supra note Ill.
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fall) of the mean monthly winter flounder catch at the Fox Island station is an indication
of when the fish are exiting and entering the Bay, and are therefore more abundant in the
West Passage during these periods (sec figure 3.4). The January-February trough is the
result of the fish having settled in for the winter further up in the Bay, while the July-
September dip is the result of most of the fish having left the Bay in search of cooler
offshore waters. The summer migration offshore into Rhode Island Sound is apparent in
the substantial increase in the mean monthly catch at Whale Rock (see figure 3.4). Yet, it
should be remembered, that despite this seasonal movement, in comparison to many other
species of finfish, which often migrate great distances from the outer edge of the
continental shelf to inshore shoal areas, the winter flounder is a relatively sedentary
species.
Studies have demonstrated that most winter flounder return to their natal inshore
areas year after year. 118 Therefore, since interspawning amongst different populations is
practically negligible, discrete populations have developed with differing growth rates
and meristic and morphometric characteristics. 119 Consequently, the winter flounder
population "is comprised of many relatively independent, localiz.ed stocks inhabitjng bays
and estuaries along the coa,>l." 120 Regional fisheries are supplied by stocks originati ng
from nearby waters. For example, as determine through tagging studies, the vast
majority of winter flounder caught in the NMFS statistical area 539 (see figure 3.5), just
off of Rhode Island, originate from Narragansett Bay and to a much lesser degree, Rhode
Island's coastal salt ponds.
118See: Mol. Lobell, "A biological survey of the sall waters of Long Island;" Alfred Perlmutter,
'The Blackback Flounder and it's Fishery in New England and New York;" and Saul B. Saila, "A Study of
winter l10under movements."
119Supra note 104 at 92.
120Alfrcd Perlmutler, "TIle Blackback Flounder and it's Fishery in New England and New York,"
Bulletin of the 13in~ll:un Occano~raphic Collection 11.2 (1947): 27.
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1221hid. at 45.
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Winter !launder spawn during the winter and early spring, when water
temperatures are close to or at their minimum.121 As a result of earlier seasonal warming
in the southern hall' of its range, spawning tends to begin first in the Mid-Atlantic and
progressively later in the season heading north. 124 Spawning in Narragansett Bay takes
place sometime from the end of December through April, with the peak period occurring
in March, when water temperatures average between 2° to 5°c.125 Spawning grounds are
generally located along the shallower margins of the Bay over sandy bottoms with depths
between 1.8 and 3.6 meters.l26 Within Narragansett Bay, the upper bay north of
Prudence Island, Mt. Hope Bay, and the Sakonnet River are all known to be major
spawning areas. The same may also hold true for Greenwich Bay and Wickford Cove. l27
Size and age of first maturity varies throughout its range. In Narragansett Bay,
just over half the winter flounder (51.8%) are mature by age 3 (272 mm or 10.71 ").128
Most females average approximately 500 thousand eggs, while large individuals may be
capable of producing 1.5 million eggs. 129 The eggs are non-buoyant and adhere in
clusters to diatom mats along the bottom, thereby reducing the chance that winds or tides
will carry them into the open ocean where their survival odds arc greatly diminished. l3O
Newly hatched winter Ilounder initially look like most other non-flatfish, with one
eye on each side of their head before they metamorphose into their more recognizable
form. Larval development occurs as follows:
The vertical fin my begin to appear 5 to 6 weeks after hatching, at a length
of about 7 mm., and the left eye has moved upward by then until about
half of it is visible above the dorsal outline of the head, while the whole
123SlIpra nole 94 al 280.
124Supra nole 98 al 6.
125Supra nole 111.
126Supra note 121 al5.
1271bid. al9.
I28Nole 87.3% of age 4 fish (322 nIDi or 12.68") are malure.
129Supra note 94 al 280.
130SlIpra nole 98 al4.
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left eye shows from the right side and the fins are fully formed in larvae of
8 mm. Metamorphosis continues rapidly. The left eye moves from this
position to the right side of the head; the pigment fades from the blind
side; the eyed side becomes uniformly pigmented; and the little fish now
lies and swims with the blind side down, its metamorphosis complete
when it is only 8 to 9 0101. tong. 131 [see figure 3.6]
LArvae and young juveniles generally feed upon diatoms, crustaceans and
dinoflagellates.l32 Adult fish switch to a diet of polychaete worms, amphipod and isopod
crustaceans, pelecypods, and plant material. 133 In southern New England, most fish are
between 4 to 6 inches by the end of their first year (see figure 3.7 for age-length
comparison).134 Immature fish generally tend to remain within the relatively safe
confines of their nursery areas year round. As they mature and become less tolerable of
warm water, they begin participating in the previously-discussed, annual offshore
migration during the late spring and early summer.
The winter flounder's migratory behavior of moving offshore into deeper waters
during the warmer months, is opposite that of most other species of finfish, which
generally migrate inshore during the spring and summer when water temperatures
moderate. This inverse migration may be a survival mechanism, allowing it to spawn and
have its larvae develop with a minimum of potential predators. A study of the migratory
and resident fish stocks of Narragansett Bay noted,
the winter flounder's success may result from physiological adaptations
that reduce competition during the spawning period. They spawn during
winter and spring when potential competitors are in the warmer, and
environmentally more stable, offshore depths ... Larvae metamorphose by
131 Supra nole 94 al280.
132Supra note 98 at 13.
133Ibid.
134supra nole 94 at 281.
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Figure 3.6 Winler Rowldcr Larval Development135
135Source: Ibid.
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June, so the most sensitive phase of the winter flounder's life history is
complete by the time potential competitors return to the Bay and begin
their spawning and growth periods. Being able to reproduce in brackish
water at low temperature, winter flounder utilize space and resources
denied more stenotropic species. 137
Yet despite this strategy to ensure an optimum survival rate, larval and juvcnilc fish still
suffer close to 99.98-99.99% mortality.13R It is cstimated that for fish populations in
Rhode Island's salt ponds, only 18 of every 100,000 hatched eggs survive to age one. 139
Part of this can be attributed to the seaward drift of larvae out of their protected inshore
estuaries and embaymenls. l40 While others succumb to predators such as the Sarsia
tubulosa, a hydromedusa. 141 Juveniles face a host of larger predators including striped
ba~s (Morone saxatilis), blucfish (Pomatomus sallatrix), cormorants
(Phalacrocoracidae), and harbor seals (Phoca vitulina)142
There is strong cvidence that larval development is highly sensitive to
temperature. Laboratory studies have found larval growth ratc to be significantly greater
at 8°C than 5°C, with metamorphosis occurring in 49 days a" opposed to 80 days at thc
lower temperature. 143 However, those fish that metamorphoscd carlier, do so at a smallcr
size, which may further diminish their odds of survivaP44 This finding concurs with
another study that noted coldcr watcr tcmperature 48-51 days prior to spawning and
137perry H. Jeffries and William C. JolliSon, "Seasonal Disuibution of Bollom Fishes in the
Narraganseu Bay Area: Seven-Year Variations in the Abwldance of Winter Hounder (Pseudopleuru/lectes
americo/lus )," Joumal rishclies RcsearchBoard ofCanada,3I.6 (1974): 1060-1.
138William G. Pearcy, "Ecology of an Estuarine Popul'ation of Winter Hounder,
Pseudopleuronecles americanus (Walbaum)." Bulletin of the Bin~halll Oceano~aphicCollection 18.1
(1962): 39.
139Saul B. Saila, ''The conuibutions of estuaries to the offshore winter Oounder fishery in Rhode
Island," Gulf Caribbean Fisheries Institute, University of Miarui. Proc. 14th Atmu.'ll Session 1%1: %.
140Supra note 98 at 30.
141Snpra note 138 at 31.
142Supra note 98 at 9.
l43lbid. at 17.
144As noted in: Mark R. Gibson, "Winter Rounder Recmitment in Narragansett Bay in Relation to
Spawning Stock Abundance and WatcrTemperature," Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife. Aug.
1991. Res. Ref. Doc. 91/5: 3.
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throughout the lan1al development period resuTted in more active and healthy larvae. 145 It
is hypothesized that the larger and more active Ian'ae are better able to avoid predation,
and therefore, colder water temperatures during their development promotes greater
recruitment. l46 Based upon this finding it was concluded that "cold winters followed by
gradual spring warming produced the largest year classes." 147
Further supporting this hypothesis is the apparent connection between above-
average winter water temperatures with periods of low or declining commercial catch.
Historical observations, dating back to the 1920s, have noted cycles of relative abundance
and scarcity in the apparent number of winter flounder. According to fyke net records
and fishermen log books, winter flounder were less abundant between 1934-1940 than
they were from 1925-1933. 148 This decline was originally believed to be associated with
a period of above-average winter water temperatures although there was no corroborative
temperature data A subsequent study demonstrated that an increasing trend of abundance
from 1947-1956 was associated with a period of climatic cooling. 149
In specific reference to the stock in Narragansett Bay, a comparison of water
temperatures and the abundance of winter Hounder, ac; measured by the URIGSO trawl
survey, hac; found there exist<; a strong relationship between the two variables. Increased
water temperature during the spawning period has been found to be a critical variable
associated with decreased catch, allowing for a 2 to 3 year time lag during which the fish
grow to marketable size. ISO A bivariate linear model that included water temperature at
metamorphosis and water temperature during the growth period to catchable size notcd
that a slight tempemture rise accounted for 92% of thc URIGSO trawl survey catch
145Ibid.
146Ibid.
147Thid.
148Supra note 94 at 282 and Supra note 26 at 8-9.
149Supra note 144 at 2.
150Supra note 137 at 1065. (significant at the 80% confidence level).
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variation between 1966-1973.151 Additional studies since then have noted a continuation
of this relationship (see table 3.2).
I'ablc 3.2: A hoel summary 01 wmter flounder abundance trends, as recorded III the URlGSO trawl survey,
and winter water temperatures in N:uTag,Ulsett Bay 152
Narragansett Bay Winter Flounder Abundance
& Winter Water Temperature
Period Abundance Trend , Winter Water Tempcr..lture
1968-72 . Declining Above Average
1'1975-80 Increasing Below Average
] 981-9] Dcclining Abovc Average
.' ..
There is no definitive, straightforward answer as to why wanner water
temperatures appear to be associated with declines in the winter flounder population. In
both studies the temperature differential was very slight and well within the species
tolerance limit. 153 Instead of temperature having a direct affect, it may involye a host of
biotic factors. It was noted that,
climatic variation during winter and early spring must be a critical factor,
imposed not as a physiological limit on reproduction, but possibly by
predation during metamorphosis. At this critical stage in the life cycle, the
left eye of the planktonic larva moves to the right side, dense pigmentation
develops, and tbe juvenile flounder, now flattened but extrcmely
vulnerable, drops to the bottom. 154
151 Pen)' H. Jefflles and Mark Terceiro, "Cycle of Changing Ahundances in the r:ishes of
Narragansett Bay Area," NOAA/Sea Grant. University of Rhode Island. Marine Report Number 170: 239.
152collccted from Mark R. Gibson, "Winter Hounder Recruiunent in Narrag:msett Bay in
Relation to Spawning Stock Abundancc and Water Temperature;" Perry H. Jeffries and William C.
Johnson, "SC<'lSonal Distribution of Bottom Fishes in tlle Narragansett Bay Area: SevcLl-Ycar \'arialions in
the Ahundance of Winter Flounder (Pseudopleurollectes americGllus );" and Perry II. Jeffries and Mark
Terceiro, "Cycle of Changing Abundances in me Fishes of Narragansett Bay Area."
153Ihid.
154lhid.
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It is conjectured that the accelerated metamorphosis may be advantageous for predators
sllch as thc sculpin (MyxoceplUllus octodecemspinosus).155 These fish that have
developed earlier, but at a smaller size, may be more vufnemble. And, as previously
noted, these warm water offspring are less robust than their cold water counterparts, thus
further contributing to their high mOltality rate. Another theory hypothesizes that the
Neomysis americana, an epibenthic mysid that feeds upon larval flounder, is more
prolific during warmer winters and may therefore be the cause of its dedine during these
periods. 156
IMPORTANT HABIT AT ISSUES
In addition to natuml climatic conditions, the abundance of winter Oounder may
be a product of the quality of the coastal environment. There are many studies indicating
that anthropogenic modifications of inshore \vaterways may be partially to blame for the
species' near coastwide decline. In its Fishery Management PlanIor Inshore Stocks of
Winter Flounder, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) noted:
Habitat quality is of particular im(xxtance to winter flounder because the
geographic location of its spawning grounds, and limited sea<;onal
movements, make this species particularly susceptible to habitat
degradation. Nursery habitat includes littoml and sublittoral saltwater
coves, coastal salt ponds, estuaries, and protected embayments. The
proximity of these habitats to many human activities expose winter
Hounder to the effects of habitat loss and alteration, effects of toxic
contaminants, and entrainment and impingement in power plant coolant
1551bid.
l.5('Perry H. Jeffries, Stephen Hale, and Aimee Keller, Historical Dala Assessmenl Finfishes of the
Narral:<msell13a~Are<!, Currenl Report: The Narragansett Bay Project NBP-89-15: 310.
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systems. The result can be an insidious loss of reproductivc and growth
potential. 157
Howevcr, with some exccptions, identifying and quantifying the causes and quantity of
mortality attributable to pollution and the modification of critical habitat, are oftcn
difficult to discern. As further noted by the ASMFC, "The effects of habitat modification
on local fish stocks are often indirect, gradual, and unquantifiable. They are also additive
and interactive." 158
Over the last several decades, many estuarine systems, embayments, and salt
ponds have been heavily impacted by the development and pollution resulting from a
burgeoning coastal population. It is estimated that 110 million people - nearly 50% of
the U.S. population - currently live in coastal counties. 159 The Northeast region, from
Maine to Virginia - which happens to coincide with the common range of the winter
110under - accounted for nearly one-third (39 million people) of this total. l60 In its
analysis of coastal population growth, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration noted, "Not surprisingly, relatively high concentrations of pollutants have
been measured in bottomrish, shellfish, and sediments at sites ncar highly populated
coastal areas." 161 A continuation of this demographic trend, and thc subscquent
destruction of coastal ecosystems, does not appear as if it will abate in the near future. By
the year 2010, the coastal population is expected to increase to 127 million peoplc,
thereby placing evcn further strains upon the coastal cnvironment. 162
Not surprisingly, larger winter 110under populations appear to be correlated with
larger totall habitat areas (see table 3.3). With this in mind, it is possible that the building
157Supra note 103 at 1.
158Ibid.
159united Slates. Department of Commerce. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administratioll.
National Ocean Service. Strategic Assessment Branch, 50 Years of Population Chan~c alonl: the Nation's
Coasts 1%0-2010, Second Report of a coastal Trends Series, 1990: 1.
l6OJbid. at 7.
161 Ibid. at 1.
162Ibid.
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"'inter Flounder Populations
Stock Size versus Available Habitat Area
Stock Location Estimated Habitat Area Estimated Population Size
Georges Bank 11,580,366 11,954,248
St. Marys Bay NS 134,400 1,821,039
Narmgansett Bay RI 84,063 6,385,057
Great South Bay NY 81,920 2,458,171
Barnegat Bay NJ 1 72,593 4,013,937
Peconic Bay NY 14,515 ; 285,300
Moriches Bay NY 8,687 1,513,489
Pt. Judith Pond RI 1,576 38,700
Ninnigret Pond RI 1,560 38,000/137,800
Waquoit Bay MA 1,211 51,M5 I
Table 3.3: Comparison of estimated tola! population size with estimated hahitat area l6.1
163Source: Supra note 103 at 2. Note: 2 figures for l'\illnigret pond are from different tagging
studies that were conducted in 1966 and 1982
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activity commonly associated with the demands or an increasing population, such as
dredging and filling for marinas and shore-front homes, may have permanently reduced
the winter flounder's total stock size. It is estimated that between 1954-1968, from
Massachusetts to New Jersey (the core area of the winter t1ounder's abundance) there was
a 6 to 15% pcmlanent loss of shallow water habitat, thereby possi bly limi ting stock size
in this region. IM
In some cases, the loss of habitat may be only temporary. For example, dredging
activity during and immediately after the spawning period can adversely affect
recruitment. The suspension of sediment particles from dredging operations has been
found to reduce hatchability, lessen yolk utilization, and inhibit larval fish from
controlling their position in the water column. 165 Additionally, the periodic occurrence of
low dissolved oxygen (D.O.) levels, due in part to e\.cessive nutrient loading, can also be
detrimental to young winter l1ounder. Juvenile fish are intolemnt of low D.O. levels and
consequently are generally never found in areas where the bottom D.O. lcvd is less than
2 mg/IYil While it is obvious that anoxic events may result in fish kills, surreptitiously,
prolonged conditions of hypoxia (low D.O.) may be responsible f(J[ retarding the
development of those fish that are unabfc to nee to more hospitable conditions.
Additionally, the extra stress burden of enduring low D.O. levels may make fish more
suscepti blc to disease or predation. 167
In addition to the above-stated problems, there is a growing body of evidence
linking certain pollutants with a higher incidence of stress-related diseases and
reproductive failure. Densely populated coao;tal areas are generally associated with
higher levels of toxic contaminants such as DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane),
PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), PAHs (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), and trace
164lbid. at 1.
165Ibid. al4-5.
166Ibid. at 79.
1671hid.
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metals, 'like cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, silver, and zinc. These
pollutants work their way into nearshore waters through surface runoff, sewage
discharges, industrial and refinery wastewater disposal, and accidental spills. l68 This
inshore pollution is especially troublesome for estuarine-dependent fish, like the winter
flounder. As noted by the ASMFC,
estuaries in the mid-Atlantic region are most susceptible to pollution
retention because of their relatively large volumes, moderate to low
freshwater inHow, and low tidal exchange: the very retention
characteristics that winter flounder ex.ploit to enhance spawning
success. 169
The winter flounder is "particularly susceptible to the effects of annual or periodic
contamination ex.posure because of... lits]1 physical contact with polluted sediments,
and ... ingestion of contaminated sediment and/or benthic organisms." l7O With the
assistance of precision measuring tools and computer data analysis, scientists can detect
even minute amounL<; of contaminants in the environment. However, fully understanding
their effed<; upon marine fauna and flora is not always easily recogni:t..able. One
barometer used to gage their impact is through detecting and quantifying the presence and
frequency of biological diseases or abnormalities in Jiving organisms such as shellfish
and finfish. For example, fin rot and liver tumors are but two indicators generally
associated with relatively degraded areas where pollutants are more perva<;ive. While this
method is far from full proof, it docs provide some means by which to detect if the level
of contamination is resulLing in chronic or sub-chronic effects that can jeopardize the
overall health of a stock.
1681bid. al8.
169Jbid. al 7.
l7OJhid. at 5.
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Liver cancer and fin rot in winter flounder is generally more prevalent in fish
endemic to degraded inshore waters. Samples of fish with a greater frequency of heptic
neoplasms, a precursor of liver tumors, have been found in areas of high sediment
contamination in the Merrimack River (MA), Salem Harbor (MA), Plymouth Harbor
(MA), Buzzards Bay (MA), New Bedford Harbor (MA), Narragansett Bay (Rl), Western
Long Island Sound, and Raritan Bay (NJ).171 Data from Boston Harbor indicate that
between 8 to 23% of the fish studied are afflicted with some forn1 of liver lesions,
however the incidence of this occurrence is declining possibly due to a reduction in toxic
discharges. l72 Fin rot was found to be most prevalent in winter flounder from degraded
areas in the Gulf of Maine and around the genera! New York City and Boston Harbor
vicinity. 173
In addition to a higher incidence of disease, another indicator that poUution may
also be limiting production is inferred by studying the eggs and !arvae of fish from
relatively contaminated areas. Scientists believe that the additional strain and stress
brought on during the spawning period serves to heighten the winter flounder's sensitivity
to the toxicity of certain pollutants. A comparison of eggs, embryos, and larvae from
rclatively contaminated and clean sites in Boston Harbor and Long Island Sound found
that fish from the degraded areas produced smaller eggs with higher early embryo
mortality, yielding smaller larvae with small yolk-saks.174 In New Bedford harbor, which
is contaminated by PCBs, the incidence of smaller larval fish was greater than a relatively
less polluted area in Narragansett Bay.175 Reduced larval size is linked to higher
mortality rates. 176
171Ibid. at 7.
l72Ibid.
173Ibid
174Ihid. at 11
175Ibid.
J7('Ihid.
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On site sampling provides a means of monitoring the health and status of a local
populations, however because fish are generally exposed to a combination of pollutants
and environmental variables, it is often difficult to discern the exact effects of anyone
particular contaminant. Consequently, laboratory studies, where extraneous variables
can be avoided or accounted for, have provided valuable information about the effects of
individual pollutants. In general, scientists have found that trace metals can eause kidney
and liver disorders, mutations of the girl structure, and elevated gill-tissue respiration
rates. I77 Petroleum hydrocarbons and PAHs are associated with the foBowing
physiological abnormalities: reduced food consumption, altered swimming 'behavior,
lower juvenile growth rate, excessive mucus secretion from skin and gills, alteration of
blood plasma, hematocrit and hemoglobin ,levels, enlarged gall bladder and altered bile
chemistry, reduced testes size, and lowered immune response. 178 For both categories of
toxins, ilt is noted that although these effects may not always be lethal, the stress they
create places "added demand ... on the animal's energy reserves which greatl'y impairs its
capacity to respond and survive in a naturally changing environment. "179
In specific reference to Narragansett Bay, there is some mixed evidence about
whether or not pollution may be a factor in the decline of this fishery. In a study of the
effects of PCBs and trace metals on winter flounder from three areas (Warwick Neck,
Whale Rock, and Quonochontaug Pond), liver neoplasms and macrophage were found to
be associated with higher levels of PCBs in the more degraded area (Warwick Neck). 180
Based on this finding it was concluded that anthropogenic pollution is adversely affecting
the health of the stocks. lSI However, based upon a study of the mortality rate of juvenile
fish collected from a beach seine study, the RIDFW concluded that, with the exception of
177lbid.
178Ibid. al9.
179rbid. alII.
lSOf.c. Lee, S.D. Saila, and R.E. Wolke, Winter Aowlder Conlaminant and Patholo~.'ical Survey:
Narra~,Ulselt Bay and Vicinity, Current Report: The Narragansett Bay Project. NBP-91-51.
181 Ibid.
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the Brayton Point powcr plant in Ml. Hope Bay, "there is no compelling evidencc that
elevated mortality rates in pre-recruit wintcr !lounder due to anthropogenic impacts or
predators are responsible. II 182 However, it is still unclear as to whether overall spawning
production may be down due to the loss of shallow water habitat or environmental
contamination.
The potential health risk for people consuming winter flounder from polluted
areas appears to be minimal. Most of the toxins mentioned above generally accumulate
in the fish's liver and not its edible tissue. 183 However, excessive PCB contamination in
New Bedford Harbor (MA) and the Acushnet River (MA) has led to a ban on eating
winter flounder caught in these locations. 184 Yet the impracticality of tracking these fish
when they migrate offshore and mix with other stocks, compromises the protection
offered by this ban. In general, outsidc of these two areas, most winter .flounder do not
exceed the health risk thresholds established under the US Food and Drug Administration
Tolerance and ACLion Levels. 18S However, the ASMFC does note that those people who
eat more than 132Ibs/year may be doing so at some risk. 186
In some locations, power plant-related mortality can be extremely detrimental to a
local stock. Power stations with open c(~)lant systems demand large volumes of water
from nearby waterways. If these intake pipes are located in close proximity to a winter
flounder nursery area, many larval and juvenile fish are often indiscriminately killed as
they become entrained or impinged in an intake pipe. Entrainment is the process whereby
eggs and larvae are trapped and drawn into a coolant system by the suction turbulence of
an intake pipe. As noted by the ASMFC,
182SlIpra note 136 al 28.
183SlIpra nole 103 aIlS.
184lbid.
1851bid. at 13.
[&llbid. al 15.
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winter flounder larvae are particularly susceptible to entrainment mortality
by power plant intakes during and after metamorphosis because they are
weak swimmers and their benthic habit places them ncar intake pipes
designed to draw bottom water. Mechanical forces, elevated temperatures,
and chlorination cause neady complete mortality of all fish larvae and
most fish eggs drawn into the coo'lant water stream of power plants. 187
Impingement mortality on the other hand, is most common for juvenile fish. It is the
process whereby fish that swim too close to an intake pipe are drmvn against its protective
screens. Even those fish that escape these two dangers still face another potential
problem; the higher water temperatures near pov.'er plants, due to the release of coolant
water, may inhibit juvenile fish from feeding .188 Since winter flounder usually return to
their natal inshore waters year after year to spawn, and do not mix with other populations,
the additional strain of this mortality, in conjunction with overfishing and unfavorable
environmental conditions, can be catastrophic for a local population.
In southern New England, the Millstone Point plant in Waterford, Connecticut and
the Brayton Point plant in Somerset, Massachusetts on Mt. Hope Bay, are two power
stations where this problem is a major concern. Both electrical pfants abut important
local winter 110under nursery areas. It is estimated that the Millstone Point and Brayton
Point plants entrain approximately 79-192 and 266-686 miUion winter flounder larvae
and impinge 16,700 and 6,000 fish each year, respectively .189 Further adding to this
problem is that "this additional mortality targets the small percentage of larvae (and
juveniles) which have survived the very high natural mortality rates experienced by
younger planktonic stages." !90
Specifically concerning the Narragansett Bay stock, the Brayton Point power plant
has in all likelihood greatly contributed to the collapse of an important subpopulation of
187fbid.
188Supra note 98 at 24.
189Supra note 103 at 16.
1'X)lhid.
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fish. As previously mentioned, Mt. Hope Bay is a major winter Oounder spawning area.
This power plant, which is owned by the New England Power Company, produces
electricity through 4 coal-fired generators. As part of the terms of its operating license,
Marine Research, Inc. regularly conducts a fixed-station research survey to monitor any
potential impact the plant may have on the local population of marine fish. As mea<;ured
through this survey, the Mt. Hope Bay subpopulation of winter Oounder has dramatically
declined over the past ten years, even more so than the rest of the ,population in
Narragansett Bay and other comparable populations throughout all of New England (see
figure 3.8).
The most recent returns from the trawl survey conducted by Marine Research, Inc.
indicate that there are relatively few remaining winter !lounder left in Mt. Hope Bay. As
of 1985, this population has been in a stage of recruitment collapse. The occurrence of
this downward trend happens to coincide with the same year that the Brayton Point plant
switched one of it<; four cooling units from a closed to an open cycle, which resulted in a
47% increase in water usage. 191 In a stock-recruitment study, female spawners in Mt.
Hope Bay were found to produce only a tenth of the age 1 recruits as did those in other
parts of Narragansett Bay and throughout New England. l92 It is estimated that the high
larval entrainment rate results in a 1.3 million loss of age 3 fish, which is a "significant"
portion of this population. 193 The consequences of this loss, in combination with above-
average winter water temperatures and overfishing has "reduced the population
essentially to zero." 194 Rather than embarking upon a spirit of cooperation to find a
mutually agreeable solution to this problem, it appears as if the New England Power
1915upra nole 136 at 13.
192Ihid. al22.
193Ihid.
I94Ihid. at 3.
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Figure 3.8: Marine Research, Inc., AJUlUal Mean Numher of Winter Rounder per Tow, 1972-1992195
1955ourcc: ihid. at 53 (rahk 14)
75
Company has recently hired a legal fiml experienced with this type of case, possibly to
dispute the conclusions of the RIDFW.l96
ABUNDANCE TRENDS
The winter Ilounder is one of the most commonly studied groundfish in the
Northeast. This is especially true of the stock in Narragansett Bay. Its importance to
both commercial and recreational fishermen has led the RIDFW, the NMFS, and Marine
Research, Inc. to carefully monitor its abundance. Additionally, its tendency to be found
relatively close to shore, within in the range of small research vessels, has contributed to
it being a common species to study by students and professors at the University of Rhode
Island Graduate School of Oceanography. Consequently, there is a wealth of fishery-
dependent and independent data to help assess its status. For example, in addition to the
commercial and recreational fishery statistics compi)ed by the NMFS, there are three
trawl surveys ongoing in Narragansett Bay, as well as a fourth survey just offshore. The
one irrefutable conclusion that can be drawn from these various sources is that the
abundance of winter /lounder in the Bay has precipitously declined over the past ten years
to the point where it is at an all-time record low level.
Commercial fisheries data are collected through the NMFS weighout port
sampling program. In Rhode Island there are three reporting specialists strategically
located in Pt. Judith and Newport. Catch and effort data are gathered through point-of-
first-sale weighout receipts and interviews with fishermen as they land their catch. 197
Additional landings information is obtained through annual or monthly surveys of dealers
1% As discussed by RIDFW biologist Mark R. Gibson at RHv1FC Council Meeting Oct. 93.
1975upra note 104 at 19.
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who buy directly from fishermen. 19R Unlike other specics, like summer flounder and
swordfish (Xiphias gladius), which have mandatory reporting requirements, fishermen are
not compelled to submit data concerning winter nounder, and do so only on a voluntary
basis. 199
The commercial otter trawl catch in NMFS statistical area 539 is one important
source of data by which to gage the general abundance of winter nounder in Narragansett
Bay. Information about catch locations is gathered through the weighout port sampling
program mostly by interviewing fishermen immediately upon the completion of a fishing
trip. Catch and effort data are geographically stratified into 10 by 10 minute
latitudellongitude landings blocks and their corresponding broader statistical areas.
Statistical area 539 is situated immediately offshore of the eastern half of Rhode Island
(statistical area 611 abuts the western half) (see figure 3.5). Narragansett Bay and Rhode
Island Sound are two important components of this area. Tagging studies have
demonstrated that the vast majority of the Narragansett Bay winter flounder popUlation
confines its offshore migrations within the spatial boundaries of this area. For example,
in a recent (1986-1990) RIDFW tagging study of 7000 winter flounder from the upper
Bay, %.59'0 of the 802 recoveries were from Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island
Sound.2OO An earlier tagging study of fish released into Mt. Hope Bay and the Sakonnet
River found that 92% of those total recaptured were from the same areas.201 A tagging
survey of winter flounder from the salt ponds concluded that most of these fish migrated
in Block Island Sound (statistical area 61 J), with only a small component venturing into
Rh(xlc Island Sound.202
1981bid.
199 Reporting requirements have since changed while this thesis was bcing completed: Mandatory
reporting is now required of all commercial fishennen in the East Coast through a system of logbooks.
200Supra notc 136 at 6.
201Ibid.
202Ibid.
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The commercial otter trawl catch in statistical area 539 provides a continuous time
series of landings data since 1964 (see figure 3.9). Over this entire time span, there
appears to be a cyclical pattern of abundance with two distinct peaks occurring during the
mid-I960s and early 1980s, followed by two subsequent troughs during the mid-1970s
and as of the present. However, it should not be mistakenly believed that this trend will
hold true for the future and that the present depressed CPUE will subsequently recover
For as noted in the RlDFW stock assessment of 1993, "The long term abundance trends
indicate that 110under populations [in Narragansett Bay] have fluctuated strongly before
and recovered. However, fishing mortality was not as high then and abundance not as
row."203 Present CPUE has declined from 75-90% since the early 1980s, and is currently
at an "unprecedented" low Ievel.204
Recreational fishery data are collected through the NMFS Marine Recreational
Fisheries Statistics Survey (MRFSS). The MRFSS is comprised of two independent but
complementary surveys. The telephone survey of randomly selected households collects
effort information on the number, location, and dates of fishing trips over a two month
recall period.205 Due to reporting inaccuracies inherent in this recall period, descriptive
catch data, such as size, weight, amount kept and released, are only gathered in the
fishing site survey.206 Data from both surveys are combined to produce estimations of
total angler participation, effort, and catch. These statistics are further stratified by,
among other things, state and region, fishing mode (i.e. shore, party/charter, and
private/rental), and distance fished from shore. Because of the low sampling intensity
prior to 1988, regional catch and effort data for southern New England were combined so
203Ibid. at 1.
204 Ibid.
205Supra note 105 at 1.
206Ibid.
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that the total catch in Rhode Island could be estimated with a greater degree of
confidence.208
Based on tOLaI catch estimates derived from MRFSS data, recreational anglers
caught just over one-third (36%) of the winter flounder landed in Rhode Island.209
Supplementary data from the results of a number of tagging studies of winter nounder
from Narragansett Bay and the salt ponds, dating back to 1947, provide varying
estimates, ranging from 13 to 51 % of totallandings. 210 The MRFSS data may be more
reliable since in each tagging study the fraction of fish landed by commercial versus
recreational fishermen varied between locations (a greater percentage of the recreational
returns came from fish tagged in upper Bay sites, while commercial recoveries were
higher for lower Bay tagging locations).211 Since 1980, the trend in the recreational catch
has been decisively downward. (see figure 3.10). Whereas in 1980, anglers caught over
one fish per trip, as of 1990, the last full fishing year prior to the inshore moratorium,
over two trips were necessary just to catch a single fish.
There are certain drawbacks from assessing a stock solely from fishery-dependent
data. As noted by the NMFS, "in fisheries that are heavily dependent on the incoming
age group to the fishery each year. .. fishery data alone can not be used to forecast
catches, since very small fish are generally not taken with standard fishing gear."212
Additionally, catch per unit effort trends for sch<x)ling pelagic species may not be
. renective of the true status of the stock. 213 Furthermore, time series of catch per unit
effort do not standardize changes in technology that may account for increased landings
208Ibid. al 7 for delails.
209tbid.
21otbid. at 6.
211Ibid.
212Supra note 104 at 30.
213Ihid.
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over prcYious years.215 For these and other reasons, fishcry-independcnt data as
collected through research surveys arc also of vital importance.
The abundance of winter flounder in Narragansett Bay and the general Rhode
Island vicinity is monitored through four regularly-scheduled research surveys conducted
by the University of Rhode Island Graduate School of Oceanography (URIGSO), the
Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife (RlDFW), Marine Research, Inc. (MRI), and
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (see table 3.4).216 In each survey the
amount of winter flounder in Narragansett Bay and southern New England has
plummeted over the past ten years to the lowest level on record.
The URIGSO research survey provides the longest continuous time series of
winter flounder abundance data in Narragansett Bay. This survey has sampkd the fish
population on a weekly basis since 1959, at its two fixed stations, ncar Fox Island in the
West Passage and Whale Rock at the western entrance to the Bay.217 The results of this
survey are decidedly negative. From 1979 to 1985 the mean number of winter Oounder
dropped from to 279.12 to 19.33 fish per tow. (sec figure 3.11) While there was a slight
rebound during the late 1980s, the catch has subsequently fallen to 12.45 fish per tow in
1992 - an all time low since the inception of the program.
Unlike the URIGSO survey which is limited to sampling from only two stations,
the RIDFW research survey covers Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, and Block
Island Sound. This survey provides the greatest spatial coverage of Narragansett Bay, in
which there are 42 potential stations divided into two strata, with Stratum I designated for
those areas less than 6.1 m deep and Stratum 2 for the remainder of the Bay.218 The
results of this survey roughly parallel those of the URIGSO study. Since 1979, the mean
215Supra uote 104 at 30.
216Additionally, since 1986 the RIDFW has conducted a beach seine survey for young-of-lhe-year
winter flounder at 16 sites in Narf"clgansett Bay. However, the time series of data from this survey is too
recent to discern any noticeable patterns or trends.
217Supra note 156 at 10.
218rbid.
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number per tow of winter Hounder landed in the Bay in the spring and falf surveys has
nose-dived from 140.56 and 138.30 to 3.41 and 8.32 fish per tow in 1992, respectively.
(see figure 3.12) For the spring survey this was an aU time low, whereas the results for
the fall were just slightly above the record low of 2.72 fish per tow in 1991.
As previously noted, a separate trawl survey is conducted in Mt. Hope Bay by
Marine Research, Inc. for the New England Power Company. The intended purpose of
this study is to monitor any potential impact that the Brayton Point power plant may be
having upon the marine life of the Bay. ]t is stTongly suspected that as a consequence of
the high rate of entrainment and impingement of larval and juvenile winter flounder, the
population of fish within the bay has crashed. The dramatic effects of this collapse can be
observed through the results of this survey; whereas in 1979 the survey averaged 74.60
winter Hounder per tow, since 1988 it has averaged less than one fish per tow. (see figure
3.8)
On a broader scale, the abundance of winter flounder for all of southern New
England has also precipitously declined over the past ten years. Catch data from strata 1-
12,25, and 61-76 in the NMFS spring and fall bottom research surveys provide
abundance infonnation about the regional stock of \"inter flounder220 Between 1981 and
1984, the amount of winter flounder recorded in the survey fell from an avemge of 1.97
to 0.49 kilograms per tow. After a short-lived rebound in 1985, the catch has
subsequently fallen off to less than a third of a kilogram per tow since 1989. (see figure
3.13)
One common argument made against becoming too alarmed over the present
scarcity of winter flounder is that this species, like many others, has historically varied in
abundance and will therefore natumUy dccline from time to time. For example,
commercial log books note periods dating back to the 1920s, whcn therc seemed to be
22Orbid. al 14.
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relatively more or less fish available than during previous years. In specific reference to
Narragansett Bay, the cyclical pattern of abundance in the URIGSO time series seems to
indicate that this species has rebounded in the past when its numbers were down.
However, caution should be taken not to assume that this pattern will repeat itself in the
future. For as noted earlier in the chapter, the present low abundance is unprecedented in
the history of the survey. That is, more specifically, the 34.16 winter flounder per tow in
1975, the former all-time low prior to the present crash, is almost three times greater than
the 12.45 fish per tow in 1992. Consequently, under present conditions, the parental
stock of fish may be insufficient to take full advantage of more optimal conditions when
they occur. For as noted by the RIDFW,
... models provide compelling evidence that presenting spawner biomass is
important. If spawner biomass declines sufficiently due to overhanrest, a
point is reached where good year classes cannot be produced regardless of
winter water temperature. This may have been the case in 1992. The
number of recruits per spawner in 1992 was the highest since 1980 and is
a..c;;sociatcd with a decline in mean water temperature. However, total
recruitment remained low because spawning biomass and egg production
were low. 223
Therefore, without a rebuilding program to help augment stock biomass, future
recruitment into the fishery may be only a fraction of its total potential regardless of
environmental conditions.
223Ibid. at 1.
CONCLUSIONS
At this late stage, it is no longer a matter of whether or not the Narragansett Bay
winter flounder stock is in poor condition. Clearly, the cornucopia of evidence from both
fishery-dependent and -independent data sources should put this question to rest. The
time has corne when the severity of this situation demands immediate action. The crux of
the problem centers upon what measures should be taken to to help conserve and rebuild
the stock. The ASMFC's Fishery Management Planfor Inshore Stocks of Winter
Flounder, which has been extensively referenced throughout this section, offers the most
comprehensive list of recommendations to resolve this issue. However, many of the
habitat proposals (discussed Ilater in this chapter), while an absolute necessity for any
long-term rebuilding program, may not be feasible in the short term. The economic costs
and inherent delays likely to be encountered with their employment, makes their
implementation over the next several years doubtful. Additionally, with the exception of
the high entrainment rate by the Brayton Point power plant and above-average winter
water temperatures, models by the RIDFW indicate that excessive fishing mortality is the
overwhelming factor inhibiting stock production.224 Therefore, since winter water
temperatures are mostly uncontrolable, the most realistic future rebuilding strategy, for
the short term, should rely almost exclusively on limiting fishing mortality and resolving
the crisis in Mt. Hope Bay.
The inshore winter flounder moratorium, effective as of July 1991, wa<;; a long-
overdue step to help protect the population of winter flounder endemic to Rhode
Island.225 However, preliminary models indicate that this may not enough. The seasonal
movement of fish out of the protected zone, the transferal of fishing effort to areas just
beyond the closure line, and illegal fishing within the Bay all have combined to limit the
224Ibid. al3.
225nris issue is discussed in greater det.1iI in the following chapter.
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effectiveness of this regulation.226 Therefore, the Council may have to consider
additional protective measures, in the next year or two, if it eventually hopes to rebuild
this fishery.
In its simplest terms, the problem is that for too long fishermen have caught too
many winter tlounder. The long-term effects of continuous overfishing, where more fish
are removed each year than are added through recruitment, have resulted in a gross
depreciation of stock size. This predicament is analogous to a spendthrift who
continuously decided to live off the principal of his investments instead of the interest -
eventually he will go bankrupt.
Theoretically, tn a well-managed fishery, only enough winter flounder would be
removed as are added to the stock through recruitment. Due to the natural variability of
stock size from year to year, in practice, finding and maintaining a fishery at this point of
equilibrium has often been elusive. Since this condition tends to be more of an ideal
rather than reality, it may be more realistic to work towards maintaining a minimum
stock biomass to protect against a stock collapse.
To calculate the annual total mortality rate (commonly referred to as "Z") in a
fishery, scientists can use both fishery-dependent and -independent data sources such as
commerciaJ landings, tagging programs, and research surveys. The rate of fishing
mortality (commonly referred to as lIP), is derived by subtracting a previously
determined natural mortality rate (commonly referred to as "M") from the total mortality
rate (F=Z-M). As a result of the abundance of winter flounder data collected in
Narragansett Bay, the RIDFW has had the luxury of being able to use all three of the
above-mentioned data sources to improve the accuracy of its estimates. (See table 3.5 for
fishing mortality rates for the winter flounder stock over the past twenty years)
Throughout much of the late 1980s, up until the last year or two, 0.55 was the fishing
2261bid. at 2.
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mortality ratc associated with the stock's maximum sustainable yicld. It comes as no real
surprise that, based on its findings, the RIDFW has concluded, "These lfishing mortality]
rates have exceeded optimal reference rates for so long ... , that the stock has been
severely depressed. "227
Period
1972-1977
1978-1982
, 1983-1987
1988-Present
Fishing Mortality
0.95
0.94
0.98
1.26
Table 3.5: Historical fishing mortality rates on winter Oounder ·stock in NarmgiU1sell Bay.
Recent models by the RIDFW indicate that because the stock has been driven to
such a low Icvel, that the previously-mentioned maximum sustainable fishing rate of 0.55
is no longer valid. Based on it" estimates of stock recovery probabilities over a ten year
planning horizon under variable fishing nites, the RIDFW concluded that, "There is little
prospect of stock recovery regardless of stock productivity at fishing rates above F=0.30.
Under average stock productivity, fishing rates must be reduced to F=O.10 in order to
have a better than even chance of recovery."2~ Because the stock is in such poor
condition, it is no longer realistic to expect an increase in abundance without a major
curtailment of fishing effort. Or, as it was more succinctly slated by the RIDFW, "stock
recovery and minimized fishing losses are mutually exclusive objectives. "229 What is
even more pessimistic to note, the RlDFW has further warned that, "Little chance of
stock recovery exists ... , [if] winter water temperatures continue their upward trend so that
2271bid.
2281bid. at 20.
229J.hid. at 2.
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spawning success is reduced. "230 Therefore, given this set of circumstances, a recovery
of the winter /lounder population in Narragansett Bay, even with the present moratorium,
is far from certain.
Rebuilding this fishery is highly dependent upon substantive action being taken at
the state level. Although a small percentage of the Narragansett Bay stock is caught in
federal waters, approximately 80% of the returns in the RIDFW tagging study were from
fish caught in Rhode Island waters.231 Bceause of its predictable migration pattern year
after year, fishermen know how to capitalize on winter Hounder when they congregate at
staging areas exiting and entering Narragansett Bay during the spring and fall. Therefore,
the Council must play an aCLive role curtailing overfishing within iLs jurisdiction if the
stocks are going to recover.
While embarking upon a rebuilding program that emphasizes controlling fishing
mortality as its primary objective, it would be foolhardy to ignore the previously-
mentioned habitat issues. it may not be possible to mitigate all of the critical
environmental issues confronting the winter flounder in Narragansett Bay, yet any long-
term rebuilding straLegy should at least seck to prevent the furthcr deteriomtion of its
habitat while controlling fishing cffort. As part of its Fishery Management Plan for
Inshore Stocks of Winter FLounder, the ASMFC recommends, among othcr things, Lhat:
1. Waste watcr treatment.plants should bc upgraded while also reducing
sewage discharge;
2. Enforcement of water pollution laws should be strengthened;
3. Dredging should bc prohibited during the winter floundcr spawning
season;
4. Power plants should be required to use the best available technology to
minimize entrainment and impingement mortality;
210Ibid. at 20.
231Mark R. Gibson, Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, Personal Contact, 29 August
1994.
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5. Cautioned should be taken to avoid siting future power plants ncar
winter Bounder nursery areas; and
6. Non-JX)int source pollution should be minimized.232
Most of the above-listed suggestions would benefit not only the winter flounder but the
marine environment in generaL Preventive measures such as siting future electrical
power plants in non-critical areas and avoiding dredging activity during and immediately
after the spawning season may be possible to implement by amending the state's coastal
zone management program. However, costs, construction delays, and legal
entanglements present a more formable obstacle for the other recommendations.
Some of the recommendations, such as improving wastewater treatment plants,
strengthening water pollution laws, and minimizing non-point source poUution were
previously addressed through the Narragansett Bay Project, an intergovernmental task
force designed to improve the overall quality of the Bay, created by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency under the auspices of the National Estuary Program.
Unfortunately, their adoption anytime in the near future remains doubtful due to a
combination of high costs and the present economic climate. For example, the
Commission's prescription to improve the overall water quality of the Bay, if taken as a
whole, would cost nearly $685 million.233 Additionally, forging a spirit of cooperation
with the State of Massachusett<;, which has jurisdiction over nearly 60% of the Bay's
watershed, presents still another obstacle to overcome. While individual parts of its plan
would obviously be less expensive, it still waits to be seen how much money will be
appropriated by the General Assembly.
Despite the obstacle of a shortage of funding, one major program is currently
under way that would help improve the ovemll water quality of the upper Bay, and
thereby potentially benefit the winter flounder. The final amendments have 'been
232Supra nole 103 al52-53.
233Pelcr Lord, "Prescription for a healthy Bay" Providence Joumal24 Nov. 1991, pp. B 1& 138
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approved for the Narragansett Bay Commission's sewage-containment project to help
prevent untreated-sewage overflows during heavy rains. However, the construction of
this massive system, which will help contain 226 million gallons of rainwater and
sewage, is not scheduled to be completed until the year 2008.234
One present habitat problem that needs to be addressed is the entrainment of
winter (lounder larvae by the Brayton Point power plant in Mt. Hope Bay. As previously
mentioned, steps must be taken to substantially reduce this mortality if the Mt. Hope Bay
subpopulation of fish is to ever be expected to recover from its present dismal condition.
The inclusion of RIDFW blackback biologist on the Technical Advisory Committee,
which supervises the plant's biological monitoring requirements, is an important step
towards meeting this objective. While there is strong evidence indicating the plant is
responsible for the collapse of this subpopulation, there are several questions still need to
be addressed before it can be conclusively proven:
1. What fraction of the cohort is actually being killed by the plant?
2. Why have other species declined in parallel with the winter (lounder?
3. Why have all age groups of winter flounder declined simultaneously
rather than in a staircase fashion?2..15
Resolving these issues will require additional time to conduct further studies before steps
can be taken to mitigate this problem. Also, as previously mentioned, it appears as if the
New England Power Company may be getting ready to legally dispute the findings of the
RIDFW rather than embarking on a path of mutual cooperation. Similar cases in the past
have often proven to be tedious and highly contentious.
234Robert C. Frederikscn "Epic sewage-containment pr~iect mnendcd; cost up" Providence
Journal-Bulletin 14 Dec. 1993 DS
235Supra notc 136 at 23.
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In comparison to regulating fishing effort, mitigating the above-mentioned habitat
problems provides a more uncertain and less quantifiable means of rebuilding stock
abundancc. Rcsolving these habilat issues, solely to benefit the winter Oounuer, with the
possibte exception of the entrainment situation, requires that the public take a leap of faith
to incur costs with unknown results. As noted by the ASMFC:
The relationship between habitat quality and YOY [young of the year]
production is not well understood and has not been quantified. Managers
do not know what kind of habitat changes result in a 20-50% change in
flounder production. Enhancing flounder populations by reducing fishing
mortality via more conservative regulations is more straightfOlward and
therefore presents less risk to managers than undertaking habitat
restoration programs.236
Therefore, while it is important to address these habitat issues as part of a long term
rebuilding plan, for the immediate future the only realistic means by which managers can
hope to conserve and rebuild the present stock is through limiting fishing mortality.
236 Supra note 103 at 18.
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CHAPTER IV
WINTER FLOUNDER MANAGEMENT HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
The winter flounder population in Rhode Island did not mysteriously collapse
overnight. As early as 1984 there were indications that it was on the precipice of decline.
Yet despite being kept abreast of the condition of the stocks, the Council was unable to take
effective action to reverse their decline. This is not to imply that nothing was attempted to
try and help protcct the fishery. Several regulations were passed including: the first state-
wide minimum size limit (which was subsequently increased); a minimum mesh size
requirement for the coastal salt ponds and parL~ of Narmgansetl Bay; and finally the inshore
moratorium. However, in each case these rules were enacted in a knee-jerk response to a
crisis and for the most part, were too little too late.
The intent of this chapter is not to argue that careful stewardship would have
prevented a decline in the fishery from its heyday during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
For as was shown in the previous chapter, this species naturally varies in abundance, and
this period was when it was at the peak of its cycle. Additionally, certain extrajurisdictional
factors beyond the Council's control, such as unfavorable environmental conditions,
habitat degradation, powcrplant-rclated mortality, and excessive fishing effort on Rhode
Island stocks in federal waters, all took their toll on the resource. Yet, since records have
been kept, never have the stocks degenerated this drastically. Furthermore, these factors
should not excuse a management system that time after time was unwilling to take the
necessary measures to prevent the stocks from deteriorating to the point of recruitment
failure and collapse.
The management system in Rhode Island seriously needs to revise its decision-
making process if it is to be expected to take timely and substantive action to better ensure
96
the viability of the state's inshore commercial and recreational fisheries. To illustrate this
argument, this chapter presents a thorough review of the management history of the winter
flounder fishery, dating back to 1984. The bulk of the information for this section is
derived from RIDFW trawl survey data, annual stock assessments, minutes of Council
meetings, and personal interviews. Although all of the participants initially worked
together to pass some of the first regulations, as the stocks continued to decline and more
substantive restrictions became necessary, things quickly deteriomted. As the chronology
of events unfolds, it will become apparent that internal conflicts severely impeded the
effectiveness of this system. In many instances, this dissonance stemmed from participants
who seemed to be working towards dissimilar, if not mutually exclusive goals.
BACKGROUND
As previously discussed, the winter Hounder has experienced periods of relative
abundance and scarcity. As recently a<; the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was at the height
of its abundance cycle. During this period, commercial landings and catch per effort in
statistical area" 539 were the highest on record since the mid-1960s. 237 Because of its
plentiful supply in inshore waters and its relatively high market price, it is not surprising
that between the late 1970s and the carly 1980s this species was annually one of the three
most valuable finfish landed in the state.238 This trend was also retlected in the URIGSO'
trawl survey in Narragansett Bay; the 279.12 winter Hounder averaged per tow in 1979
was the second highest amount on record since the inception of the survey in 1959.239 As
is so common when a fishery is at the peak of its abundance, there was little foresight to
237Source: Supra note 17 al 28.
238RI Commercial Fisheries Landings, NMFS
239Supra nole 17 a141. (The leading ycar was 1968 with a mean of 287.66 fish per tow.)
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adopt conservation measures. In fact, at this time it was not unusual to use small winter
flounders as lobster bait. 24o
The Council minutes for 1984 are silent about any serious discussion regarding this
fishery. In the fall, the RIDFW completed its annual review of important commercial
species captured in it') trawl survey from the previous year. 24 1 The results form this report
were mixed; while the mean number and weight of winter flounder increased, a
continuance of this trend was in jeopardy due to a paucity of young recruits. Compared to
1982, the number of fish in the smallest size class (::; 12 em) decreased by 43%.242
Another area of concern was the reduction in the rate of increase of the largest size class
(~23 em), which happened to be those fish that were commercially valuable and sexually
mature.243 Based on its hndings, the RIDFW warned that "a strong year class must appear
in 1984 if sufficient numbers of fish for both recreational and commercial harvest (~23 em)
are to continue. "244 This was especiafly critical for Narragansett Bay and Rhode Island
Sound due to the extensive inshore fisheries in these regions.245 As a precautionary
measure, the report recommended that a minimum size limit (with no specific size
indicated) be adopted.246
240rom Halavik, Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council member, Personal Contact, 28 Nov.
1991.
241This report, and others mentioned for 1985, 1986, 1988, and 1989, which included only a
cursory review of the major conunercial and recreational species recruited in the RIDFW tmwl survey.
should not be confused with the comprehensive statistical stock assessments completed in 1987 and
alillually since 1990.
242Timothy R. Lynch, Fishery Resource Assessment for the Coastal Waters of Rhode Island (Jan.
7,1983 - Dec. 31, 1983) Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, (7 November 1984): 14.
2431bid.
2441bid.
24Slbid.
246lbid.
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The Council responded to the RIDFW's advice by adopting the state's first winter
flounder minimum size limit. In November, an 1] inch size limit was approved, effective
as of January 1, 1986.247 For the most part, there was IitLle opposition to this regulation.
This was probably because the minimum commercially acceptable size was somewhere
around 10 to 11 inches.248 Therefore, this rule only codified what was already generally
the status quo. However, in all fairness, this regulation also coincides with the species'
approximate size of sexual maturation.249
The RIDFW trawl survey continued to indicate a dearth of small fish. Due to the
decline of young recruits, the overall mean number of winter Hounder per tow declined
17.3%.250 In the 13 to 22 em size class, the number of fish dwindled by 25%, which was
relatively modest compared to the 83% reduction in the smallest size category (512 cm).251
In iL.;; analysis, the RIDFW cautioned:
attention must focus on the 512 em size class (age 0-1 ),bccause the 83.0%
decrease noted in 1984 is in addition to the 43.0% decrease noted in 1983.
It is this size class that will eventually recruit to the fishery (commercial and
recreational) and it.;; strength is very important for future harvests... In
addition, [or the first time since 1979, the ~26 em size class (those
commercially preferred in Rhode Island) experienced a 5.0% decline in
mean number per tow. Although not considered significant, this percentage
represents a-break in a five year trend and one which may continue.252
247R11ode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 5 November 1985.
248Supra note 112 at 292.
249Mark Gibson, PreliminaI·y.Assessment of Wintcr Hounder (pseudopleuronectcs awcricanus)
Stocks in Rhode Island Waters Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, Sept. 1987: 2.
250 Timothy R. Lynch Coastal Fishery Resource Assessment Oan. 1. 1984 - Dec. 3 Ll984)
Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wil<Uife.
251Ibid.
252Ibid.
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After adopting the state's first winter flounder minimum size limit during the
previous year, thc Council did not follow through with any additional regulations in 1986.
There were two petitions to curtail the inshore commercial fishery, yet neither suggestion
was brought to a votc. One request was for a ban on otter trawl fishing for winter flounder
in Charlestown and Quonochuntaug Ponds.253 The other more sweeping demand sought
to prohibit the commercial harvest of winter Hounder in Mt. Hope Bay, the coastal salt
ponds, and Little Narragansett Bay.254
Results from the RIDFW trawl survey once again provided more depressing news
about the condition of the stocks. The overall mean number and weight of winter Hounder
per tow decreased significantly in Rhode Island Sound, Block Island Sound, and
Narragansett Bay.
Percentage Decrease of Winter Flounder From 1984
Location Mean Weight Mean Number
Rhode Island Sound 91 % 88%
Block Island Sound 90% 75%
Narragansett Bay 62% 36%
Table 4.1255
On one positive note, in a reversal of the trend from the past several years, the mean
number of fish in the smallest size class (::512 em) increased by 50%.256 In regards to this
phenomenon, the RIDFW cautiously noted:
253Letter to the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Cmmeil, 1986.
254Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 10 Dec. 1986.
255ri.mothy R. Lynch Coastal Fishq); Rcsource Asscssment (Jan. 1. 1985 - Dec. 31. 1985)
Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife.
256Ibid. (Remember that these resulL'i are for 1985 and were not influcnced by the 11 inch size
limit effective as of 1986.)
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However encouraging this increase may be, it is not believed significant. Repeated
annual increases in the mean number per tawas well as the survival to maturity and
harvestable size is desired. To this end, the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council
instituted an eleven inch minimum harvest size effective January 1, 1986. It is
speculated that with prudent adherence to this regulation, fishing mortality will
decrease and population size increa"e.257
In the faU of 1987, the RIDFW completed its first comprehensive assessment of the
state's winter l10under stocks. The origins of the report stem from the continuing decline
of the fishery and from a request by Council member and eminent marine biologist Saul
Saila.258 Unlike in previous years, this study was solely devoted to a single species. As a
result, it was able to includc in depth statistical modeling to gage specific bench marks such
as fishing rates associated with optimum yield, overfishing, and potential stock collapse.
The Council did not address the salient points raised in the document until the beginning of
1988.
According to the assessment, the rcsource was suffering from overfishing, yet the
condition was not critical. By conducting a cohort analysis from data obtained through the
RIDFW's trawl survey and tagging program, fishing mortality was estimated to be
between 0.515 and 0.60.259 Through forecasts deri\'ed from stock production models,
maximum sustainable yield for the fishery was calculated to be 5.1 million pounds at a
fishing ratc of approximately 0.245.260 Optimum yield was associated with a range of
fishing mortality between 0.25 and 0.40. Based upon these findings, excessive fishing
effort wa<; believed to be inhibiting the potential optimum yield from the fishery, yet there
257Ibid.
258Supra note 249.
259rbid. at 7.
260Ihid. at 8.
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was no imminent danger of recruitment failure or stock collapse. 261 However, in specific
reference to the salt pond stocks, which represent "discrete reproductive units," the models
indicated that any increase in effort "could be dangerous. "262
To prevent further damage to the fishery, the assessment recommended first
stabilizing effort, whieh was growing annually, and then reducing fishing mortality by
25%.263 To accomplishing this goal, it suggested a seasonal closure during the winter
spawning period.264 Raising the minimum size limit was discouraged due the likelihood of
increasing the discard rate.265 Furthermore, area closures were not endorsed because of
the natural tendency of the species to travel beyond the prohibited zones and the ability of
fishermen to transfer effort elsewhere.266
While the assessment reported that the stocks were not in any immediate danger, it
did recommend that the Council take precautionary measures to manage the fishery rather
than having to react to a crisis sometime in the future. It warned that continued growth in
fishing effort would lead to potential trouble.267 In what now seems prophetic, the report
further noted:
Because of economic inerlia, stock collapses are very hard to reverse.
Environmental effects on recruitment make it very difficult to feel the pulse
of the fishery with high certainty. Without conservative management, a
stock col/apse will be sudden and nearly unpredictable.268
261Ibid.
262Ibid. at 48.
263Ibid. at 9.
264Ibid.
265Ibid.
2661bid.
267Ibid. at 8.
2681bid. at 1.
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19R8 was a pi volal year in the management of the state's winlcr flounder fishery.
Whereas previously this issue was not a top priority, from this point until 1992, it was, for
the most part, the center of the Council's attention. Like a firebell in the night, the stock
assessment sounded a warning that instigated a mad dash of activity. Throughout the year,
the vast majority of Council and Finfish Committee meetings were devoted to finding a
mutually agreeable solution to help conserve the stocks. Yet despite this effort, by year's
end not only were no new regulations agreed upon, but the strain of prolonged negotiations
started to take an effect upon the participants. User groups were becoming increa<;ingly
frustrated as they tried unsuccessfully to develop a plan, through the Finfish Committee, to
meet the 25% reduction-in-effort target goal. AdditionarIy, the working relationship
between the Council and the RlDFW started to disintegrate a" they argued over their
respective roles in the rule-making process.
From its inilial meeting of the year, the Council weighed various proposals to
ostensibly help conserve the stocks. In January, a minimum mesh size requirement for
winter flounder nursery areas such as Narragansett Bay and the coastal salt ponds was
proposed.269 This suggestion never made it pass the discussion stage. In March a public
hearing was held to gather input on, among other things, a possible 12 inch minimum size
limit for winter tlounder.27o By nearly a three to one margin, those in attendance at the
hearing, who were mostly commercial fishermen, spoke in opposition to the measure.27I
As an alternative, some supported a minimum mesh size requirement.272 Others were
against any new regulations because they claimed they would create too much of a financial
hardship.27J
269Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minules 6 Jlan. 1988.
27ORJlOde Island Marine Fisheries Council Minules 9 Mar. 1988.
271Ibid.
272Ibid.
2731bid.
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Prior to the conclusion of the hearing, several commercial fishermen complained
that the Council did not truly represent their intercsts.274 They fclt it needed to include
more people who were sympathetic to the plight of otter-trawl fishermen. 275
During the spring and summer, the Finfish Committee, which tends to be
dominated by smaH inshore draggers, met several times to develop an alternative plan.
Based on some of their earlier comments at previous Council meetings, it was no surprise
that the members of this group endorsed a proposal calling for a minimum mesh size to
ostensibly help protect juvenile fish. They were willing to abide by a requirement calling
for a four inch minimum mesh size (cod end) while fishing in Narragansett Bay, the
Sakonnet River, Charlestown and Quonochontaug ponds, Little Nal1dgansett Bay, and the
Pawcatuck River during the winter months of November through February.276 After
reviewing the historic monthly catch records and tag returns, thc RIDFW noted that the
corresponding curtailment in effort would not be sufficient to effectively reduce fishing
mortality.277
As the year drew to a close, little if any headway was made towards reaching an
agreement over the proper course of action needed to help conserve the fishery. The
inability to resolve this issue led to a confrontation between the Council and the RIDFW.
The major point of contention was over the responsibilities of each group in the
development of management proposals. On at least two occasions, the Councit requested
the RIDFW to submit a list of pre-approved options for it to vote upon; which would
satisfy the 25% effort reduction, for it to vote upon.278 Each time the RIDFW declined,
stating that it wanted to stay within its prescribed duty, which, as it claimed, was to provide
technical a,;sistance and advice, not to formulate specific rules.279 It'; reluctance to accept
2741bid.
2751bid.
276RllOde Island Finfish Committee Minutes 9 May & 9 Aug. 1988.
277Rhode Island Marine Fishelies Council Minutes 29 Sept. 1988.
278Rhodc Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 29 Sept. & 27 Oct. 1988,
279Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 27 Oct. 1988.
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this offer e"entually resulted in a public disagreement during the October Council
meeting.28o
A similar problem developed between the RIDFW and the Finfish Committee. The
praetice whereby the RIDFW evaluated proposals only after the Finfish Committee labored
to reach a consensus, created tension and resentment.281 Committee members demanded
more input while they were formulating proposals for the CounciL282 In response to this
criticism, the RIDFW sent its chief winter flounder expert, Mark Gibson to lend assistance
at some of its subsequent meetings.
By the end of the year, when tensions started to settle, both the Council and the
RIDFW agreed to work together to jointly develop a winter flounder management plan in
1989.2lB
Throughout ]989, finding a solution to conserve the state's winter flounder stocks
continued to be the major focus of attention. In response to criticism from the previous
year, the RIDFW took a more active role during the initial stages of the decision-making
process. At nearly every Council and Finfish Committee meeting, state biologists were on
hand to lend assistance and provide technical advice. In January, the RIDFW completcd a
special report about the potential effectiveness of size limits in reference to the winter
flounder fishery.284 According to the study, the rate of fishing mortality was well above
the preferable level for the 11 inch size limit (F=O.758 versus 0.470), and wac;; dangerously
close to the collapse rate (F=O.818).ns It went on to state that without any further attempt
2,g°lbid.
281Ibid.
282Ibid.
283Rhodc Island Marine Fisheries Council tvfinutes 1 Dec. 1988.
284Mark Gibson, Size Limits with Special Reference to Winter 11011uder in Rhode IslandRhode
Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, Jan. 1989.
285Ibid. at 9 & 10.
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to seriously lessen fishing mortality, the fishery would, in all probability, collapse in three
years.286 This message seemed to kindle a sense of urgency and seriousness in the
Council to rind a solution to the problem.
For most of the year, the Finfish Committee devoted its undivided attention to the
winter flounder crisis. Initially, its members supported a combination of limited seasonal
and area closures, a ban on night dragging, and a minimum mesh size for inshore
waters.287 When it appeared that an increase in the size limit would also be required to
meet the target goal of a 25% effort reduction, they reluctantly backed a proposal raising the
size limit by a half of an inch to 11.5 inehes.288 However, some commercial fishermen
were against the measure, claiming that out-of-state fishennen would prosper from their
sacrifice because of the smaller size limits in neighboring states (such as in Connecticut and
New York).289
While the Finfish Committee \Va" developing its ideas, for the first time ever, the
RIDFW presented a formal set of recommendations to help manage the fishery. This action
represented a major change in policy; whereas previously the Division had limited its input
to commenting on proposals made by the Councilor Finfish Committee, it was now
intr<x1ucing proposals for the Council to decide upon. The Division's recommended:
1. A 12 inch minimum size limit, effective as of January I, 1990;
2. A seasonal (exact months not specified) mesh size of 5 inches for
Narmgansett Bay and the southern coastal salt ponds;
3. Adopting a formal policy that only proposals which are readily
quantifiable be considered;
4. Committing the Council to an annual fall review of the status of the
stocks by the RIDFW.290
2861bid. at 11.
287Rhodc Island Finfish Commillee Minutes 28 Jul. 1989.
288Rhode lshmd Finfish Committee Memo 15 September 1989.
289Rhode Island Finfish Cornmillee Minutes 20 Jun. & 28 Jut. 1989.
290List compiled from Rhode Island Finfish Conuuiltcc rvlinutes 26 Sept. 1989.
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These suggestions attempted to address the immediate short-term need to conserve the
stocks while at the same time they also offered a fmmework for future regulatory actions.
Under item four, if the 1990 assessment continued to indicate a reduction in stock size, the
Council was supposed to "raise the minimum size or lower catch levels effective January 1,
1991. "291
The first two recommendations were derived from the previously mentioned report
on size limits. Based on its models, the Division calculated that maximum sustainable yield
could be attained if winter flounder were first recruited into the fishery at 11.5 to 12
inches.292 However, in that same study, it qualified its findings with two important
conditions:
1. Fishing effort needed to be stabilized to prevent fishennen from trying to
maintain their past eatch levels by either fishing more intensely or making
longer trips.293
2. Sublegal fish accidentally captured will need to survive after being
discarded.294
As was pointed out in the study, meeting these conditions was not very realistic.295
The first two recommendations also contradicted the RIDFW's previous analysis of
potential management alternatives. In its 1987 winter flounder stock assessment, the
RlDFW noted that, "Size limits are not considered effective due to the high mortality of
discards and high minimum limit needed to accommodate current fishing rates."296
29tRllOde Island Marine Fisheries Committee Minules 28 Sept 1989.
292Supra note 284 at 10.
293Ibid.
294Ibid. at 2 & 3.
295Ibid. al 12.
296Supra nole 249 at 1.
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Additionally, it also wamed that, "Area restrictions are problematic because of the
migratory naturc... of thc stocks. "297 While the minimum mcsh size proposal was
intended Lo reduce the incidental bycatch of small fish, its effectiveness would be
compromised by its temporal and spatial limitations. Immature fish remaIn inshore
throughout the year and would therefore be vulnerable to fishermen using small mesh
outside of the seasonal restrictions. Additionally, mature winter flounders disperse
offshore into deeper waters where they could still encounter mesh sizes less than 5 inches.
While some Council members remained dissatisfied with the range of options
offered, the proposals were nonetheless brought to a public hearing in October. At the
hearing, most of the commercial fishermen in attendance were in opposition to the first two
choices. The following reasons were stated as to why the new size limit and the minimum
mesh size requirement were unsatisfactory:
1. More time was needed to determine if the II inch size limit was helping
the stocks recover;
2. The new minimum size would give New York and Connecticut (which
had smalfcr legal size limits) fishermen an unfair advantage over Rhode
Island fishermen;
3. The decline in catch brought on by the new minimum size and mesh size
regulations would cause fishermen to go broke;
4. The new mesh size restriction would not be feasible in a mixed species
fishery.29R
Other industry representatives were more willing to find some common ground to reach an
agreement. Jim McCauley, from the Rhode Island Fishennen's Cooperative, favored area
closures over a size increase.299 A spokesman from a recreational fishing club supported
the 12 inch size limit as long as all user groups were required to abide by the same
297Ibid. at 9.
298} ,ist compiled from Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 26 Oct. 1989.
299Ibid.
108
regulation.3 00 Howcver, there were also others in attendance who argucd against the
necessity for any regulatory intrusion. They l"clt that the Council should not interfere in the
lives of fishennen and should let the la\vs of economics control fishing effort.3° 1
During its November meeting, the Council voted to increase the size limit (effective
January 1, 1990) to 12 inches and require all otter trawler vessels to use a 5 inch mesh size
cod end while fishing in Narragansett Bay (north of a line running from Bonnet Point to
Beavertail Point to Brenton Point, then from Sachuset Point to the Sakonnet Light House)
and Quonochuntaug and Charlestown ponds from November through February.302
However, after an outcry of protest that the new regulations were too drastic and would
cripple the industry, the Council backed off its original plan. The new size restriction was
divided into incremental increases of 11.5 inches for 1990 and 12 inches for 1991.303
Additionally the 5 inch mesh size area was pushed north in Narragansett Bay, to a line
drawn stretching from Carrier Pier to Conanicut Point to the T Pier on Prudence Island to
Carr's Point, and from Sachuest Point to Sakonnet Point - an area that receives
significantly less otter trawl fishing effort (see figure 4.1).304
As in 1988, the RIDFW did not prepare a formal winter t10under stock assessment.
However, the results of ito; trawl survey released during the fall, brought more depressing
news about the fishery. Once again, there wac;; a marked reduction in abundance of winter
flounder in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island Sound, and Block Island Sound.3 05 The most
significant decline was in Rhode Island Sound, where the mean weight and number per
tow in the spring survey plummeted by 90% from the previous year.30G In Narragansett
300lbid.
30 llbid. (According to this argument, as the number or rish decline, catch rates will fall, requiring
fishcnncn to switch to more abundant stocks, thercby automatically reducing fishing mortality.)
302Rhodc Island Marine Fisheries COlUICil Minutes 30 Nov. 1989.
303Rhode Island Marine Fisheries couucil Minutes 28 Dec. 1989.
304lbid.
305rimothy R. Lynch, Coastal Fisheries Resom-cc Assessment-Trawl Survey Rhode IsI:'Uld
Di vision of Fish and Wildlife, 1988:6.
306lbiJ.
109
L _ -- - - - - - - _. - -
Providence
Rhode Island
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.-J
./
Block Island Sound
~ OoscdArea~I
ii!:III::li!I~II!I:1:~ Reopened Dragging Zone
I
\
\
Figure 4.1: Revised 5 inch minimum mesh size area in Narragansell Bay
110
Bay the news was little better; the total weight and number of fish recTUited in the fall
survey fell by 67% and 72.3%, respectivciy.30?
Despite considering several proposals to further conserve the winter flounder
stocks, throughout 1990 the Council did not take any decisive action. In retrospect, 1990
wa" a luB between two strife-ridden years. After undergoing the draining ordeal of
implementing and rescheduling the new size limits late in 1989, most Council members
were inclined to hold off on any additional regulations. Furthermore, their hesitancy was
due in part to the anticipation of a detailed stock assessment, similar to the 1987 report,
scheduled to be presented late in the year. To the Council's credit, it did not seriously
consider several attempts to further weaken some of the measures previously enacted.
Contrary to their earlier position, a group of commercial fishermen, acting through
the Finfish Committee, attempted to repeal the mesh size restriction in Narragansett Bay.
They claimed that the regulation would not help the fishery because it was difficult to
enforce (due to the variability of mesh size measuring devices) and that it was "impractical"
because it did not cover a wide enough area.308 In lieu of the requirement, they proposed a
ban on night dragging by otter trawlers fishing north of bridges in Narragansett Bay.309
This suggestion was never seriously considered by the Council.
The 1990 assessment released in the fall, continued to bring more pessimistic news.
It noted that fishery-dependent statistics were at critically depressed levels. Both
recreational and commercial eatch per unit effort were at record low Ievels.3 10 Based upon
survey results compiled through the NMFS's Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics
307Ibid.
308 Rhode Island Finfish COImnittee Minutes 19 Mar. 1990.
309Ibid.
310Mark Gibson, RI Winter Rounder Stock Assessment Update 1990: A Report to the Rhode
Island Marine Fisheries Council Rhode Island Division of Fish and \Vildlife, (December (990): 2 & 3.
(Note: These rccords have subsequcntly been surpassed.)
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Sun1ey, on average, anglers required approximately five trips to eatch a single winter
t10under while fishing in Rhode Island walers.311 Calch by oUer lrawlers in statistical area
539 declined to approximately 750 Ibs per day.3 12
Indices of abundance, derived from the trawl surveys, paralleled the depressed
catch statistics. In 1989, the sun1eys by the RlDFW, the NMFS, and the URlGSO
recorded very low abundance levels, with the first two studies setting all-time records.313
These results were a ret1ection of continuous year c1a<;s failures dating back to 1987.314 In
Narragansett Bay, the news was even more distressing. Based on its models, the RIDFW
slated that the species had entered a stage of recruitment failure.315 E<;timates calcuJated
from information provided through the survey trawls, indicated that the level of spawning
stock abundance was below 20% of its maximum potential - a benchmark used by many
biologists to denote a stock that is in critical condi tion.316
Based upon its findings, the RIDFW warned there was a "significanl probability of
stock collapse under current fishery conditions. "317 To improve the situalion, it urged for
additional reductions in fishing effort than those previously suggested. According to the
RIDFW, "The 12" minimum size limit is insufficient in and of itself to initiate recovery.
Substantial reductions in the mortality rate are required (40 to 50%). "3) 8 To achieve this
goal, the assessment recommended implementing" large, permanent area closures. II)) 9
311 Ibid.
312Ibid. at 10. (Source: graph of catch per unit effort in statistical area 539)
313Ibid. at 3.
314Ibid.
3151bid. at 4.
3t6Ibid. at 5.
317Ibid. at 6.
318Ibid. at 7.
3191bid.
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In 1991, the acrimonious struggle between proponents who wanted to keep the
fishery open and others who supported severely curtailing fishing effort resulted in: an
internal split within the RIDFW that was eventually escalated to the Director of the DEM; a
ruling by the DEM legal counsel stating that the Council had failed to abide by the
Administrative Procedures Act while adopting the inshore winter (lounder ban; a further
disintegration of the working relationship between the Council and the RIDFW; and a
polarization of the Council into two factions deeply entrenched on opposite sides of the
issue. Yet ironically, from this debacle emerged one of the strictest regulations ever passed
by the Council: a total moratorium on the han/est of winter (lounder from Narragansett
Bay, the coastal salt ponds, the Pawcatuck River, and Little Narragansett Bay. However,
as the year drew to a conclusion, this measure was jeopardized by a counteroffensive to
rescind the ban and replace it with more moderate restrictions.
The m<~orcatalyst for this controversy was the negative winter flounder stock
assessment ,issued late in 1990 calling for further reductions in fishing mortality. Starting
with the its first meeting, the Council spent the vast majority of the year wrestling with this
issue. In January, John Stolgitis, the then Chief of Fisheries for the RIDFW, read a list of
suggestions that included prohibiting the han/cst of winter flounder from Narragansett
Bay.32o However, he qualified his remarks by noting that he was not presenting a eormal
set of recommendations and that the staff was still divided over the potential of the 12 inch
size limit to help rebuild the stocks.321 By February, the Division was able to officially
endorse a 40% reduction in effort, however it did not provide specifics on how this goal
should be me1.322 Instead, it urged the Finfish Committee to develop more stringent
proposals to curtail some of the excessive fishing mortality.323
320Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minules 29 Jan. 1991.
321Ibid.
322Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council tvtiuules 26 Feb. 1991.
32.1 rbid.
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In March, the Finfish Committee presented the following idea<; to ostensibly help
eliminate 40% of the efrort in the fishery:
1. A four fish rod and reel fimit;
2. A continuation of the 5 inch mesh requirement and the 12 inch size limit;
3. Prohibiting night fishing by otter trawlers in Narragansett Bay north of a
line stretching from Point Judith to Sakonnet Point:
4. A cessation on the deployment of gillnets on designated winter tlounder
spawning grounds;
5. Banning the possession of winter flounder taken with nets from
December 1 through March 15 in Narragansett Bay north of the same line
stipulated in the third recommendation; and
6. Making it illegal to fish for !lounder in the coastal salt ponds, the
Pawcatuck River and Little Narragansett Bay during January and
February.324
Il was decided to bring these recommendations to a public hearing.325 However, Council
member Tom Halavik requested that the RIDFW accompany cach proposal with a
confidence interval for it<; potential to meet the 40% target reduction.326 Sometime after
this request, yet prior to the May public hearing, the following proposals were added to the
list:
1. A two fish (instead of four a<; suggested by the Finfish Committee), year
round, hook and line bag limit for all Rhode Island waters along with a
ban on catching winter llounder by nets between November 1 to April 1
north of a line drawn from the Point Judith Light to the Sakonnet Point
Light (Loran Cline 43960).
324Rhode Island Finfish Comminec Minutes 15 l'vlar. 1991.
325Rhode Island Marine foisheries Council Minutes 26 Mar. 1991.
3261hid.
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2. No possession of winter Ilounder taken by any means north of the Loran
C 43960 line.
3. A complete year round momtorium on winter Oounder fishing in all
Rhode Island waters.327
There is no mention in the minutes about their origins. However, during the January
meeting, John Stolgitis commented that some of his staff favored prohibiting the retention
of winter Oounder while fishing in Narragansett Bay.328 According to the RIDFW's
calculations, only the above stated options would meet the 40% curlailment in efTort.329
Therefore, all of the proposals suggested by the Finfish Committee, even in combination,
were deemed to be inadequate.
Unlike what has occurred previously or since then, most of those in attendance at
the May public hearing fully supported laking immediate action to help rebuild the stocks.
The general consensus at all previous meetings was for as little regulatory interference as
possible. One reason for this reversal may have been the lack of prior notice fully
explaining the range of options that were going to be reviewed. Originally, the Council
agreed to only consider the Finfish Committee's proposals, none of which, in all
likelihood, would have been of major consequence for the commercial industry.
The sentiment expressed at the public hearing, was overwhelmingly in support of a
closure. Based on this input, the Council unanimously voted to implement the year-round
moratorium in Narmgansett Bay, the coastal salt ponds, the Pawcatuck River, and Little
Narragansett Bay (see figure 4.2).330
327H1UldoUl of managemcnl options considered allhe 1 May 1991 public hcaring.
328Supra nolc 320.
329Supra nole 327.
330Rhodc Island Marine Fisheries COtUleil Iv1inutes 28 May 1991. (The vole was 7 - 0; council
memher Bah Smith did nol Vole because he was pending a legal decision on whelher or nol his partieipalion
in the issue rcpresenled a conDiel of inleresl.)
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Immediately prior to the approval of the moratorium, John Stolgitis unsuccessfully
tried to persuade the Council to pass a less restrictive plan)31 Once again, the internal
division within the RIDFVv resurfaced. Despite the overwhelming support for the closure
by his staff, he nonetheless recommended that a four fish hook and line limit coupled with
a ban on night dragging during the winter would be sufficient to control overfishing and
help restore the stocks.332 Even after the passage of the moratorium, he continued to press
for less restrictive regulations.333 Eventually, to avoid a continuation of this situation,
which was undermining the recommendations made by the RIDFW's winter flounder
biologist, a group of staff members (including both deputy chiefs) elevated the matter to the
Director of the DEM who decided in favor maintaining the moratorium.334 While John
Stolgitis' recommendation was overruled, the disunity exposed by this incident may have
added impetus to the dri ve to rescind the ban.
News of the moratorium shattered the complacency of those who were
economically dependent on the fishery, like commercial fishermen and bait and tackle store
owners. They argued that the new restriction would put them out of business.335
Additionally, many commercial fishermen fclt they were being compelled to assume an
inordinate amount of the burden to help the species recover. According to their perception
of the problem, pollution, environmental change, predators (such as cormorants), and
acidic seaweed (desmerestia) were responsible the collapse of the winter flounder
population.336
In an attempt to invalidate the moratorium, severdl commercial fishermen threatened
to initiate judicial proceedings on the grounds that the Council violated the guidelines
331Ibid.
332Ibid
333Tom Meade, "Rounder fishing will retum to Rhode Island," Providence .Ioumal 16 Feb. 1992,
Section D: 14.
334Tom Meade, "Support remains strong to continue the flounder ban." Providence Jotlmal22
Dec. 1991, Section B: 14.
335RllOde Island Marine Fisheries Council ~,,1inutes 27 Aug. 1991.
:BGlbid
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SlXcified under the Administrative Procedures Act.337 In an opinion rendered by Kendra
Beaver, chief legal counsel for the OEM, it was decided that the announcement of the
public hearing failed to explicitly state that the Council was considering such a closure and
furthennore, comment was not sought on its potential economic impact on small
businesses.338 Therefore, based on this decision, another public hearing was held in
November to address these issues. Although many small inshore draggers vehemently
voiced their opinions that the winter 110under moratorium would lead to their financial
demise, the Council decided to retain the ban.
Shortly after the conclusion of the second public hearing, the RIDFW presented its
annual winter flounder stock assessment for 1991. The report offered a continuation of the
depressing news concerning the health of the fishery. Both fishery-dependent and
independent mcasuremenL.o;; used to gage abundance were at extremely low levels.339 Since
1980, the amount of winter flounder had declined from 60 to 95%.340 During this same
period, the commercial catch had fallen by 75 to 90%.341 In Narragansett Bay, the stocks
were so decimated, that they were classified ao;; being in a state of collapse and recruitment
failure.342 Furthennore, it noted that while estimates of fishing mortality in Narragansett
Bay, derived from 1990 survey data and catch curve analyses, indicated that the rate of
fishing mortality had fallen from 1.25 to 0.62, the unpredictability of fish stocks reduced to
su<.:h critically low levels negated any comparison to traditional referen<.:e points (FO.l,
Fmsy, and Fmed).343
3370eneral Laws of Rhode Island §§45-35-3.
33~"New hearing scI for RI winler Oounder closure," Commercial Fishclies News No\'. 1991,
Seclion A: 1 4.
339Supra note 17 at 1.
340Ibid.
34 1Ibid.
342Ibid.
343Ibid. at 20 & 21.
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Based on the recorded level or mortality, the assessment reported that the
probability or recovery, even with the moratorium, was less than 25%.344 It suggested
thal the ban may not be sufficient to ensure a recovery without additional restrictions.3 45
Due to the seasonal migmtory habits of the species which carry it beyond the closed areas,
and the high probability of fishermen transferring their effort to coincide with the period
when fish vacate the protected zone, the impact of the regulation was cakulated to incur
only a 22% reduction in fishing mortality.346 Therefore, to increase the likelihood of a
recovery within the next decade, the assessment advocated the need to further reduce
fishing effort by 70 to 100%.347 The report recommended that additional measures,
possibly including a complete closure, were necessary~ otherwise it warned, "If spawner
biomass is driven low enough by overfishing, recruitment may fail regardless of climatic
conditions. "348
As 1991 drew to a close, the movement to rescind the winter Dounder momtorium
gained momentum. The struggle to reopen the inshore fishery was one of two major
contentious issues addressed by the Council during the first half of 1992.349 It is no
coincident that this movement coincided with the reinstatement of Council member Bob
Smith, a commercial fisherman who had previously refmined from participating while the
state Ethics Commission·determined whether his involvement in the management of this
fishery represented a conflict of interest. Immediately upon his return, he helped organize a
coalition of four members (including himself) that sought to placate the demands of those
who were against the closure.
344Ibid at 21.
345Ibid.
34Glbid.
347Ibid. at 2.
348Ibid. at 10.
349-nlC quahog digger - diver controversy was the other major issue.
119
In early 1992, the state Ethics Commission cleared Council member Smith to
participate in the management of the winter flounder fishery after it determined that he did
not earn in excess of $5CX)O or 5% of his income from the sale of this species.350 Around
the same time, members William Palombo, Ralph Boragine, and Nick Butziger (two
commercial representatives and a charterboat captain), withdrew their support for the
moratorium in response to the subsequent continuous outcry against the measure. As a
result, the Council was divided four to four over the issue. This deadlock led to a more
active role for the chainnan, Malcolm Grant, who is empowered to cast the deciding ballot
to make or break a tied vote.
In February, the first meeting in which Bob Smith was once again pcnnitted to
participate, the coalition attempted to replace the ban with more moderate restrictions.
Council member Nick Butziger stated that the moratorium was too stringent especially since
in his opinion, "fisheries management is an inexact science" and therefore conditions may
not be as dire as they are made out to be in the stock assessments.351 He suggested the
following recommendations in lieu of the closure:
1. A continuation of the 12 inch size limit;
2. Instituting a minimum mesh size of 5.5 inches to retain winter !lounder;
3. Prohibiting night dragging by oller trawlers working north of the Loran
C 43960 line;
4. Banning the possession of winler Hounder while commercial fishing
from December] to March 1 north of the Loran C 43960 line as well as
in the other currently closed areas;
5. A four fish recreational bag limit; and
6. Permitting a 25 pound by-catch allowance for vessels fishing during the
closed season or with smaller mesh than 5.5 inches.352
350Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 11 Feb. 1992.
35Jlbid.
352Jbid.
120
On the initial vote, the proposal was deadlocked four to four, which required chairman
Grant's participation who broke the tic by voting against the motion.353 Rather than going
on to new business, a long drawn-out struggle ensued to reach a compromise. After
making some slight modifications, the proposal was once again defeated by a five to four
margin.354 On the third attempt, when the time period in item four was extended to include
the month of November, three of the proponents of the moratorium (Saul Saila, Louis
Othote, and Robert Randal) gave in and the motion carried by a seven to one vote.355 The
explanation lor their reversal is not exactly clear. However, the marathon session which
had been in progress for over four hours coupled with the constant vehement arguments in
opposition to the moratorium by nearly everyone in the packed rcx)m, probably weighed
heavily in their decisions.
Due to technical and procedural problems, the plan was never implemented. One of
its major defects was that it failed to specify the geographic range for the 5.5 inch minimum
mesh size limit and could therefore be interpreted, as written, to include all of the state's
jurisdictional waters. Additionally, OEM lega~ counsel ruled that the action was invalid
because, as specified in the Administrative Procedures Act, the Council failed to consider
the economic ramifications of its decision.35G Furthermore, it stated that the major
revisions incorporated in the proposals required the scheduling of a new public hearing to
solicit comment on theissue.357
A formal evaluation of the plan by the RIDFW indicated several deficiencies,
foremost of which, was that it would not sufficiently reduce fishing effort to permit a
reasonable chance of a stock recovery. Even without attempting to account for effort
transfers, under the proposed package, the reduction in fishing mortality would be 17.4%
3531bid.
354Ibid.
355Ibid.
35GRhode Island Marine Fisheries COUJl(,'il Minutes 11 Mar. 1992.
357Ibid.
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resulting in only a 30% probability that the stocks would recover by the year 2002.3 58 Its
major \vcakness was that the prescribed closure did not coincide with months trdditionaUy
known for producing the most winter tloundcr. Based on historical catch records, only
17% of the commercial and recreational occurs between November through February.359
Additionally, the effectiveness of the night ban could not be calculated due to insufficient
data.360 As the report pointed out, another drawback with temporary spawning closures in
general, is that any reduction in mortality is usually offset by an initial surge of fishing
effort immediately after the restriction is lifted.36I The RlDFW suggested, that if the
Council was intent on reopening the fishery, the following alternatives be included for
public comment:
1. Rearranging the close season to encompass the months of April, May,
June and July to coincide with the peak period of productivity in the
fishery;
2. Reducing the recreational bag limit to two fish;
3. Considering a 1% bycatch of winter Hounder during the closed
season.362
After the above-stated recommendations were approved a<; additional alternatives, the
Council voted on whether or not to bring the proposals to a public hearing. Initially, it
appeared as if the motion carried on the first try by a four to three margin, however,
chairman Grant set a major precedent by voting to make a tie (four against - four in favor)
358Mark Gibson, Evaluation of Winter Flounder Mana~ementMeasures Discussed and Clarified at
the March Meeti~~ of the Rhodc Island ]\'Iarine Fishcries CotUlcil Rhode Island Division of Fish and
Wildlife, Apr. 1992: 3.
3591bid.
360lbid. at 2.
3611bid. at 3.
362Ibid. at 2.
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and thereby (as specified in Robert's Rules (~fOrder) defeating the majority needed to pass
the proposal.363
POSTSCRIPT
In February of 1994, bait and tackle store owners spearheaded a successful drive to
modify the ban to permit a limited recreational fishery. By a four to one vote, the Council
passed the following new regulations:
1. To maintain the existing area closure for flounder fishing;
2. A state-wide five (5) inch minimum mesh size to keep and possess
winter flounder;
3. A limit recreational fishery of four winter flounder per day during the
month of April.364
In an attempt to mtionali7--e reopening a limited recreational fishery, it was argued that the
additional mortality imposed by the one month fishery would be offset by the five inch
minimum mesh size requirement.365 However, as noted by RIDFW biologist Mark
Gibson, it was unclear as to what effect this plan would have on total fishing mortality.366
Therefore, despite no real improvement in stock abundance, other than a better than average
1992 year class, the Council elected to pass its first major exemption to the inshore
moratorium - just a few months shy of its three year anniversary.
Although it was uncertain at the time of the meeting, subsequent analyses have
detemlined that this measure will mise overall fishing mortality. This is especially bad
news because in addition to hindering a recovery, as things currently stand, the state has
exceeded the recommended fishing mortality rates developed by the ASMFC in il<; Fishery
363Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 10 Apr. 1992.
364Rllode Island Marine Fisheries Council Minutes 16 Feb. 1994.
365Ibid.
36611bid.
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Management Plan for Inshore Stocks of Winter Flounder.367 Whereas in the past these
guidelines were nonbinding, as a result of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Coopemtive
Management Act (passed as Ti tie VIII of H.R. 2150, the Coast Guard Reauthorization
Bill), all management plans passed by the ASMFC are now mandatory. Modeled after the
highly successful Striped Bass Act of 1985, those states out of compliance with ASMFC
plans risks having a moratorium imposed an all fishing for the species in question by the
Secretary of Commerce. Consequently, sometime in the near future, the Council will have
to take action to better protect the stocks.
CONCLUSIONS
The absence of clearly expressed goals and objectives ha'l seriously hindered the
management or the winter 110under fishery in Rhode Island. In reviewing the regulatory
history of this fishery, it is apparent that there \Va" no predetermined plan or guidelines by
which to manage, never mind conserve, this species. Instead, time after time, actions were
taken in response to a crisis, and not a" part of a preconceived stmtegy to help protect the
stocks. Additionally, Council members solely determined by themselves what actions to
take, and were therefore compelled to make value-ladenjudgemenL'l about the proper
course of management. Given the diversity of members involved in the decision-making
process, and therefore diversity of opinions about what is good or bad for the fishery, it is
not surprising that the management process was marred by infighting and incessant delays,
all of which has been to the detriment of the resource. Combine this with a willingness to
foremost accommodate the needs of the fishermen instead of those of the resource, and it
367Mark R. Gihson, Rhode Island Division of fish and Wildlife, Personal Contact, 29 Aug.
1994.
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bccomes even more apparcnt why the Council was unable to pass substantive regulations to
stcm the collapse of this fishery.
In retrospecl, the Councif bears most of the responsibility for the current poor
health of the winter flounder population. Yet, the RIDFW is also shares some of this
responsibility. Although it ha., provided many invaluable stock assessments and technical
advice, at other times it has offered contradictory recommendations (which will be
discussed in greater detail :later in this chapter). However, the intent of this analysis is not
to assign blame after the fact; instead, it is intended to review the decision-making process
so that fault.., within the system can be identified and hopefully rectified in the future.
In looking back at the stewardship of this fishery, and bearing in mind that in a
period of about ten years the abundance of winter flounder in Narragansett Bay went from
near-record highs to an all time low, it becomes apparent that something went terribly
wrong. While some may look to blame unfavorable natural conditions such as above-
average winter watcr temperatures, or other causes like the combination of pollution and the
loss of critical habitat, according to the best available dal4, the driving force behind the
collapse of this fishery has been the inability to curtail the overfishing that hao; taken place
year after year. It is true that overfishing in federal waters and coastal development and
pollution are partially responsible for the present state of affairs, yet stock models by the
RIDFW indicate that the vast majority of wintcr flounder originating from Narragansett Bay
are caught in state watcrs and that it is excessive fishing mortality, not habitat degradation,
that is most responsible for reducing stock size (with the JX)ssible exception of the power
plant mortality in Mt. Hope Bay). Unlike in some fisheries, where incorrect decisions are
made due to a lack of data, the managers in this fishery have had the luxury of numerous
data sources and stock assessments. While maintaining the stock at its former peak of
abundance from the late 1970s and early 1980s is unrealistic (due to several unseasonably
warm winters), it is not too much to expect that it could have been prevented from
collapsing the way it did. At thc very Ieao;t, more timely conservation measures would
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have, in alllikelih(x)d, maintained a greater spawning stock biomass so that it would not
require a decade or more to rebuild the population.
The lack of management goals and objedives makes it extremely difficult to
objectively assess the performance of this management system. As previously discussed in
an earlier chapter, an organization's goals and objectives help to identify what it is striving
to attain. Since its goals and objectives are unclear, by what measures or standards should
the Council's management of the winter flounder fishery be judged a success or failure? In
other words, what is its specific purpose? Is it the job of the Council, in conjunction with
advice from the RIDFW, to protect the living marine resources under its jurisdiction or to
see that these resources are fUlly utilized with little regard for the future? As things
currently stand, nowhere is it written that the Council is supposed to even prohibit
overfishing. It is these questions that have not only perplexed the author, but have also left
the Council wi thout the guidance to better handle the problems it encountered in trying to
manage this fishery.
Under this management system, regulations are born out of crisis situations, not as
part of a preconceived strategy to conserve the stocks. Most, if not all of the regulations in
the winter Oounder fishery have been passed in response to stock assessments supplied by
the RIDFW. For example, the first minimum size limit (11 "), passed in 1985, came about
after the RIDFW noted during the previous year that such a measure would be beneficial.
As another example, the 1991 inshore momtorium came about after the 1990 stock
assessment noted that more stringent regulations were needed to increase stock abundance.
This process, whereby advice from the RIDFW initiates the Council to take action, is not
bad in and of itself. In fact, it is healthy sign that the Council, in some situations, is at lea"t
responding to the data provided by the RIDFW. However, it is mostly after the Council
receives this information, when it must try to act in a timely fa<;hion and reach a consensus
about what mea<;ures to take, that things start to fall apart.
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In its strictest sense, Rhode Island docs not truly have a management system for its
marine fisheries. As previously discussed, an essential element of management is trying to
reach some predetermined goals and objectives. The Council provides a forum whereby
regulations can be promulgated, yet it is does not seek to achieve anyone specific aim.
Instead it responds on a case-by-case basis, or more specifically crisis-by-crisis basis,
whereby its members ostensibly work to resolve the problem at hand. In this process,
Council members are free to individually detennine what is a desirable outcome. These
decisions are shaped by their values, which often vary from individual to individual, or
user group to user group. This would not be such a major obstacle they all could agree to
prioritize long-term sustainability ahead of all other matters. Ideally, this should be the
case; however in practice, where short-term economic concerns often exert pressure against
conservation, this is usually unrealistic - especially for those managers who make a living
from commercial or recreational fisheries.
In specific reference to the management of the winter flounder fishery, like in most
other fisheries, this disparity in values can often be a source of contention. One
commonality that runs throughout the period under consideration (]984-l994), is the
fundamental difference of priorities between the biologists from the RIDFW and those who
earn an income from commercial or recreational fisheries. In most cases, the biologists
have recommended a lisk-averse strategy to manage the fishery~ fishermen, on the other
hand, have generally opposed this advice. For example, in its fonnal stock assessment of
1987, the RIDFW suggested that while the winter tlounder stocks were not in any
immediate danger, precautionary measures should be taken.368 Yet subsequently, several
months later in March of ]988, during a public hearing in which input was sought on a
possible ]2 inch minimum size limit, many commercial fishennen in attendance advocated
against the measure, arguing that if would cause too much of a financial hardship and that
368Supril notc nOle 249.
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the previous 11 inch size limit \vas not given enough of an opportunity to prove its
effectiveness.3 G9 A year later, despite a growing sense of urgency to take some measures
to consen'e the stocks, many fishermen once again protested against a proposal for a 12-
inch size limit and a 5-inch minimum mesh size based on nearly identical argument<; from
the year before.37o Almost every subsequent recommendation by the RIDFW to conserve
the fishery has been meet with stiff resistance because of financial reasons.
. Naturally, this discord has spilt over into the Council. In general, the Council is
commonly divided between those who those earn an income from fisheries and those who
do not. While this is not always a given, it usually seems to work out this way. Those
representatives who make a living from commercial or recreational fisheries tend to be more
inclined to place the short-term economic needs of fishermen ahead of the biological needs
of the resource. For example, this dichotomy was blatantly obvious when the Council tried
to rescind the inshore moratorium in April of 1992. The motion eventually failed to carry a
majority, with the vote split evenly, with those members who do not earn an income from
fisheries voting against it and the other members, a charter boat captain and the three
commercial representatives, voting to pa<;s it.371
It is this difference in values, where some are more willing than others to jeopardize
long-term sustainability for greater short-term rewards, that makes fisheries management so
contentious. Unfortunately, when there is no mechanism to resolve these differences, such
as in Rhode Island, the result is usually incessant turmoil where management decisions are
delayed at the expense of the resource. For example, a<; noted previously, in its 1987 stock
assessment, the RIDFW recommended that precautionary mea<;ures be taken to help
conserve the stocke;; and protect the viability of the fishery.372 Yet despite this warning, the
Council did not pass any new regulations until November of 1989, nearly two years later!
369Supra nole 270.
370Supra nole 298.
37 ISupra nole 363.
372Supra note 112 at 8.
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Additionally, these regulations, a half-inch size increase (11.5") and a 5-inch mesh
requirement for the lightly-fished (commercially) northern Narragansett Bay, did not take
effect until January of 1990.373 During this time, the stock rapidly deteriorated to where
the RIDFW went from advising that there was no immediate danger of a stock collapse in
1987, to warning in 1990 that there was a significant probability of a stock collapse.
Throughout this critical period, the Council was embroiled in nearly constant quarrels over
what action, if any, to take. Eventually, after failing to develop any substantive regulations
on its own, it turned to the RIDFW to suggest proposals that it could vote upon.374 (As
discussed earlier in this chapter, this in tum precipitated another battle over whose
responsibility it was to develop such proposals.) Consequently, the Council squandered
this two-year window of opportunity to take more immediate action to help conserve the
fishery.
To help facilitate and expedite the decision-making process, a system of goals and
objectives would be of invaluable a.,sistance. As noted in the second chapter, goals and
objectives, if stated clearly and concisely, can make conflicting activities more recognizable
and help evaluate choices when there are conl1icts. For example, a goal such as to
conserve the stock., by preventing overfishing (which would of course have to be further
specified through more detailed objectives) could help to alleviate some of the differences
between Council members by prioritizing their values, at least in the context of this
decision-making process. That is, it would compel those mem1bers who feel otherwise, to
accept the fact that their foremost responsibility is to ensure the viability of the resource, not
protect the short-term economic needs of fishermen. Most importantly, it would accelerate
the decision-making process to more quickly respond to a rapidly changing situation, such
as occurred in the winter flounder fishery. Disagreements may still ensue over the best
373SlIpra nole 303.
374Supra nole 291.
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course of action to protect the stocks, yet it would narrow the focus of these arguments
from a contest over allocation rights to that of a struggle over strategies of conservation.
It is important to remember that such goals, if they are to be useful in facilitating the
decision-making process, should be stated in a straightforward manner and not leave any
doubt about an organization's foremost priority. For example, consider the situation on the
national level, where fisheries are supposed to be managed according to, among other
things, the nebulous concept of optimum yield, which is defined as the maximum
sustainable yield "as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."375
Such a goal can hardly be said to make conflicting activities more recognizable and help
compare ehoices to resolve dilTerences, since it simultaneously makes four things,
maximum sustainable yield as well as economic, social, and ecological factors, all of equal
importance. Therefore, fishery meetings on the national level can, and do, become bogged
down as different user groups vociferously argue to protect their own parochial interests
while its councils are left without much guidance to resolve these differences.
A system of concise goals and objectives, in addition to facilitating the decision-
making process, could be extremely beneficial in developing a more risk-adverse fisheries
management program. It is important to bear in mind, that under the current system in
Rhode Island, not only are managers often unable to make timely decisions, but their
eventual decisions usually cater more to the fishermen than the resource. That is, there is a
greater willingness to err favoring the economic interests of the fishermen than protecting
the viability of a fishery.
For example, consider what tmnspired when the Council passed two substantive
measures to protect the winter Oounder fishery in the late fall of 1989. As previously
discussed, after delaying for nearly two years, in November of ]989, the Council finally
managed to adopt a 12 inch minimum size limit and a 5 inch minimum mesh size
37516 USC 1802 § 3(7).
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rcquircmentto posscss wintcr Houndcr while fishing in Narragansett Bay-north of an
imaginary hne drawn from Bonnet Point to Brenton Point and from Sachuset Point to
Sakonnct Point.376 Subsequcnlly, after an outcry of protest that thesc mcasures would be
too financially devastating, a month later, the Council gave in and modified its original
regulations. The 12 inch size limit, which was to takc effcct in January of 1990, was
broken down into two progressive size limit'> of 11.5 inches for 1990 and 12 inches for
1991. Even worse, the 5 inch mesh size requirement was substantially weakened by
pushing the line further north in the Bay to an area that received much less fishing effort
from otter trawl vessels.377
As another example, consider what the Council has attempted since it passed the
inshore winter flounder moratorium in the spring of 1991. Once again, after an outcry of
protest, some members have changed their position on the ban. Despite no new data
indicating any improvement in the condition of the stocks, in 1992 a serious attempt was
made to repeal the ban, because, as one of the proponents put it, "fisheries management is
an inexact science."378 Therefore, according to this argument, because of the imprecisions
of forecasting stock size, it is better to err in favor of the fishermen than that of the
resource. If not for a technicality, the moratorium would have been replaced by a serious
of measures that taken as a whole, were much less effective in reducing fishing mortality.
In 1994, another attempt to modify the ban, spearheaded by bait and tackle store owners,
was successful in pushing through a limited one-month open recreational fishery with a
four fish bag limit.379 While some may argue that the simultaneously-passed 5 inch
minimum mesh size requirement for all state waters would afford additional protection for
the resource, as noted by RIDFW biologist Mark Gi bson, the effects of such a trade off are
376Supra note 302.
377Supra notes 303.
378Supra note 350.
379Supra note 364.
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uncertain.380 Therefore, once again, it was octter to gamble with the viability of the fishery
than risk hurting the fishing industry.
Throughout the history of the management of this fishery, the RIDFW has been of
invaluable assistance providing technical stock assessments and quantitative analyses of
regulatory proposals. Yet, in some situations, internal strife within the RIDFW has led it to
provide contradictory recommendations. Nowhere was this more evident than when the
inshore winter flounder momtorium was passed in 1991. At the time, the then Chief of the
RIDFW, John Stolgitis, vehemently disagreed with a group of biologists on his staff,
including both deputy chiefs, over the necessity of a mordtorium. Even after the passage of
the moratorium, he continued to argue that it was too Draconian. In addition to being a
public embarrassment, this division also served to undern1ine the credibility of his own
biologist's stock a<.;sessments and subsequently provided further impetus to try and rescind
the moratorium.
In conclusion, a once vibrant resource has been reduced to a shadow of its former
self. In a period of just over a decade, the ncar-record abundance of winter tlounder in
Rhode Island waters, especially Narrdgansett Bay, has drastically dwindled. Today, its
spawning stock biomass is so low, that it is incapable of producing a dominant year class
even under favorable natural conditions. The real tragedy is that despite ample warning of
an impending crisis, the Council failed to take substantive measures to help prevent the
collapse of this fishery. Instead, regulations were passed in fits and spurts, and usuaHy
only after a crisis had developed. Without a system of goals and objectives to define its
purpose, the Council struggled to make timely decisions and often failed to take the
necessary precautions to conserve the stock.s. Consequently, a once important commercial
and recreational fishery has been squandered.
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CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The conservation of marine fisheries starts with the recognition that they are a
foremost a public resource, and as such, are held in trust for everyone, including
generations yet to come. It is widely understood that fisheries are of enormous social,
economic, and ecological value. If used wisely, they can provide a continuous source of
food, employment, and recreation, without endangering their biological role in the marine
environment. Unfortunately, in practice, this is rarely the case. In Rhode Island, no where
has this failure been more evident than in the collapse of its winter !lounder stocks over the
past ten years. In an effort to help revitalize this resource and provide the framework to
better manage many other of the state's marine fisheries, this reports oilers the following
four recommendations:
Recommendations
1. A system of unambiguous goals and objectives should be adopted to improve the
efficiency of the Council.
,2. Conservation - as defined through sustainable production - not allocation, should
be the overriding priority when administering the state's marine fisheries.
3. The Rhode Island General Assembly should provide more guidance for the Council
by stating that its foremost responsibility is to promote sustainable pnxluction.
4. Scientific advice should playa greater role in the decision-making process.
Additionally, this section will include a case study of the Atlantic striped bass fishery and
its management over the past ten years, to illustrate how the recommendations listed above
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have been put into practice to he'lp rebuild a fitshery that, similar to Rhode Island's winter
I'lounder fishery, was inefficiently managed for many years.
Thc failure to halt the decline of Rhode Isl'and's winter flounder fishery is a
microcosm of the problems occurring on both a global and national level. For example,
the totat world-wide catch has regressed neady 5 percent since 1989.381 Some regions
have been harder hit than others; four areas in particular - the ea<;t-central Pacific and the
northwest, west-central, and southeast Atlantic - have declined by approximately 30
percent during this same period.382 According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, four of the world's 17 major fisheries are commercially depfeted.383 (While
it is true that in some instances multiple factors are responsible for the decline, for the most
part, excessive fishing mortality remains the principal source of depIction.) Closer to
home, on a national level, 42 percent of the 153 species a<;sessed by the NMFS are
designated as overfished.384 In the Northeast, as a result of the severe overfishing of
traditional fish stocks ~uch as cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, the New England
Fisheries Council has shut down a large section of Georges Bank - what was once the
nation's most prolific fishing grounds.
Many fishing industry representatives have cautioned, that marine fisheries often
occur in cycles, and therefore managers should not overreact to the present scarcity of some
species. For example, a<; noted in historic catch records and research survey data, the
winter flounder in Narragansett Bay was at the peak of its abundance during the mid to late
1960s, only to decline for most of the 1970s, and subsequently rebound later in the decade
and throughout the early 1980s (see figures 3.9 and 3.11). Therefore, according to this
argument, the present condition is just a natural trough in its abundance cycle. However, it
381ScoU Sonner, "Oceans' bounty nearly depleted," Providence Journal. 24 Jul, 1994 sec. A: I &
11.
3821bid.
383Colin Nickerson, "Stripping the sea's life" The 13oston Globe. 17 Apr. 1994: I & 24-25.
384Marine Fish Conservation Network A National Ar,:enda to Protect. Restore, and Conserve
~vlarine Fishl-'fies, Pmnphlct.
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is important to keep in mind that as time progresses, so does technology. For example, on
a very broad historic scale, since the establishment of the first European scttlemenL<; along
the Bay over three hundred years ago, fishing technology has evolved from crude spears
and fish traps to powerful motorized trawlers armed with a vast array of sophisticated
technology designed to increase their harvest. More recently, over the past several
decades, fishermen have acquired, among other things, precise satellite positioning, larger
and! stronger synthetic fishing nets, fish-finding sonar, and more powerful vessels. It is
becoming increasingly apparent, that without precautions, modem fishing fleets are now
powert'ut enough to severely deplete a stock in a short period of time.
In reference to the winter flounder fishery in Narragansett Bay, the RIDFW has
warned that spawning stock biomass, as it currently stands, is so depressed that the species
may not be able to produce a good year class even under optimal natural conditions. This
may have been the case in 1992, when despite the advantage of a relatively cold winter,
recruitment only improved marginally and there failed to appear a strong year class.385 The
RIDFW continues to warn that a subsequent recovery and consequently better landings
may not be forthcoming without further harvest restrictions. Unfortunately, some continue
to argue that its present low abundance is not so dire, claiming that its current status is a
natural phenomenon that has occurred from time to time in the pa<;t (before accurate records
were kept) and is not the result of continuous fishing year after year. However,
considering the consequences of what may occur if little or no action is taken (commercial
extinction), the state must now act responsibly and adopt a risk-averse management
program.
Some still continue to argue that the winter flounder's current depressed status is
the result of a combination of factors, including pollution and the loss of habitat, and
therefore fishermen should not be singled out to bear the burden of rebuilding the stocks.
385Subsequently, in 1993 recruitment strength remained poor despite conducivewinter water
temperatures. The same appcars lo be true for 1994. (Mark Gibson, Persona] Conlact 26 August 1994.)
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However, for reasons previously discussed, reducing fishing mortality is the only practical
and feasible way to increase stock abundance over the next decade (sec chapter 3).
Proponents of Rhode Island's council system contend that despite its shortcomings,
it provides adequate protection of the state's marine fisheries. For example, although it
r:ook years to come about, the Council ultimately passed an inshore winter flounder
moratorium. However, before accepting this as being indicative of what can be expected of
this system, it is important to review the conditions under which it was adopted and what
has since transpired. As discussed in the previous chapter, in looking back over the
minutes of the Council, it is interesting to note the unusual circumstances under which the
moratorium came about For instance, the original proposal for such a restriction did not
originate from the Council and was not fonnally agreed upon to be brought to a public
hearing. Instead, somehow - most likely through the input or the RIDFW - immediately
prior to the public hearing in which it wa'S approved, it found its way onto a list of
innocuous proposals previously submitted by the Council that even in their entirety would
have done little to change the status quo and conserve the resource. In what had previously
or since occurred, most of those in attendance at the public hearing supported the closure.
As many opponent'S argued afterwards, had they known that the Council was considering
taking such action, they would have attended the public hearing and spoke out against it.
This may sound like a poor excuse, yet it is worth remembering that the subsequent public
hearing advised by the OEM legal counsel, was due in part to this specific oversight.
Since its passage, several members have rescinded their support for the
moratorium. As noted in the previous chapter, over the pa<;t several years there has been
intense pressure to revoke or weaken the ban. In two instances, the moratorium just barely
survived. If not for a technicality, less than a year after being adopted, it would have been
replaced with a much weaker sea'Sonal (winter) dosure. Another attempt to reopen the
fishery failed only after the chairman set a precedent to make a tie vote and thereby undo the
majority needed to pass the proposal. Finany, in 1994, a movement lead by bait and tackle
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store owners succeeded in sccuring a limited recreational fishery, despite no real
improvement in the status of the stocks. As a result, the state is currently out of compliance
with the mandatory fishing mortality rates stipulated by the ASMFC and therefore, as stated
under the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Comprehensive Management Act, faces a possible
imposed moratorium if conditions remain unchanged. In retrospect, considering the unique
set of circumstances under which it was adopted and what has transpired since its passage,
the moratorium seems more hke an aberration rather than proof of the Council's
commitment to conservation. Additionally, considering these circumstances, it seems quite
likely that the fishery will eventuaHy reopen due to outside pressure, rather than as the
result of a true stock recovery.
With this in mind, and with many of its other marine fisheries also suffering, it is
important, now more than ever, that the state make it a priority to better steward these
vaJuable natural resources. Under the present system, the state has abdicated its
management responsibilities to the sole discretion of a citizen-ba<;ed council dominated by
commercial and recreational fishermen. Its past performance has proven that this
arrangement is unreliable in safeguarding fish stocks from overexploitation. Yet mther than
implementing a bmnd new system, which in addition to being a long drawn-out process
would most likely be plagued by unforeseen start-up problems, the following
recommendations may provide a remedy to revamp the Council and make it a better
guardian of long-term sustainable pr'Oduction.
RECOMMENDATION 1
A system of unambiguous goals and objectives should be adopted to
in.!prove the effi~iency of the Council.
The stewardship of Rhode Island's marine fisheries would greatly benefit from a
system of unambiguous goals and objectives. In comparison to most other states, Council
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members operate in one of the lease restrictive environments. They are free to pass
regulations without subsequent approval by a supervisory agency nor are they res}X)nsible
for meeting any predetermined legislative requirements (i.e. such as to prevent
overfishing). With the exception of some procedural restraints, the state's fisheries are
administered solely at their discretion. Furthermore, in an attempt to accommodate a broad
spectrum of interests in the rule-making process, the CouncB is inclusive of both
commercial and recreational fishermen as well a<; others skilled in fisheries biology. The
combination of these two conditions has proven to be anything but successful. To
understand why, it is important to keep in mind what can be expected of the current set up,
which brings together a diverse group of participants each with their own expectations or
goals. Each individual's values, and how they are prioritized, play an important role in
which goals are selected. They shape his perception of the issue at hand and what course
of action to follow. Unfortunate'y, in fisheries, seldom is their a consensus as to which
values are most appropriate. This is especially true when dealing with people of different
backgrounds. Consequently, it should not be surprising that on the Council, each
member's values often diller, or even worse, are at cross purposes to one another. And
therefore, it is not unusual for individual members to be working towards dissimilar or
opposite goals from each other.
Without a system of goals and objectives, the Council operates at a great handicap
at recognizing conflicttng activities or comparing choices when differences occur. The
result is a decision-making process that is prone to incessant delays as Council members
struggle to reach a consensus on what course of action to take. This inability to make
timely decisions or adopted precautionary measures is largely to blame for the precarious
position the winter flounder is in. The magnitude of the decline of this once-abundant
species is reflected in the deteriomtion of it<; fishery. Since the early 1980s, the commercial
CPUE of winter flounder caught in and around Rhode Island waters has plummeted nearly
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81 % while thc recreational CPUE has fallen off by 90(Y;).3~G Additionally, its abundance,
as detcnnined in several local trawl' surveys, is at or ncar record low levels. Yet dcspite
being kept abreast of the situation through stock assessmcnts provided by the RIDFW, the
Council has been generally incffective in stemming the decline. For example, no where
was this more apparent than when the Council delayed for two years before it responded to
the 1987 RIDFW recommendation to take precautions to help conserve the fishery before
conditions worsened. By time it took action in late 1989, the population was in a tailspin.
By its next major move - the inshore closure of 1991 (nearly two years later!) -
continuous oveIfishing year aftcr year had decimated stock biomass to the point where a
reasonable chance of a recovery was (and still is) estimated to take about a decade.
The stale can take grcat strides towards improving the efficiency or responsiveness
of the Council by compelling it to adhere to a system of unambiguous goals and objectives.
Such a measure would help instill a trucr scnsc of management, where decisions arc made
as part of a preconceived strategy rather than in reaction to a crisis. In understanding the
pivota~ role that goals and objectives serve in any management program, whether it
concerns the stewardship of a natural resource or the business decisions of a multibillion
dollar corporation, it is important to keep in mind the definition of management as stated in
the second chapter:
Management is the~ and science of dctcnnining, c(x)rdinating, and utilizing
human and material resources to reach the goals and objectives of an organization.
It is a process that indudes clements of planning, briving direction, coordinating,
organizing, and controlling Ian] organization to reach its goals and objectives.387
For thc Council, a system of goals and objectives would providc a common thread to help
bring its divergcnt interests together. Ir clearly slated, they can specify iL" ultimate purpose
38GSllpra nole 24 at 16.
::l87SlIpra nole 4.
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and help reconcile the disparity of values of its membership - at least in the context of its
dccision-maki ng process.
RECOMMENDATION 2
Conservation - as defined through sustainable production - not
allocation, should be the overriding priority when administering the
state's marine fisheries.
As things currently stand, the Council is a state regulatory body that operates
\vithout a specific purpose other than to administer the state's marine fisheries as it so
determines. As previously discussed, seldom do participants involved in the decision-
making process agree over what goals should be selected. If a system of goals and
objectives is adopted as suggested in the first recommendation, it is imperative that
c()nsen1ation be made unequivocally the foremost priority. Given the disparity of values of
its members, under no circumstances should these goals and subsequent objectives be
ambiguously stated. Such a situation would only precipitate what has occurred on the
federal level, where the nation's fisheries are managed under the nebulous goal of optimum
sustainable yield. Therefore, it must be absolutely clear that issues of allocation arc
secondary to maintaining sustainability.
While it may seem that the ultimate aim of fisheries management is conservation, in
practice this is often not true. Unfortunately, administrators are generally driven by
obtaining benefits that are accruable solely to themselves, not the resource. As previously
noted, "a fundamental premise [of fisheries management] ... is that all· benefits derivable
from fisheries management are accruable solely to man."388 While some environmentalists
and biologists who are also policy makers would disagree with this statement, it is
3R8S IIpra note 87.
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il11lX)flantto keep in mind that many citizen-based regulatory bodies are dominated by user
groups, not ecologists or scientists. For example, on the Council, two-thirds of its
members are commercial or recreational fishennen. Consequently, there is an inherent
conflict of interest for those who are supposed to serve as guardians of the resource and yet
at the same time make a profit or derive some other means of satisfaction from harvesting
this same resource.
Fisheries management would be a fairly simple task if all participants subscribed to
the goal of sustainable production. That is, to harvest the resource so as to maintain a
spawning stock biomass that can reasonably be expected to perpetually regenerate those
losses due to natural attrition and fishing mortality. Unfortunately, in practice, the
realization of this goal has proven to be elusive. In addition to the conflict of interest
discussed in the previous paragraph, there are several other reasons why fishermen are
generally reluctant, outside of what they may ostensibly claim, to support sustainable
production. Some of their reluctance stems from the innate inefficiencies of hanrcsting a
common property resource. For example, in such a fishery, the best intentions of those
fishermen who are consen'ation minded can be easily thwarted by less scrupulous
fishermen willing to risk their future for greater short-term profits. Additionally, the
benefits derived by forsaking present catch can be easily dissipated by others who enter the
fishery when conditions improve.
The present state of affairs is in some respects analogous to Winston Churchill's
criticism of appeasement, in which he compared it to that of feeding an incessantly hungry
alligator those people standing around you in the hopes that you will be the last one eaten.
As things currently exist, in fisheries, different user groups and individual fishermen are in
fierce competition with one another to maintain or inerea~e their present cateh with little
regard for the future. Ultimately it winds up being a struggle to be the last one in business
as the resource dries up. This may be an overstatement, however it is a fairly accurate
analysis of the mentality that drives the management process. While concessions are
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occasionafly made to reduce fishing mortality, seldom are these measures ever laken as a
precaution, nor do they ever go far enough to make any significant difference by the late
crisis stage in which they are adopted. Atl too often, it a case of too rittle, t<x) late. In the
end, when the resource ultimately is depleted, the exact condition they are trying to avoid
- to incur any major disruptions that will effect their profits - has become a reality
anyway. While it may be true that abiding by a strict set of conservation guidelines will
impose smaller annual harvests, at least all concerned parties can continuously generate
some revenue without the disastrous results of long-term closures that all too often seem to
be a natural progression under the current system.
RECOMMENDATION 3
The Rhode Island General Assembly should provide more guidance for the
Council by stating that its foremost responsibility is to promote
_sustainable production.
As previously noted, the Council is a regulatory body that operates without a
specific purpose other than to administer the state's marine fisheries. With the exception of
some procedural constraints, it is accountable to no one and can make decisions as it feels
appropriate. Such an arrangement, which has been a Ixxm for fishermen seeking to operate
with a minimum of regulatory interference, has come at the expense of protecting the
interests of the general public. H has catercd to the fishing industry's dcmand to maximize
its short-term profits. Consequently, a resource that is in theory held in common by all
citizens of Rhode Island to enjoy and appreciate, is being allocated for the benefit of a
privileged few. While it is true that in many instances these individuals have invested
heavily in harvesting capital and have the most to lose if their catches are reduced, they also
stand to profit greatly if conditions improve. Considering what has transpired since the
inception of the Council back in 1976, the state must act to reform the present management
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system so that its marine fisheries are held in trust for all to enjoy, including generations yet
to come.
To help accomplish this, the state must more definitively define the overall purpose
of the Council. Throughout its existence, the Council has been severely hindered by a lack
of guidance to help direct the decision-making process. Without repeating much of what is
stated above, this deficiency has been further exacerbated by the diversity of its
membership. The result is a decision-making process prone to incessant delays and
incapable of adopting pre-emptive strategies to avert a crisis. Without an operating
directive, its members can and often do support policies that are at cross purposes to each
other. As previously noted in chapter two, the closest example of an operating guideline
can be found in the 1981 act that recodified Title 20 of the General Laws of Rhode Island.
Under this law, "the animal life inhabiting the lands of the state... and the marine waters ...
can be developed, preserved, and maintained for the beauty that wild anima~s bring to the
environment. "389 While such a goal offends no one, it is of little functional value. For
example, is it realistically possible to both simultaneously "develop" and "preserve" a
natural resource? What should take priority when there is a conOict of such a nature?
While the General Assembly does go on to state that harvest restrictions should be adopted
for the "conservation and perpetuation of all species of fish and wildlife"39o it still must
more definitively prioritize conservation ahead of allocation. The failure to do so will
continue to ensure that when administering the state's marine fisheries, the interest') of the
general public will fall by the wayside in the industI)'-dominatcd Council.
389Rl1<x!e Island Public Law 1981, chapter 197.
39OJbid.
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RECOMMENDATION 4
Scientific advice should play a greater role in the decision-making
rocess.
It is not uncommon to hear Narragansett Bay compared to that of a specimen under
a microscope. That is, with the nearby prestigious University of Rhode Island Graduate
School of Oceanography, federal representatives who take an active interest in maritime
issues, and a dedicated statc environmental agency, there is a plethora of academic and
government studies focusing upon the Bay. A number of these programs are dedicated to
monitoring thc status of its fisheries in one way or another. For example, there are four
major trawl surveys inside and just outside the Bay that provide a continuous time series of
abundance data on numerous species, including the winter f1ounder. Additionally,
commercial and recreational catch and effort data are collected by or under the supervision
of the National Marine Fisheries Service. All of this inforn1ation is processed and analyzed
by the RIDFW and summarized in annual or periodic stock. assessments. Despite the time,
effort, and money spent on collecting and processing this data, it is only of marginal usc in
managing the state's marine fisheries.
As previously discussed, the Council is free to administer the state's marine
fisheries as it so decides. Its decisions are final and do not need subsequent approval from
a state agency or have to conform to some pre-establish guidelines, such as to prevent
overfishing. Therefore, it can ignore or act in direct defiance to the best available data as
presented by the RIDFW. No where has this been more true than in iL<; attempt to reopen
the winter !lounder fishery after the 1991 inshore moratorium. Dcspite the continuous
warnings of the RIDFW that additional precautions are necessary to realistically promote a
recovery, the Council has attempted on several occasions to rescind or weaken the ban. As
noted previously in chapter 4, in 1992, Jess than a year after adopting the closure, the
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Council voted to reopened the fishery with only some minor restrictions. If not for a
technicality, this would have become a reality. Later that same year, the chainnan had to
set a precedent by interceding to make a tie vote to prevent a similar motion from being
approved. Finally, in 1994 the Council voted to allow a limited, one-month recreational
fishery despite continued urging by the RIDFW to further curtail fishing mortality.
It should be remembered that fisheries management is a human-centered not
resource-centered process. That is, in essence, it is a contest by individuals or user groups
for the largest share of the pie. All too often, it is a process where the benefits secured by
fishennen - to minimize regulatory interference and maximize their total allowable catch
- come at the expense of the long-term health of the resource. To reverse this trend,
scientific data should serve as a tool to restrain fishing mortality by setting up minimum
thresholds below which stock abundance may not fall if there is to be a reasonable chance
of maintaining sustainable production. Yet rather than getting into a general discussion of
how such a precaution can be employed, it would be better to present a case study of how
this idea and the goals mentioned above have actually been put into practice to help rebuild
and efficiently manage a fishery.
MANAGEMENT OF THE ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS FISHERY: A CASE
STUDY
Under the ASMFC Interstate Management Plan for Stliped Bass, a system of goals
supported by quantifiable objectives ha<; been the cornerstone of a highly successful effort
to help protect and rebuild this fishery. Just a decade ago, the future of the Atlantic striped
bass fishery appeared to be in serious jeopardy. Between 1973 and 1983, the commercial
harvest of striped bass had plummeted from a record high of 14.7 million pounds to an aU-
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time low of 1.7 million pounds (see l'igure 5. J).191 The recreational catch, as estimated
through the MRFSS, paralleled this trend, nose diving from 6.6 million pounds in 1979 to
1.0 million pounds in 1984.392 Furthermore, throughout this same pcn(xl, year class
strength, as measured through several research surveys, remained dangerously weak for
over ten years (see figure 5.2). AHhough this fishery experienced ups and downs in the
past, the severity of this decline was alarming.
To better understand what happened, it is helpful to brietly review some a"pects of
this species' life cycle. The striped bass is an anadromous fish that is rarely found far from
shore (see figure 5.3). The Atlantic population, which ranges from northern Florida to the
St. Lawrence River in Canada, is chiefly comprised of three stocks emanating from the
tributaries of the Chesapeake Bay in Virginia and Maryland, the Hudson River in New
York, and the Roanoke River in North Carolina.393 Although this percentage varies
annually and by location, the Chesapeake stock is believed to be the dominant contributor,
accounting for approximately 90% of the total population.394 After spawning in these river
systems during the spring, it migrates up the coastline. During the late fall it retraces its
path and winters in or near these estuaries.
Its nearshore distribution, coupled with its superior fighting ability and culinary
quality, has made the striped bass a popular species with both commercial and recreational
fishermen. Its plentiful abundance and value as a source of food was recognized by the
first European settlers. As noted in one early account from 1635,
391Atlantic States Marine Fishcrics Commission, Fisheries Mana~ement Report No. 16 of thc .
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Conullission: Supplement to the Striped Bass FMP Amendment #4 , Mar.
1990: 4.13-4.15 (Although total coastwide landing further declined throughout the 1980s, this was after
ASMFC institutcd stringent fishing restrictions under its interstate management plan.)
392J.E. \Vcaver, R.B. [oairbanks, and CM. Wooley, "Interstate management of Atlantic coastal
striped hass," Proceedings of the I £th Annual Marine Recreational Symposium, 1986: 77.
393Supra note 391 at 4.66.
394Ihid. at 3.5.
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Figure 5.1: Commercial Landings of Striped Bass. Note landings after 1984 affected by stringent catch
restrictions imposed under Amendment 4 to the ASMfC Striped Bass Management Plan.395
3 C)5Supra note 11 at 4.13-4.15.
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Figure 5.2: Year class strength of striped hass as measured by the Maryl<md Department of Natural
Resources Chesapeake Bay YOlUlg-of-thc-ycar seine survey.396
39Glbid. al4.23. Data for the years 1990-1993 gathered through personal contact with John
Fields.
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Fignre 5.3: Striped Bass.l'vlorone saxatili~397
397Sourcc: Henry B. Bigelow and William Sohroedcr. Fishes of the Gulf of Maine. Fishery
Bulletin 74 of the Fish and Wildlife Service. vol. 53. Washington: GPO. 1953.
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The Basse is one of the best fishes in the country .... the way to catch them
is with hooke and line: the fishennen laking great codline, to which he
fasteneth a piece of Lobster, and throws it into the sea, the fish biting it
pulls her to him, and knocks her on the head with a stick.... the English at
the top of an high water doe crosse the creeks with long seanes or Basse
nels, which stop the fish; and the water ebbing from them are left on dry
ground, sometimes two or three thousand at a set. ...398
In more recent times, the striped bass has been commercially harvested generaUy by rod
and reel, beach seines, gillnets, and fish traps. Just prior to its collapse, from 1966 to
1975, commercial landings were around 10.6 million pounds a year.399 Its high price,
averaging $1.78 per pound in 1983, provided an incentive to continue fishing even after its
numbers had fallen ofr.4oO For recreational anglers, this species may be the quintessential
sport fish. It" willingness to strike a bait or lure, strong fighting ability, relatively large
size (the all-tackle angling record is 78.5 pounds), and availability in nearshore waters, all
serve to make it a favorite target of recreational fishennen. In the two decades preceding its
collapse, it is estimated that the recreational catch equaled or exceeded the commercial
harvest.4o 1
Continuous overfishing year after year eventually took its toll. The striped ba<;s is
dependent upon occasionally strong or dominant year classes to provide a large pool of
spawners to last through periods of poor recruitment. By the early 1980s, the abundance
of the critical Chesapeake stock, as observed through Maryland's young-of-the-year
research survey, was in very poor shape. By that point, it had failed to produce a strong
year class throughout most of the 1970s (see figure 5.2). It is true that spawning success
is generally detennined not so much by the abundance of parental fish, but by random
398From \Villiam Wood in New Eng/atui's Prospects (1635) as quoted in: Nicholas Karas, 111C
Complete Book of tlIe Striped Bass, South Hackensack, Ncw Jersey: Stoeger Publishing Company, 1974:
113.
399Sura notc 391 at 4.10.
400Ihid. at 3.6.
401Ibid. at 3.1.
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cnvironmental factors such as watcr tcmperature and fresh water inflow,402 and
consequently, the amount of new recruits is more of an indicator of future rather than
present stock abundance. However, during this period, a combination of perennial
overfishing and poor spawning conditions, and to a lesser extent coastal pollution, had so
dramatically decreased the population of sexually mature fish, that a dominant year class
could not occur even under favorable natural conditions.403
Prior to 1984, large-scale efforts to promote conservation generaHy failed. To
understand why, it is important to remember that the striped bass is usually found in coastal
waters and generally does not venture far offshore. Consequently, approximately 90
percent of the striped bass catch wa,; (and still is) harvested within state jurisdictional
waters.404 Protecting and rebuilding the stocks therefore required interstate cooperation
throughout its entire range. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. During this
period, management wa,; administered on an individual state basis. Throughout il';
southern range, conservation efforts traditionally aimed at protecting the breeding stock.
As a resulL, size limits permitted the harvest of smaller, sexually immature fish while
protecting those that were larger and mature. This was in direct contrast to those states
from New Jersey on north, where size limits were specifically designed to protect smaller,
immature fish. An initial attempt by the ASMFC to promote more consistency through a
variable minimum size limit, which called for a 14 inch minimum size limit in those states
with producing estuaries and a 24 inch size limit elsewhere, wa,; meet with stiff
resistance.405 Various user groups complained that the restrictions would cause too much
of a financial hardship and states bickered with one another about their share of
402Ibid. at 4.72.
403Ibid. at 4.83.
404Ibid. at 35.
405Supra note 392 at 78 & 80.
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responsibility to curtail fishing mortafity.406 With compliance voluntary, efforts to
promote conservation throughout its range !laundered.
With the states unable to work together, the federal government took a more active
role in the management of this fishery. In 1979, Congress passed the Anadromous Fish
Consen'arion Act (P.L. 96-118), which called for, among other things, a study to
detennine the causes for the decline of the Atlantic striped bass population. In the
meantime, as the states continued to make little headway resolving their differences, the
fishery deteriorated to a record low level. Finally, after growing impatient waiting for a
resolution, in 1984 Congress passed the Striped Ba~s Conservation Aet (P.L. 98-613),
which made it mandatory for each state to comply with the ASMFC's Interstate
Management Plan or risk faeing a federally-sanctioned moratoria on striped bass fishing.
From this point on, individual states up and down the East Coa~t fell into compliance with
the ASMFC's management ptan.
Adaptive management is a central element of the this plan. Instead of utilizing the
traditional management precept of maximum sustainable yidd, which is reliant upon several
stock assumptions which do not hold true for the striped ba~s, the primary strategy of this
plan is to restrain the harvest of dominant year classes so they can continuously contribute
to new stock recruitment over an extended number of years.407 By controlling fishing
effort, the plan is designed to promote "the restoration and maintenance of historical levels
406Ibid. al 80.
407Supra nole 391 aI4.103. (According to the ASt..,lFC, MSY was r~iectcd because the AtIantic
striped bass population did not meet the following crileria:
A. The stock must be self-regulating. "A self regulating population is one in which population dynamics
forces will result in an increase if the population level drops below the equilibrium, while if the
population exct.'cds the equilibrium. natural factors will cause a decline towards tIlC equilibrium point. ";
B. Habitat suitability for production musl be comparable 10 suitabililY in earlier decades;
C. There is a necessily for long-lernl hislorical calch and efforl dala. As nOled by the ASMFC, lhere was a
lack of effort data in tIle striped bass fishery and "Changes in Ihe nalure of lhe fisheries over lhe pasl five
to ten Ye<lfS ... cause an underlying nonstalutionarity in the landings dala which would have 10 be used in
any calculation of MSY It (Ibid. at 4.102-103)
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of the stocks" rather than targeting a specific production level.408 As noted the the
ASMFC,
Adaptive management inherently takes into account the fact that existing
information and data available on the species is often incomplete or
inaccurate. In the face of such uncertainty, management regimes are
developed based on the best information available, and the consequences of
implementation of those regimes arc closely watched through rigorous
monitoring of the fishery and stock. New information collected via this
monitoring is then analyzed, and the results of the analyses are used to
modify the initial management approach. Monitoring is a continuous
permanent element of an adaptive management approach, as is the
modification, correction or tuning of the management regimes
implemented.409
Adaptive management acknowledges that there arc uncertainties in forecasting stock
parameters and therefore provides a nexible fmmcwork to more efficiently respond to
changes in stock conditions as new information becomes available.4 ) 0 Furthermore, as
noted in the quote above, management strategies are modified based upon observable or
quantifiable data collected through constant monitoring, not according to the whims of
fishing groups. While it is true that most management regimes eventually a90pt new
courses of action as more experience is gained, adaptive management regimes, through the
constant feedback of their monitoring programs, are designed to more immediately institute
changes when necessary.
408Ibid. at 4.103.
409Atlantic Slates Marine Fisheries Commission, Fisheries Mana~ement Report No. 15 of the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission: Supplement to the Striped Bass FMP AmendmenL#4 , Ocl.
1989: 5.
4 1<1hid.
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A cornerstone of the Striped Bass Management Plan's success is the manner in
which it" goals are supported with quantifiable objc~tives based up::m careful monitoring of
the stocks. The main goal of this plan (which has been revised since its inception) is to
"perpetuate the striped bass resource throughout its range so as to generate optimal social
and economic benefits to the nation from its commercial and recreational harvest and
utilization over time."411 One of the objectives to meet this goal is to "restore and maintain
self-sustaining spawning stocks, minimizing the possibility of recruitment failure, as
determined by YOY [Young of Year} indices, or other measures or spawning success."412
This objective has been further refined through several amendment" to the origina) plan. In
October of 1985, the ASMFC adopted Amendment 3, which designated that 95 percent of
the females from the 1982 and subsequent year classes of the Chesapeake Bay stock was to
be protected against fishing mortality and, that 95 percent of these fish was to bc allowed
the opportunity to spawn at least oncc.413 This amendment applied until the three year
running average of the Maryland's young-of-thc-ycar index reached 8.0.414 As per this
stipulation, various coastal states adopted stringent regulations, ranging from total closures
to a combination of prolonged seasonal closures and very large size limit" - reaching a
minimum 01'33 inches total length by 1987.415 Amendment 4, which was adopted in
October of 1989, set up an structured plan to relax these restrictions upon mecting the target
goal of an 8.0 three year running average for the Maryland juvenile index. Under this
amendment, a transitional recovery fishery was established, with a target fishing mortality
rate of 0.25 (which is equivalent to a 20% loss of legal size fish due to fishing effort).416
Additionally, if the three year average falls below 8.0, reductions in fishing mortality are to
41lSupra nole 391 al3.9.
412Ibid.
413Supra nole 392 at 82.
414Ihid.
415Ibid.
416Supra nole 409 at o.
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be taken into consideration.417 FUlthemlore, under this amendment, the 19(10 to 1972
Chesapeake Bay stock size \Va" set as the benchmark population size for designating the
stock as [ully recovered, at which the allowable fishing mortality rate will be increased to
0.50.418
As alluded to in the objective and amendments discussed above, a critical
component of the monitoring process under this plan is the careful tracking of new recruits
produced in each year class. While this index can vary widely due to environmental
factors, the assumption is that its magnitude is reOective of future stock abundance and
reproductive capacity of each specific year class.419 The Maryland index was chosen
because studies have demonstrated that it accounts for 60 to 90 percent of total coastal
landings.42o As noted by the ASMFC,
The rationale for using young-of-year indices as triggers in the management
plan is that they represent an "early warning" signal of low stock
abundanec. Low reproductive success demonstrated by a Jow index value
allows management actions to be taken which will conserve those year
classes of fish which may not yet have been exploited because of protective
minimum size limits, thus ensuring that a sufficient breeding stock is
available in future years.421
Somc critics have argued that it was premature to relax restrictions in the fishery upon
attaining the 8.0 three year running average since one exceptionally large year class, as was
the case in 1989, can unduly inOuence the three year average despite the continuance of ,low
4171bid. at 13 (Under Addendum III to Amendment 4, the arithmetic mean has been replaced by the
geometric mean in an attempt to reduce index variability and increase the reliability of estimating annual
harvest quotas.)
418Jolm Fields, Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, Personal Contact, 29 Jul. 1994.
419Supra note 391 at 4.17.
420Supra nole 409 at 8.
4211hid.
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stock abundance. While this may be true, it is the concept of using ajuvenile index as an
early warning indicator of potential future problems, that this analysis is primarily
interested In. Such a system provides a framework to develop proactive strategies to better
avert a crisis rather than managing in response to one.
Under the guidance of the ASMFC's Interstate Management Plan, the Atlantic
striped bass has undergone a dramatic restoration over the past ten years. It is currently
projected that on January 1, 1995, aftcr having reached the population benchmark
discussed under Amendment 4, the striped bass wilf be designated as fully recovered.422
This recovery is reHected in greater CPUE by commercial and recreational fishermen, as
well as through vastly larger projected stock size estimations. Additionally, although year
class size is greatly affected by environmental conditions, there has been more consistent
periodic strong year classes. In fact, Maryland and Virginia's young-of-the-year indices
for 1993 were the highest on record.423 In an area plagued by one disappointment after
another, where many traditional fisheries are in desperate shape due to overfishing, this is
one of the few bright spots for fishery management efforts in the Mid-Atlantic and New
England region. Additionally, in an attempt to repeat this accomplishment, Congress
passed the Atlantic Coasta'l Fisheries Cooperative Management Act,which is modeled after
the Striped Bass Conservation Act of 1984. As a result, ASMFC management plans are
now binding on all coastal states.
The success of the Interstate Striped Bass Management Plan is due in large part to
manner in which it clearly and specifically states what it is trying to accomplish. Unlike
many other fishery management programs, which are so often riddled with unrealistic and
nebulous goals that only complicate and confu..<;e the decision-making process, this plan
unambiguously makes conservation its top priority. As a result, those officials involved in
the management process were able to work towards a single purpose. To their credit, they
422Supra note 418.
423IbiJ.
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developed a set of objectives, further refined through amendments, that rebuilt the fishery
in a step-by-step process. Through the Draconian fishing restrictions imposed under
Amendment 3, oYcrfishing ceased and the stocks were afforded a chance to recover. While
it is true that thcse measures put some fishermen out of business, the alLernative of doing
anything less would have prolonged the recovery process or even worse, left the
population in poor condition. The 8.0 three year running average trigger mechanism
developed under Amendment 4, reopened the fishery in a gradual fashion ,vith specific
target levels of fishing mortality designed to minimize the risk of overfishing the stocks.
Furthermore, allowable fishing mortality, which is carefully monitored by the ASMFC, is
associated with total stock abundance. Under Amendment 5, scheduled to become
effective starting in 1995, total allowable fishing mortality will be further increased based
upon the Chesapeake stock having rcached the 1%0-1972 target population size. The end
result is that under this plan, the ASMFC successfully rebuilt the Atlantic striped bass
fishery through a carefully thought out, proactive and systematic strategy.
ADOPTING THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ASMFC STRIPED BASS
MANAGEMENT PLAN TO RHODE ISLAND'S WINTER FLOUNDER
FISHERY
The framework of this plan can be of invaluable assistance in improving the ovemll
management of Rhode Island's marine fisheries. More specifically, it can serve as a model
to help steward the winter flounder fishery. Instead of leaving the fate of this resource to a
free-for-all fight between various user groups, as has been true in the past, the ASMFC's
Striped Bass Management Plan provides a framework to rebuild this fishery based upon an
objective review of stock conditions and in a risk-averse manner. Such a change in
strategy would be of great assistance as administrators struggle over what to do next. Even
tcxlay, with the momtorium in place, the future status of the winter Oounder fishery remains
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uncertain. Fishing mortality since the closure, indicates that greater restrictions may be
necessary to realistically expect a recovery. Due to a number of possible factors, such as a
transferral of greater fishing effort into open areas outside of the dosure line or even the
illegal continuance of fishing with!n Narragansett Bay, too many fish are still being
removed.424 Additionally, as noted previously, under the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries
Cooperative Management Act, the Council is legally obligated to reduce fishing mortality or
risk a moratorium. The long and acrimonious fight to manage the fishery over the past ten
years has splintered administrators into different factions~ some members of the RIDFW are
pressing for even stricter regulations while the Council seems to be divided into two
groups, one of which is guardedly optimistic that the ban may yet still succeed while the
other wants to reopen the fishery as soon as possible. The end result is that without a clear
directive, these differences are bound to lead to another prolonged round of endless
arguments, paralyzing administrators from effectively managing this fishery.
If the decision-making process is to be reformed, the state legislature should
intercede and make conservation the primary goal of management. In addition to
prioritizing the biological needs of the resource ahead of the parochial interest" of
commercial and recreational fishermen, such a measure would help to create a more
responsive management system. This would be the first step towards developing a
proactive stewardship program where administrators can pre-plan their strategies to
coordinate and organize their activities to better respond to changing conditions. Such a
measure would provide a common thread to unite the disparity of values that have hindered
the system in the past. By prioritizing what they are trying to accomplish, managers can
better evaluate choices and resolve conOicl" when they occur. Additionally, it would
provide the framework to develop a series of objectives so that decisions can be made
424Supra nok 2(j al 2.
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ba<;ed more upon objective stock. assessments rather than the shorHenn economic needs of
fishennen.
As previously discussed, under the ASMFC's Striped Ba<;s Management Plan, the
goal to "perpetuate the striped bass resource" is further defined through an objective
specifying that" [Young of Year] indices, or other measures of spawning success" be used
as a criteria to determine if this goal is being meet. The Maryland young-of-the-year index
wa<; selected because of its proven ability to account for a large percentage of the variation
in total coa<.>twide commercial striped bass landings. The 8.0 three year running average
senred as a trigger by which to gage if the strict restrictions imposed under Amendment 3
were helping to perpetuate the striped bass population. Upon meeting ,this condition,
allowable fishing mortality was increased in a gradual and cautious manner under
Amendment 4. It may be possible to implement a similar system, utilizing data from onc or
more of the local trawl sUlVcyS, to manage the winter flounder population in Narragansett
Bay.
Young-of-the-year indices or some other mcasure of prerccruitment strcngth, can
senre as an indicator of potential stock abundance. Models that can project these indices
forward in time, while accounting for appropriate growth and mortality rates, can provide a
forecast of future conditions in the fishery. With this information, managers can take
preemptive measures ,to restrict or relax fishing mortality as necessary. However, an
important first step in developing such a program is to demonstrate a relationship between
one or more of the juvenile indices and landings. A famous study by C. Bhillip Goodyear
compared commercial striped bass I'andings to the Maryland young-of-the-year index.425
Through multiple regression analysis, he established that the magnitude of the index could
account for up to 83% of the variation in annual commercial landings by comparing the
index data 2,3,4, and 5 years prior to the year of landings. Such a time lag allowed the
425See: Supra nole 30 at 92-96.
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juvenile fish to reach marketable size. As a result, he conduded that the index could be
used for "monitoring recmitment into the population and as a basis for management
decisions. "426 By conducting a similar study, it may be possible to show a statistically
significant link between prerecmitment winter flounder abundance in Narragansett Bay and
subsequent commercial catch of winter flounder off Rhode Island.
As previously discussed in chapter 3, there are several surveys conducted
individually by the URIGSO, Marine Research Incorporated, and the RlDFW that monitor
the abundance of winter flounder specifically in Narragansett Bay. Of these studies, the
time series of winter flounder abundance broken down by size (so that it can be converted
into age categories) is too recent to utilize URIGSO trawl survey and the RlDFW young-
of-the-year beach seine data.427 Of the other two surveys - the RIDFW Spring and Fall
trawl surveys and the Marine Research trawl survey in Mt. Hope Bay - the greatest
variation in landings can be explained by the data of age 0 (Young-of-the-Year) winter
Oounder in the RIDFW Fall survey.
This brief study will set out to show through a multiple regression analysis that the
abundance of age 0 winter flounder observed in the RIDFW Fall trawl survey accounts for
a large part of the variation in commercial landings of winter flounder in NMFS statistical
area 539. As discussed previously, commercial catch information is collected by the
NMFS through port agents who interview fishermen dockside. Through these interviews
they also collect location of fishing activity and effort data. To avoid any bias that may
result from annual variations in fishing effort, this anafysis will standardize catch by using
catch per unit of effort (CPUE) (recorded in kilogmms per day fished). Therefore, CPUE
and not landings will serve as the dependent variable. Winlcr flounder recorded in the
RIDFW Fall (as well as the Spring) trawl survey arc measured and subsequently
426Ibid. at 92.
427Thc LJRIGSO survey only startcd eategori7jng winter 110under into size categories on an miliual
basis starting in 1986. The RlDl',V beach seinc survey began in 1986. Consequently, the data arc too
recent to show any significant relationship.
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categorized by age. Indices are recorded by age for the mean catch per tow. The three
independent variables are the: age 0 index three years prior to the year of landings (noted as
age 3 fish ,in table 5.2); age 0 index four years prior to landings (noted as age 4 fish in table
5.2); and age 0 fish five years prior to landings (noted as age 5 fish in table 5.2). For
example, in 1983, those fish listed as age 3 were the observed age 0 fish in the 1980
survey; the age 4 fish were the age 0 fish in 1979; and the age 5 fish were the age 0 fish in
1978 (see tables 5.1 and 5.2). Age 3,4, and 5 fish were used because they constitute the
bulk of the commercial catch. Younger fish have generally been too small to market and
starting in 1985, were less than the legal size limit. Older fish are not caught in large
quantities because of high fishing mortality rates. Because the first five years of the age 1
abundance data were required to complete the first series of independent variables, the
analysis was restricted to landings from 1983-1993. These data were then subjected to
multiple regression. As noted in table 5.3, approximately 89% of the variations in reported
CPUE in statistical area 539 can be accounted for by the age 0 indices 3, 4, and 5 years
prior to the year of landings.428 This result is significant at the 95% confidence level (see
figure 5.4 and tables 5.3). Therefore, this index may serve as a means to assess future
abundance and make proactive management decisions.
Eventually, a<; a greater time series of abundance data are collected, some of the
other sunreys may prove more effective. However, for the time being, the age 0 index of
winter Oounder in the RIDFW FaU trawl survey can serve as an important component to
develop proactive strategies to steward the winter Oounder population in Narragansett Bay.
For example, through the establishment of a benchmark or trigger index of year cla<;s
strength, such as the 8.0 three year running average in Amendments 3 and 4 of the Striped
BaBS Management Plan, allowable fishing mortality can be regulated based upon
projections of future conditions in the fishery. Such a measure would be of great
428Similar analyses using data from the RIDFW Fall survey and the Marine Research Survey in
Ml. Hope Bay round Ulat respectively, they accounted ror only 55% and 51 % of the CPUE.
161
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife
Fall Trawl Survey
Narragansett Bay
Age 0 Winter Rounder
(Mean Number per tow)
34.30
16.18
0.53
9.85
10.74
1.41
1.10
2.60
4.76
0.46
0.16
0.82
0.70
1.40
5.42
0.08
Table 5.1: The ablUldance of age 0 (Young-of-the-Yem) winter f10under observed in the RIDFW Fall Trawl
Survey in Narragansett 13ay429
429Ane 0 wintcr flounder data gathered from l\'lark R Gibson, "Stock Assessment of Winter~ -
Hounder in Rhode Island 1993," page 41.
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Predicted CPUE of Winter Flounder m Statistical Area 539
Reported Predicted
Commercial Commercial
I Year CPUE Age 3 Age 4 Age 5 CPUE
1,983 1069 0.53 16.18 34.3 1067
1984 1139 9.85 0.53 16.18 1165
1985 941 10.74 9.85 0.53 1025
1986 720 1.41 10.74 9.85 675
1987 582 1.10 1.41 10.74 605
1988 550 2.60 1. 10 1.41 531
1989 906 4.76 2.60 1.10 655
1990 419 0.46 4.76 2.60 461
I
1 1991 457 0.16 0.46 4.76 448
1992 410 0.82 0.16 0.46 412
1993* 256 0.70 0.82 0.16 4051
Table 5.2: Dat.1 table of age 0 (Young-of-the-Ycar) winter Ilowldcr two, three, and four years prior to year of
reported CJ)UE (Kgs. per trawler day fished) and mUltiple regression estimation of CPUE.430
*Reportcd CPUE data for 1993 is preliminary
4301bid al 54-55.
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Multiple Regression Analysis of Age 0 Winter Flounder
R
.94 .89
I Source
Degrees
Freedom
Sum
Squares
Mean
Square F-test Probability
Regression
I Residual
Total
3
7
10
782116.02
97625.61
879741.64
260705.34
13946.52
18.69 .001
Standard
Coefficient T-Valuc Probability
.71 5.56 .0009
.13 .82 .4381
.57 3.55 .0093'
9.82
8.82
4.62
358.26
54.60
7.25
16.41
Intercept
Age3
Agc4
Age 5
I Standard
Variable Coefficient Error
'I===========:::::=========::;;::;======~
Tables 53: Multiple regression analysis of age 0 (Young-of-the-Ycar) winter flounder two, three, and four
years prior to year of reported CPUE (Kgs. per trawler day fished).43 I
431 Analysis generated from Statview II wilh Abacus Concepts, Inc., Berkeley, CA.
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Figure 5.4: Reported versus Multiple Regression estimation of CPUE of winter Hounder in NMFS
Statistical Area 539.
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assistance in precluding the endless rounds of delays that plague the present system. This
index, which would in all probability be developed by the RIDFW, could be based upon
some historical average of year class strengths when conditions in the fishery were better.
However, rather than using it as an index to relax restrictions in the fishery, it may better
serve as an indicator to provide an early warning of worsening conditions. For example,
one extremely good year class can have a have an overbearing influence upon an average
index and thereby prematurely trigger an increase in allowable fishing mortality even when
the surrounding year classes are still very p<x>r.432 Such may have been the case when
restrictions were relaxed in the Atlantic striped bass fishery based upon an exceptionally
good year class in 1989.433 Therefore this index can better serve as an early warning
signal to decrease allowable fishing mortality rather than relax restrictions in a fishery.
However, a measure of year class strength can still be utilized to increase allowable fishing
mortality as stock abundance increa'ies. As currently in usc in striped ba'is management,
the result,; of the Maryland juvenile index are plugged into a spawning stock biomass
model (based upon the Maryland Harvest Control M<xlel) which projects total recmitment
strength for each year class over its entire life span, taking into account appropriate growth
and mortality rates.434 As a result, the effects of various scenarios of fishing mortality on
total stock size can be modeled to help managers make a more informed decision. Similar
to the early warning signal, by using an historical average of total stock size when
conditions were better in the fishery, a benchmark can be developed to serve as a trigger (0
relax restrictions as warranted.
Under such a system, the power of the Council would be limited to regulating the
state's marine fisheries within some pre-established guidelines, yet it would still serve an
important function in deciding what strategies to incorporate to meet a stipulated level of
432Mark R. Gibson, Rhode Island Division of Fish and Wildlife, Personal Contact, 26 Aug.
1994.
433Ibid.
4341hid.
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fishing mortality. Additionally, it would help to bettcr infusc stock assessment data
provided by the RIDFW into the decision-making process.
Due in large part to uneontrollcd o"clfishing, timc is quickly running out for some
of the state's most important commercial and recreational marine fisheries. As noted by
Stuart O. Hale, in an historical perspective of Narragansett Bay,
Today salmon have disappeared, the numbers of alewives and shad are
greatly reduced, and squeteague are far fewer in numocr. The Bay's
menhaden fishery t1uctuates from year to year. Among the shellfish, the
oyster arc gone, scallops arc few, lobster are still in residence, soft-shell
clams can be found in diminishcd quantities. Quahaugs appear to have held
their own and have probably increased.
It is unwisc, however, to state Oatly that certain species are gone for
good or arc about to disappear. Both food stocks and predators are subject
to cyclical variations, environmental factors change, and fishing pressures
increase and decrease. Nevertheless, it would seem that in general the Bay
today provides a less varied and dependable fare for palates of those who
live along its shores.435
Unfortunately, since this assessment was originally published over a decade ago, some
things have worsened; today, the quahaug appears to oc less numerous than it once was.
Additionally, within the last several years, the tautog (not mentioned above) has similarly
declined. Therefore, now more than ever, it is imperative that the state work to protect and
consen'e the living natural resources that still inhabit the Bay.
The winter Oounder is in especially despemtc shape. Years of poor management
have jeopardized the future viability of a species that was once the most abundant fish
found in state waters. Despite relatively good natural conditions during the past two
winters, recruitment into the fishery has remained poor. It now appears that conditions are
435Stuart O. Hille, Narragansett Bay: A Friend's perspective,Rhode Island: Rhode Isl<U1d Sea
Grant, The University of Rhode Island, 1980: 77.
167
SO pcxx that the present spawning stock is incapable of rejuvenating the fishery.
Unfortunately, because this fishery docs not exist in a vacuum, rebuilding the stocks may
be more difficult than originally believed. As many traditional commercial species, such as
the yellowtail flounder, have nearly disappeared from local southern New England waters,
many fishermen continue to concentmte on the winter flounder despite its low numbers.
With so few available options, many small vessel fishermen are willingly to risk venturing
further offshore, beyond the closure line, so that they can continue to catch winter flounder
and still make a living. The state is nowat a crossroads, where it must decide if its going
to continue the status quo that is responsibte for this predicament or adopt changes that wiB
better ensure that its marine fisheries remain a viable resource for future generations to
el1Joy.
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